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Over nine experiments I investigated young children’s ability to learn the names, 
actions and functions associated with artefacts. Experiment 1 examined whether children, 
performing a referent selection task, attach a novel action to a novel referent (i.e., applied 
mutual exclusivity). Children chose the novel artefact significantly more often than chance. 
Experiments 2 and 3 used tests of comprehension and extension to investigate whether 
children fast map novel artefact names and actions.  I used a strict definition of fast mapping: 
incidental learning, minimal exposure, and long term retention.  Accuracy was above chance, 
with no significant differences between action and naming. Experiments 4, 5 and 6 created 
and refined a methodology designed to study children's ability to fast map an artefact’s 
name, action and function. Following brief incidental exposure to an artefact’s use (i.e., 
making a music box play), 3- and 5-years-olds were equally likely to fast map a novel name, 
action and function. In a more challenging task, with just one demonstration of the novel 
artefact information, 3-year-olds found action easiest to remember in a test of 
comprehension. Experiment 7 investigated 4-year olds’ production of names and actions 
after a brief exposure. Actions were produced substantially better than names.  Experiment 
8 used referent selection tasks to further test 3-year-olds’ mutually exclusive behaviour. 
Once again, performance with name, action and function did not differ. This suggests 
children believe that artefacts are associated with a specific name, action and function, and 
that these are characteristic features of an artefact category. Experiment 9 investigated 
which of these features we regard as defining category membership: 3-year-olds tend to 
categorise by shape, whereas older children (and adults) prefer function.  Overall, my data 
suggest that young children are excellent learners of artefact information, although the way 
humans categorise artefacts may change during later development.    
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As adults living in a western society we come into contact with hundreds of 
artefacts every day. An artefact is defined as any object made by humans, specifically with a 
view to its subsequent use. We rely on a plethora of different artefacts of varying 
complexity: alarm clocks, mobile phones, cutlery, pens, laptops etc. These artefacts reflect 
both our understanding for the world in which we live, and the capacities of our own bodies 
(Johnson-Frey, 2004). For children born into a western society, it is clear that there is much 
to learn about their artefact rich world. The questions are what information do children need 
to learn in order to use an artefact, how do they learn it, and how does this knowledge 
develop? 
In order to use an artefact in an artefact rich society, I suggest, children need to 
know three principal things. These are the action, the function, and the name associated 
with that artefact. 
In all cases, actions are the product of sensorimotor representation (Boncoddo, 
Dixon & Kelly, 2010; Rakison & Woodward, 2008). Of course actions need not utilize 
artefacts – for example when waving a hand or dancing.  Using an artefact usually entails the 
combination of a specific artefact with a specific action.  The artefact must be held with the 
correct grip and orientation, and then manipulated in the correct way (Johnson-Frey, 2003, 
2004). In contrast, the function of an artefact is the effect it has when used.  That is, a 
specific action-artefact combination brings about a specific change to the environment.  This 
is often a change to a specific substance or object, which is referred to here as the artefact’s 
‘substrate’.  For example, when a hammer (the artefact) is used, it is held by its handle with 
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the head on top (grip and orientation); the arm and wrist are moved in such a way (the 
artefact’s action) as to bring the head of the hammer into contact with the nail (the 
artefact’s substrate). This contact drives the nail into the surface on which it is held (the 
artefact’s function). 
Actions involving artefacts are inextricably linked to those artefacts’ functions: 
artefact, action and function are bound together.  At the most superficial level, there is an 
associative contingency between artefact-action-function, as an artefact’s function is usually 
achieved when the action and artefact co-occur (e.g., a nail is driven when the appropriate 
limb-movement is made with a hammer held in the correct way).  At a deeper level, there is 
a causal narrative, which describes how specific properties of the artefact interact with 
specific properties of the action made with it and thereby achieve its function. This narrative 
can be described in terms of everyday language (e.g., the nail is hit hard with the heavy 
hammer) or with more scientific rigor (e.g., in terms of forces or the atomic structure of 
materials involved).  Children must start by learning some information associated with an 
artefact (its action and function).  Finally, children also need to learn the artefact’s name. 
That is the phonological representation that labels the artefact. Knowing an artefact’s name 
is essential if children are to fully appreciate the more subtle aspects of some artefacts’ 
social function (e.g., money or art), or to learn more about how the artefact works (i.e., the 
more complex causal narrative). 
My thesis focuses on young children’s (3- to 5-year-olds) ability to learn these three 
pieces of essential information about an artefact. In particular, I develop a procedure to 
investigate what children learn about artefacts following a brief exposure in a ‘real world’ 
context. I investigate children’s comprehension and production of artefact information 
following this brief exposure. I also investigate how this information is utilised by children 
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when reasoning about artefacts. My research question, ‘How do young children acquire and 
apply their knowledge of artefact use?” is quite novel, although it relates to research 
described in a number of literatures.  
Much of the previous research – on referent selection and fast mapping – has 
focused on artefact naming. I have extended this historically ‘word learning’ literature to 
investigate the acquisition of knowledge about the actions and functions associated with 
artefacts. The referent selection literature recognises that the presentation of novel name 
causes children to attend to novel artefacts (Horst & Samuelson, 2008). Word learning 
principles (e.g., mutual exclusivity and whole object bias – Markman, 1987; Golinkoff, Mervis 
& Hirsch-Pasek, 1994; Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003) can be used to explain why 
children attend to novel artefacts when presented with a novel name. The Fast Mapping 
literature indicates how children learn artefact names (e.g., Markson & Bloom, 1997; 
Holland, Simpson & Riggs, 2015). 
A larger literature has investigated the development of imitative behaviour.  This 
literature offers a different perspective on artefact action and function learning (e.g., 
Simpson & Riggs, 2011a; Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister & Riggs, 2013).  In contrast, a small 
literature has begun to examine how children respond to novel artefact actions and artefact 
functions (Childers & Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Casler and 
Kelemen, 2005, 2007). The ‘extension’ literature examines which artefact features are 
deemed characteristic of the category to which an artefact belongs, and thus extendable to 
other members of that category (e.g., Deák, Ray & Pick, 2013; Childers & Tomasello, 2003; 
Waxman & Booth, 2000). Finally the ‘categorisation’ literature aims to establish which 
features are viewed as defining category membership, rather than merely being associated 
with it (e.g., Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996; Kemler Nelson, 1999).  
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It is difficult to integrate research from these different literatures, and so develop a 
coherent narrative in my thesis.  To help the reader orient themselves with respect to these 
literatures, I begin by defining the key terms used in them. After that, the next section begins 
by reviewing research from the referent selection and fast mapping literatures, as it applies 
to word learning. Fast mapping of other kinds of information is then considered. Next, a very 
brief review of imitation research is included. I discuss the similarities and differences 
between an imitation approach to minimal exposure learning about artefacts’ action and 
function, and a fast mapping approach to learning about artefacts action and function. 
Following that, I introduce categorisation literature, with particular regard to the observation 
of a shape bias in young children’s artefact categories (i.e., they tend to categorise artefacts 
by their shape). Briefly I describe two accounts to explain this bias: the Attentional Learning 
Account and the Shape-as-Cue account. A key questions is, once children have learned novel 
information about an artefact category, how does this information contribute to their 
understanding and definition of that category or future categories?  
I will return to the aforementioned literature in the relevant empirical categories. 
Nine experiments are grouped into three chapters. Chapter Two describes three 
experiments investigating whether children can engage in referent selection and then fast 
map both artefact names and artefact actions to pass tests of comprehension and extension. 
In Chapter Three, I detail a methodology designed to examine young children's ability to fast 
map an artefact’s name, action and function. Four experiments refine this methodology to 
investigate which information children find easiest to learn. Chapter Four examines 
children's ability to select and categorise of novel artefacts using name, action, function and 
shape information.  
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1.2 Key Terms 
 
 
1.2.1 Fast Mapping  
The term ‘fast mapping’ labels an experimental learning process first developed by 
Carey and Bartlett (1978). This methodology was designed to approximate a child’s everyday 
word learning experience. Unfortunately, the term fast mapping is not consistently applied. 
Researchers tend to interpret the term in slightly different ways. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I will use three key experimental features, taken from Carey and Bartlett’s original 
study, as definitive criteria. Firstly, as children are not explicitly taught every new word they 
learn in the real world, the fast mapping procedure should involve no direct teaching. 
Secondly, using their study as a guide, a fast mapping methodology involves only a single 
learning session with limited exposure to the new word. Finally, to demonstrate learning, 
retention should be tested for after a significant delay (i.e., more than just a few minutes). 
These criteria are pertinent as they allow us to study learning using a controlled, 
experimental procedure whilst simulating a natural learning environment.  
In later work, the other key study in the literature (Markson & Bloom, 1997) defines 
fast mapping in a similar way. Markson and Bloom describe fast mapping as a learning 
process through which children observe few incidental exposures and demonstrate long-
term retention. Thereafter, many researchers define fast mapping in a much less stringent 
way. That is, fast mapping is merely the process of selecting the referent for a novel word 




1.2.2 Incidental Learning  
Incidental learning describes an important methodological feature of fast mapping. 
With incidental learning, novel information is presented to the participant but not explicitly 
(i.e., so not ‘Here is some important novel information – remember it!’). The focus of fast 
mapping task is not overtly about learning this new information at all. In some previous 
studies involving incidental learning, the main focus of the child’s time with the 
experimenter is to play a game (e.g., “…children were told it was a game…” Markson & 
Bloom, 1997; p 813).  Furthermore, once the children have been exposed to the novel 
information, they should not be encouraged to learn or remember the novel information.   
  
1.2.3 Minimal Exposure  
Minimal exposure is another key feature of fast mapping. It requires experimenters 
to limit the number of presentations of the novel information to the child. In a typical fast 
mapping study children are only told the novel information between one and three times 
(e.g., Markson & Bloom, 1997; Vlach & Sandhofer 2012; Deák & Toney, 2013; Holland, 
Simpson & Riggs, 2015). Moreover, the exposure of the novel information, within the 
experimenter-child interaction, is brief. For example, in the five to 10 minutes spent with the 
experimenter, the novel information may be presented in one to three sentences – each of 
which lasts only a few seconds.  
  
1.2.4 Retention  
Retention describes the ability to store information long term:  it is the third and last 
of the features I use to define the fast mapping methodology. In a traditional fast mapping 
task, a test of retention is required to demonstrate that learning has taken place. In both 
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Carey and Bartlett’s original study (1978) and Markson and Bloom (1997), children were 
tested one week after their initial exposure to a novel word. For example, in Markson and 
Bloom’s investigation of novel artefact name learning, children were asked to select a target 
artefact, from a choice of unfamiliar items, one week after initial exposure of the novel label. 
More recently, Holland, Simpson & Riggs (2015) have stressed the importance for assessing 
retention after a long-term delay to truly understand learning processes. Although some 
developmental investigations test for retention after a much shorter delay (e.g. 5 minutes, 
Horst & Samuelson, 2008), I employ the more exacting standard used in the original fast 
mapping studies: a delay of about a week. 
  
1.2.5 Referent Selection  
The term ‘referent selection’ has been used to describe the process that allows us to 
use our understanding of familiar stimuli, to correctly select a novel target when hearing an 
unfamiliar word (Mather & Plunkett, 2012; Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Halberda, 2006; 
Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). Using Carey & Bartlett’s (1978) initial fast mapping study as 
an example: Children were shown a red and an olive colour tray, and asked to retrieve the 
‘chromium’ tray. As children already had an understanding of the colour red, they were able 
to identify that the experimenter was referring to the other tray, and that therefore this was 
the referent for the novel word ‘chromium’. In Carey & Bartlett’s study children successfully 
selected and retrieved this tray.  
  
1.2.6 Mutual Exclusivity  
Markman (1987) originally proposed the mutual exclusivity principle in relation to 
word learning: it is a process that may occur during referent selection. It describes an 
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understanding that individual categories in the world cannot receive more than one label. 
For example, if something is labelled ‘chair’ it cannot be given a second, different name. This 
principle means that a novel name cannot be applied to anything that already has a name. It 
is suggested that this principle allows children to successfully complete referent selection 
tasks (Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003). Although Markman’s initial theory dictates that 
children will reject giving objects more than one name, thus look for an unfamiliar exemplar, 
alternative theories exist suggesting children actually demonstrate a simpler bias towards 
novelty (Mervis, Golinkoff & Hirsch-Pasek, 1994).  
Despite mutual exclusivity’s initial affiliation with language acquisition researchers, 
whose theories propose domain-specific mechanisms (Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Merriman 
& Bowman, 1989), some current researchers believe that mutual exclusivity simply describes 
children’s more domain-general assumption that categories either are distinct (i.e., Riggs, 
Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015) or are at least understood to be distinct by interlocutors 
through shared understanding (Childers & Tomasello, 2003). It is thus believed that this 
behaviour will be demonstrated beyond simply names, for example children demonstrate 
mutually exclusive behaviour when selecting the referent for an artefact action (Riggs, 
Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015). 
 
1.2.7 Extension 
Extension is key to learning new words (Bloom, 2000). We would be unable to learn 
new words so quickly if we didn’t understand that once we had learned a novel word (e.g., 
chair), this label can then be extended to all other members of that category (chairs). For 
example, after children have learned a novel name for a novel artefact, in extension tasks 
they are then asked to find further examples of the same artefact category (Waxman & 
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Booth, 2000; Jaswal & Markman, 2003; Jones, Smith & Landau, 2001). If children successfully 
attach their novel name to similar items (usually the same shape, but differing in other 
features such as size, colour and/or texture – see section 1.2.10), it demonstrates that they 
understand that the word they have learned applies to all other items that belong to the 
same category as the initial item (Markson & Bloom 1997; Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Deák 
& Toney, 2013).  
 
1.2.8 Categorisation 
Categories refer to groups of items or instances that are seen as intrinsically similar 
in nature. Categorisation is the behaviour whereby we identify these group similarities 
within a variety of things, and thus form such categories (Sloutsky, 2003). When examining 
our vocabularies and our understanding of artefacts it is clear that we are able to group 
similar artefacts into categories, and that this is a necessary skill for vocabulary acquisition 
(Smith & Samuelson, 2006). Two laboratory tasks are commonly used to investigate 
categorisation. Previously mentioned extension tasks examine which artefact features 
children recognise as characteristic of an artefact category, and so allow items to be grouped 
on the basis of these features (Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Jones & 
Smith, 2002). Categorisation tasks, often in a forced-choice procedure, investigate which of 
these features is deemed definitive of the category (Landau, Smith & Jones, 1998; Kemler 
Nelson et al., 1995; Booth & Waxman, 2002). 
 
1.2.9 The Shape Bias 
The shape bias describes a preference for shape over other features when defining 
an artefact’s category (Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988, Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996). Landau, 
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Smith and Jones (1988) propose that early language acquisition teaches children to partition 
the world according to shape. They suggest that young word learners attend to shape as the 
critical factor when making decisions on how to extend and define novel nouns. Smith and 
colleagues propose the Attentional Learning Account to explain the shape bias (see section 
1.5.3 – Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe & Samuelson, 2002; Colunga & Smith, 2008). 
They suggest that as children’s vocabulary increases, they begin to attend (without 
deliberative thought), to the perceptual similarities between objects they have previously 
experienced being labelled with the same name. Once this link has been established it allows 
children to learn other object names more rapidly, via an automatic attention to shape 




Humans understand the world to be made up of natural categories (e.g., dogs, 
apples, lakes). Natural categories refer to a natural grouping reflecting the structure of the 
natural world and, arguably, not a human interpretation of it. Essentialism is a philosophical 
term suggesting that we have a naïve intuition that certain natural categories, have causally, 
deep hidden properties, known as essences. (Locke, 1960 – cited in Bloom, 2000; Kelemen & 
Carey, 2007). These essences, while we do not always know what they are, ultimately define 
our categories: thus essentialism is one way to explain human categorisation.  
Kelemen and Carey (2007) summarise theories suggesting that adults’ reason about 
artefacts in terms of their intended functions. Intended function performs the same role in 
creating artefact categories, as essences perform in considering natural kinds (Kelemen & 
Carey, 2007). Functions are not obvious when perceiving an artefact (particularly when, as is 
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usually the case, it is not being used); nevertheless artefacts can usually be categorised by 
their function. Bloom (2000) proposes that children have a similar essentialist understanding 
of artefacts. Children intuitively know that some deeper characteristic (essence) binds 
members of an artefact category together; we do not need to know what these deeper 
properties are, simply that they exist. He proposes that children possess a ‘general instinct’ 
that artefact labels reflect what the artefacts really are (i.e., their essence), not merely how 
they appear to be (Bloom, 2000). 
 
1.2.11 The Design Stance 
The design stance is another term from philosophy. It describes a conceptual 
understanding that all artefacts were created, and thus thoughtfully designed, by their 
maker (Dennett, 1987, 1990). In psychology, it has been proposed that, as adults, we 
understand that a designer has created an artefact in order to fulfil a certain purpose or 
function (Bloom, 1996; Kelemen, 2004). As such, when designed, artefacts’ physical 
properties will be specifically arranged to achieve this goal. It is this understanding that 
allows us as adults to infer an artefact’s function from its shape (Kelemen & Carey, 2007; 
Michaels, 2003; Kemler Nelson, Herron & Morris, 2002). For example, scissors imply cutting 
due to their sharp edges. Researchers are interested as to whether children demonstrate 
such an understanding and how and when it develops. Some suggest that when children are 
given detailed information regarding an artefact, and its intended function, they will use this 
to aid category formation (Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000). This theory is 
complemented by a Shape-as-Cue Account of the shape bias, which suggests children attend 
to artefact shape as a cue for its intended function (see section 1.5.4; Bloom, 2000). 
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1.3 How We Learn About Artefacts: Word Learning Research 
 
1.3.1 Word Learning Through Fast Mapping 
As anthropologists have shown (Gaskins & Paradise, 2010), and as we know through 
our own life experience, children are not explicitly taught everything they learn. A good 
example of this is vocabulary acquisition; in a lifetime the average native English speaker will 
acquire tens of thousands of words (60,000 to 100,000; Bloom, 2001), and it is estimated 
that by the age of six years children are proficient users of 6,000 to 14,000 of them (Carey, 
1978). However knowledge of these, on average, 10,000 words, does not depend upon an 
adult sitting down and overtly teaching a child each one. Instead, children have learning 
processes through which they can amass, over time, large amounts of information without 
such overt support. Exactly how children learn these words is a matter for debate. One 
school of thought suggests that word learning relies on domain-specific mechanisms 
(Markman 1989; Waxman & Booth 2000). Others go further to suggest that some domain-
specific word-learning mechanisms are automatic (Samuelson & Smith, 1998). One such 
hypothesised domain-specific and automatic learning process is called ‘fast mapping’ 
(Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Waxman & Booth, 2000). 
 The fast mapping methodology was designed to approximate a child’s everyday 
word learning experience. In Carey and Bartlett’s (1978) original, study children were given 
single exposure to a novel word as part of classroom interaction. In a referent selection task 
(section 1.2.5), the nursery teacher, pointing to two trays, and asked a child to “Bring me the 
chromium one. Not the red one, the chromium one.” This task made use of children’s ability 
to use mutual exclusivity (section 1.2.6): to recognise that the novel word must label the 
novel colour. In this instance the children heard the novel word ‘chromium’ spoken ‘as if’ 
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they already understood what the word meant. Is this not how most infants encounter the 
vast majority of the vocabulary they acquire? Through hearing the word spoken 
‘conversationally’ by a more skilled language users, and inferring its meaning through 
contextual cues (Bloom, 2000). 
Carey and Bartlett tested the children’s comprehension of new words after 10 
minutes, and after a delay of one-week. Children were asked to identify the colour chromium 
from an array of coloured stimuli. Successful retention thus demonstrated the ability to 
maintain, recall and accurately re-use information long after its initial introduction. It is clear 
that to demonstrate legitimate learning children must be tested after a substantial delay 
period. Without a delayed test for retention, it is unclear whether participants have 
established a stable name-category representation (i.e., ‘chromium’ means olive colour), or 
whether a ‘correct response’ is merely the repetition of something they have just done (i.e., 
selected the olive colour – Horst & Samuelson, 2008). 
Perhaps surprisingly, given how influential this study was for subsequent research, 
only eight of the 19 participants (47%) correctly identified the “chromium” coloured item 
during the comprehension task (chance performance = 11%). This wasn’t significantly 
different from a control group, who did not receive any preliminary training, and were simply 
shown an array of coloured items and asked the same comprehension question. Six (30%) 
managed to correctly select the target colour with no previous exposure. Nevertheless, this 
work was significant in driving further investigations of fast mapping. It provided a way for 
researchers to use a naturalistic, laboratory-based task to investigate what sort of words can 
be fast mapped. Using the same methodology, Heibeck and Markman (1987) investigated 
fast mapping of novel shape, colour and texture words, finding shape mappings the most 
reliably fast mapped after a ten-minute delay. More recently Holland, Simpson and Riggs 
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(2015), examined the fast mapping of artefact label, shape, colour and texture words in both 
the short term (after 5 minutes) and long term (after 1 week). They found that, while all 
types of word were retained in the short term, only artefact labels were retained long term, 
after a one-week delay. 
 
1.3.2 Word Learning Principles Applied in Fast Mapping 
There are many processes at work when children learn a new word through 
engagement in a fast mapping task. Initially, it is important children are able to recognise 
which attribute the newly heard word should be applied to. For children to infer a novel 
word meaning in a single session without explicit labelling, they must be making assumptions 
about what the word means. In this environment, they haven’t encountered the word in a 
sufficient range of contexts, as such, they are unable to ‘triangulate’ on the meaning. They 
must rely on their knowledge of word learning principles to guide the meaning that they 
infer.  
Markman (1987, 1989, 1990) suggested two principles are used by children when 
fast mapping new words: whole object labelling and mutual exclusivity. Markman and 
colleagues (Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Baldwin & Markman, 1989), obtained data through a 
series of experiments, consistent with two principles (or biases) that guide children’s word 
learning. First, when children are presented with a novel label for an unfamiliar object, they 
assume that the novel word labels the object as a whole – not one of its parts or 
characteristics. Markman (1990) used the example of a dog, suggesting that children 
understand that the word refers to the creature as a whole, and not simply identifying its tail 
or the colour brown or the texture furry. This principle is supported by her aforementioned 
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fast mapping data, which suggests children are more proficient at fast mapping novel shape 
words than novel colour or texture words (Heibeck & Markman, 1987).  
Markman's second word learning principle is that children attach new labels using 
mutual exclusivity. Markman suggests children understand “…that each object will have one 
and only one label.” (Markman, 1990; p. 66); a chair cannot be named a chair and also a 
pencil (1987, 1989, 1990). Thus, we cannot attach two different labels to a single object 
category; there is a one-to-one correspondence between categories and words. Naturally, as 
adults and proficient language users, we understand that within this broad constraint there 
are exceptions and different levels of categorisation. These can lead one object to have 
multiple labels (e.g., a spoon can also be labeled ‘cutlery’ and ‘teaspoon’). It is this 
understanding of mutual exclusivity that allows children to successfully complete the 
referent selection component of many fast mapping tasks. Upon seeing both a familiar and 
unfamiliar object, and hearing a novel label, children assume the novel label must attach to 
the unfamiliar object as they already have a label for the familiar one. 
So what is the difference between fast mapping of a novel word and merely 
completing a referent selection task? Simply, the difference lies in retention. A referent 
selection task can be described as an ‘on-line’ task which requires no construction of a name-
category representation, and thus no retention (Horst & Samuelson, 2008). Contrarily, fast 
mapping is a learning process, and one cannot claim learning without a demonstration that 
information has been accurately retained long term. Referring back to Carey and Bartlett’s 
methodology, it is apparent that to complete the initial referent selection task it only 
requires the participant to make a quick, selection, without having to consider anything 
further or processing at a deeper level. The children know that one tray is red, so they were 
able to complete the task by simply excluding that tray and selecting whatever was left (the 
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olive tray). In fact, referent selection did not require them to actually pay attention to the 
novel tray or its specific colour. Simply to pass the task, they can select chromium by 
exclusion - it's not the red one. 
To complete a fast mapping task children are required to retain and recall the novel 
name-category link and use it at a later date. Understanding this, fast mapping could be 
defined as the process by which we can use an on-line task to facilitate, and so pass, the off-
line task of comprehension one week later. 
 
1.3.3 Is Fast Mapping Domain Specific? 
Some language researchers believe that fast mapping is a domain-specific learning 
process unique to language acquisition (e.g. Waxman & Booth, 2000). If this were the case, 
you would expect the fast mapping of words to be a robust phenomenon. However, despite 
initial successes (Carey & Bartlett, 1987; Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Markson & Bloom, 
1997), more recent fast mapping methodologies and data are far from consistent. These 
findings are reported as fast mapping by the authors, however do not always meet my 
definitive criteria (incidental learning, minimal exposure and long-term retention). Positive 
findings include Gershkoff-Stowe and Hahn’s (2007) observation of fast mappings in 16 to 18 
month-olds, tested over a number of weeks. Spiegel and Halberda (2011) have found novel 
label retention, from single exposure, in 2-year-olds. While Jaswal and Markman (2003) 
found accurate comprehension of novel names in 3-year-olds after a two-day delay; and 
Waxman and Booth (2000) demonstrated 4-year-olds successfully retain words after a 
week’s delay.  
Negative findings are also well represented in the literature. For example, Horst and 
Samuelson (2008) found poor retention in 24 month-olds, after only a five-minute delay. 
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Furthermore, Vlach and Sandhofer (2012), followed Markson and Bloom's (1997) original 
methodology, but found that although 3 year-old children performed well in the immediate 
test, the success rates dropped considerably after one-week and one-month delays 
(dropping by nearly 50%, from approximately 70% down to roughly 20%, with chance 
performance at 17%). Even following careful reviews of the literature (Horst & Samuelson, 
2008; Holland, 2014) there does not seem to be a clear explanation for why words fast map 
sometimes, and not others. There are just too many differences in the methods used from 
one experiment to the next for a clear picture to emerge. 
If fast mapping were a domain-specific word learning mechanism, it would also 
suggest that information other than words should not be fast mapped. Some theorists 
suggest that fast mapping is part of a more domain-general learning process (Markson & 
Bloom 1997; Bloom, 2000; Childers & Tomasello, 2002 & 2003). Examining this question, 
some researchers have investigated whether fast mapping can be used to learn alternative 
information beyond words.  Markson and Bloom (1997), investigated 3 and 4-year-olds’ (and 
adults’) fast mapping of three kinds of information. Participants were introduced to a novel 
name, a linguistically presented fact (e.g., my uncle bought me this) and a visually presented 
fact (where a sticker is placed) about an artefact. All the novel information was presented in 
a game, whilst participants interacted with four familiar and six unfamiliar artefacts. They 
were tested after one of three intervals: immediately after exposure, after a one-week delay, 
or after a one-month delay.  
Markson and Bloom found that the children (and adults) were still able to recall 
name and linguistic fact even after a one-month delay. After one month, only the adults had 
managed to retain the visual fact. They suggested a number of reasons for this. Firstly, that 
perhaps the novel artefacts themselves - being unfamiliar - were simply more salient than 
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the relatively unimportant placing of a sticker. Secondly, that possibly fast mapping is only 
used when information can be extended to other category exemplars (i.e., names can be 
extended). The placing of a sticker would not be relevant to other members of a similar 
category and thus not retained under by fast mapping conditions. 
A study by Deák and Toney (2013) aimed to replicate and extend these findings. 
However, despite the authors’ defining the investigation as fast mapping (using minimal 
exposure and testing long term retention), the procedure included explicit naming. For 
example Deák and Toney explicitly told the children that they would learn about some new 
objects and they should try to remember what they learn. As such it cannot be considered 
fast mapping, under my definition (incidental learning, minimal exposure, and long term 
retention). Deák and Toney similarly tested children's ability to rapidly learn novel artefact 
names; facts using familiar language (e.g., ‘my sister gave this to me’); and facts containing a 
novel word (e.g., ‘this is from Saybu’). Additionally, they tested whether or not children were 
able to learn an association between a novel artefact and visual information (as has 
previously been tested with sticker placement tasks), but this time in the form of pictograms 
(e.g., do not enter sign). For pictogram learners, the experimenter held the artefact whilst 
pointing to a pictogram card stating, “This one goes with this”. 
Deák and Toney found that after a week’s delay, 3- and 4-year-olds were able to 
pass comprehension tests in all four conditions. Specifically, children were able to select 
target artefacts from an array of 17 familiar and unfamiliar items, for example: "Can you find 
an Oni?" (word/name condition) or "Which one is from Saybu?" (fact condition). In the 
pictogram condition, the experimenter pointed to a card and asked,  "Which one goes with 
this picture?"  
Participants were also successful in completing extension tasks. Children were 
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shown 20 artefacts; the original four novel artefacts and four additional category exemplars. 
Of the four different exemplars: one was identical (i.e., same shape, colour, and texture), 
another was the same shape but a different colour, a third was the same shape but different 
texture and colour and the final artefact was a different shape and different colour. Children 
were prompted to look at all the artefacts and then asked: "Are there any [name]s, can you 
find all the [names]s?". Once children had selected an artefact they were asked, "Are there 
anymore [name]s, or is that the last one?” Until the children replied "No", or all the artefacts 
had been selected. This was replicated for facts: "Are there any things here that [fact]?" and 
pictograms, "Are there any [picture card raised]?" In all three conditions children were able 
to extend appropriately. However, after a week’s delay, children scored higher 
comprehension, production and extension accuracy for facts (particularly those containing a 
novel word) over novel names and pictograms.  
Several other studies also report young children’s ability to learn non-verbal 
information such as melodic sequences or actions (Campbell & Namy, 2003; Childers & 
Tomasello, 2002 & 2003). However, these studies also do not meet my definition of fast 
mapping, as at least one of my three criteria (incidental learning, minimal exposure, and long 
term retention) were not met. Most commonly, as in the aforementioned Deák and Toney 
(2013) study, it was incidental learning that is missing.  
 
1.3.4 The ‘Not Quite’ Fast Mapping of Artefact Action and Function 
Similarly, there has been some research to specifically investigate children’s learning 
of artefact information for use. As noted in the first section to this thesis, to successfully use 
an artefact in an adult like fashion, we need to know the name, action and function 
associated with it. We have evidence from word learning studies that, at least sometimes, 
 21 
children are successful at fast mapping artefact names (e.g., Heibeck & Markman, 1987; 
Holland, Simpson & Riggs, 2015).  
Some research suggests that children will use a mutual exclusivity approach to 
children link a novel verb to a novel action (Merriman, Marazita & Jarvis, 1995; Merriman, 
Evey-Burkey, Marazita & Jarvis, 1996). These studies did not claim to be examining fast 
mapping (as they used explicit exposure and tested immediately) but, after brief exposure, 
children match a novel action to a novel verb. However, these were still verbal 
representations, and as such ultimately investigating language acquisition. Is it possible that 
children can also fast map action and function? There are several relevant studies worth 
considering (Childers & Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Casler and 
Kelemen 2005). Although none meet my definition of fast mapping, and indeed, the authors 
only talk about ‘learning’. 
The first to investigate children’s learning of artefact actions were Childers and 
Tomasello (2002). This study investigated how the number and frequency of exposures 
affected children's learning. Children were taught either six novel words (six nouns or six 
verbs) or six novel actions through ostensive labelling of a novel artefact. This exposure was 
then repeated under different training timetables (e.g., four exposures in one day or one 
exposure per day for four days). Although individual exposure was brief and children were 
tested after a delay period, the demonstrations were both explicit and repeated several 
times (more than one exposure session) and as such fail to meet all three fast mapping 
criteria.  
Children were tested on both comprehension and production. With comprehension, 
children were very good at recalling the target artefact in all word and action conditions. 
They accurately retained on average 2.7 out of 3 nouns, 2.4 out of 3 verbs, and 2.6 out of 3 
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actions – with no significant differences between conditions. However, with production, 
children were able to reproduce novel actions (2.08/3) significantly more than they were 
able to reproduce novel words (nouns 1.18/3, verbs 0.63/3). It was also noted by the authors 
that children in the verb condition often reproduced the manual behaviour for the verbs 
action when asked to speak the word.   
Childers and Tomasello (2002) suggest their results indicate that the cognitive 
processes children use to learn words can be applied to the acquisition of actions. They make 
two proposals. First they suggest that children strive to learn information that they are not 
able to determine by simply looking at an artefact. The action associated with using an 
artefact cannot usually be inferred directly from its appearance (especially by children with 
their limited knowledge of the physical world). Instead these actions are often learnt socially, 
through observation. A second proposition is that children strive to learn information about 
a category that is relevant across other exemplars from that category. Thus children 
understand that the action associated with an artefact will be performed with all exemplars 
of that artefact category.  
Childers and Tomasello (2003) found evidence for the extension of artefact-actions 
in a follow-up study. Adapting the method of Waxman and Booth (2000), they compared 
21/2-year-olds’ learning and extension of artefact names. Children were shown seven 
artefacts (four familiar and three novel). The experimenter picked up each artefact 
commenting on a feature of it before putting into a bucket. When referring to the target 
artefact in the word condition the experimenter said, "It's called a Koba". In the action 
condition she demonstrated an action on it (balancing it on her elbow and moving the elbow 
up and down) whilst saying, "Look what we can do with it". Although slightly less explicit 
than in the 2002 study, this still cannot be regarded as incidental exposure. 
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Once all the artefacts had been acted upon and then placed in the bucket, the 
experimenter tipped all of them back onto the table. Participants were then asked an initial 
comprehension question. This was either "Can you hand me the koba?" or "Can you pass me 
the one we do this with?" [pantomiming action]. Immediately following this, with no delay 
period, children were shown a new set of artefacts including 2 novel exemplars that were 
the same shape (but differed in size, colour or texture). They were then asked the extension 
question "Are there any other ones that are kobas?" or "Are there any more we do this 
with?" The question was repeated until children said no, or had selected all of the items. 
Naturally, with explicit exposure I would not describe this procedure as fast mapping, 
moreover, with no delay period, nor have the children demonstrated learning, only 
extension. 
Across both naming and action conditions, 12 out of 20 children selected only within 
category artefacts and 8 out of 20 selected both within category (same shape, different size / 
texture / colour) and out of category (different shape) novel exemplars. However, on 
reflection, the authors suggested that children of this age probably struggled to say no to the 
experimenter, so they then analysed only the first two responses made on the extension 
trials. Sixteen out of 20 children, in both the action and naming conditions, successfully 
identified the two-novel exemplars in their first two responses. In Childers and Tomasello's 
opinion, these two studies support the view that children can learn novel actions as easily as 
names. 
The final article, which investigates artefact-action learning, is Hahn & Gershkoff-
Stowe (2010). Citing Childers and Tomasello (2003) data as the motivation for their work, 
they aimed to replicate the previous results in young children, and see whether the same 
outcome was found with older children and adult participants. Once again this study fails to 
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meet my criteria for fast mapping as the novel artefacts were explicitly named and attention 
drawn to the action made with them. In Experiment 1, 2- and 3-year-olds were shown four 
novel artefacts, presented individually. In the naming condition, the experimenter named 
the artefacts approximately six times, and in the action condition the experimenter 
demonstrated an action six times. The children were permitted to handle the artefacts, and 
were encouraged to produce the names or actions for themselves. Immediately after the 
exposure session, children were assessed on their comprehension and production. 
In the comprehension test children were shown the four novel artefacts and asked 
to identify each one in turn. For the noun condition children were asked "Where's the 
[name]?" In the action condition the experimenter re-enacted target actions asking, "Which 
one do we do this with?" The 3-year-olds passed comprehension tests successfully in both 
the action and naming condition. The 2 year-olds found the comprehension of name slightly 
easier than the comprehension of action. In the production tasks the children were passed 
each artefact one at a time and either asked "What's this called?" or "What do we do with 
this one?" However, whilst being able to successfully reproduce the action (Mean = 85.15%), 
most children were unable to reproduce the name (Mean = 11.71%).  
Building upon this, Experiments 2 and 3 tested older participants with larger 
numbers of novel artefacts, and a second testing session the following day. Four- and 5-year-
olds were able to comprehend more names than they could produce across both sessions. 
However, the action data did not display the same production deficit. By the second session, 
a significant number of participants could successfully both comprehend and produce all 
actions, but could not produce more than half of the names. 
We know from the sheer scale of human vocabulary that children are extremely 
proficient at learning new words. Previous research suggests fast mapping is a successful 
 25 
mechanism for learning new words, particularly artefact names. Directly comparing artefact 
name and action learning, we can see that children were equally, if not more, successful at 
learning an artefacts action under these conditions. This certainly suggests that, even under 
a strict fast mapping procedure, children would be capable of fast mapping artefact action 
information.  
Casler and Kelemen (2005) investigated artefact function learning. They suggest that 
children as young as 2-years-old are able to successfully learn function information after 
minimal exposure. Participants were presented with two novel artefacts both of which 
afforded the demonstrated function. However, only one of these artefacts was used to 
achieve this function. Tested immediately after exposure, both children and adults were 
more likely to choose this target artefact when asked to achieve the demonstrated function 
(even when a different exemplar was used or selecting it required effort). Investigating 
further, participants were asked which tool they would use to achieve a different function. 
Although children chose the target artefact less often when asked to achieve this new 
function, only the adults consistently chose the other artefact (i.e., above chance). 
Despite the aforementioned studies (Childers & Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & 
Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Casler & Kelemen, 2005) not adhering to my definition of fast 
mapping, they do provide evidence that children are able to learn artefact actions and 
functions from relatively limited exposure. I consider some of the limitations of these studies 
in the Introduction to Chapters 2 and 3, when explaining the method I employ to investigate 





1.4 How We Learn About Artefacts? Imitation Research 
 
1.4.1 What Do Children Learn When They Imitate? 
Imitation research (e.g., McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2010; Simpson & Riggs, 
2011a; McGuigan & Whiten 2009) commonly investigates children’s ability to reproduce an 
action after a limited exposure. Some of this research requires children to act with a tool 
(i.e., an artefact) to achieve a goal (i.e., to achieve the artefact’s function – e.g., McGuigan, 
Makinson & Whiten, 2010; Simpson & Riggs, 2011a; McGuigan & Whiten 2009). Under 
experimental conditions, imitation research consistently finds that through observational 
learning, children are quick to imitate the actions of others (e.g., Carpenter, Call & 
Tomasello, 2005; Nielson, 2006). Imitation is recognised as “…an effective mechanism for 
novices to learn object-related skills” (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme & Bushnell, 2007; p 807). 
With participants in many studies ranging from one to five years, it would suggest that as a 
learning process, imitation starts early and develops rapidly (Brugger et. al, 2007; Call, 
Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005; Rakoczy, Tomasello & Striano, 2005).  
Imitation is generally defined as copying the actions of another. It has been 
documented that in imitation tasks, children will sometimes imitate actions regardless of 
whether these actions seem to be achieving something worthwhile. This unreflective copying 
(often called ‘over imitation’) has been demonstrated even when a task has a clear goal and 
when an action clearly has nothing to do with achieving it (Meltzoff, 1988b; Call, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2002; Horner & Whiten, 2005; Huang, Heyes & Charman, 2006; McGuigan, 
Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007).  For example, in a task in which the goal is to use a tool to 
remove a sweet from a tunnel in a box, children will imitate an action that involves 
pointlessly waggling the tool in another part of the box. The explanations behind this 
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behaviour vary. There are domain-specific accounts which suggest that children make use of 
their physical-causal knowledge (e.g., Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009) 
and social-cultural accounts, which focus more on children’s thinking about their relationship 
to the to-be-imitated demonstrator (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2012). More recent theories 
have emphasised the role of more domain-general cognitive abilities such as working 
memory (e.g., Simpson & Riggs, 2011; Subiaul & Schilder, 2014).  
Whilst these imitation studies may sometimes provide insight into children’s ability 
to learn about artefacts (including artefact action and function), it is important to note that 
these studies are not examining artefact learning. Imitation researchers usually do not focus 
on artefacts. Often the research requires the children to act upon ‘objects’ or ‘tools’ (e.g., 
Huang and Charman, 2005; Hayes, Ashford & Bennett, 2007; Leighton, Bird & Heyes, 2010), 
but these are simply as a means of created easily coded action. Whether or not these actions 
are being made with artefacts, and what children might infer about the artefacts being used, 
is largely irrelevant. Generally, imitation researchers’ interest lies in explaining why children 
perform some of the actions they observe, and not others. 
Nevertheless, imitation research often involves a specific action being performed 
with a specific artefact to achieve a specific goal - this can be inferred to represent the 
function of the artefact used (e.g., McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn and Horner, 2007; Simpson & 
Riggs, 2011; Horner and Whiten, 2005). In such experiments children are often able to 
reproduce the action to achieve the goal (function). For example, McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn 
and Horner (2007) used a puzzle box task in which children saw an experimenter use a long 
tool to retrieve a reward from the centre of a box. During the demonstration children saw 
the experimenter perform an irrelevant action (inserting the tool in the top of the box) and 
the relevant action (opening the door on the front to insert the tool) to retrieve the reward. 
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Three- and 5-year-olds, regardless of condition, all imitated the irrelevant action before 
completing the relevant actions to retrieve the reward. Thus, all the children did correctly 
demonstrate the function of the tool to retrieve the reward. Although it is unclear exactly 
what the children are learning with regards to the link between the tool, action and function, 
these results contribute further evidence that after brief exposures children are capable of 
successfully recalling actions demonstrated on an artefact. As these actions achieve a goal, 
such results can provide some support for the notion of rapid learning of function.  Although 
as the irrelevant action is produced, children’s causal understanding of the artefact’s 
function can be questioned. 
 
1.4.2 Imitation Literature Versus Fast Mapping Literature 
It is clear that comparisons can be made between the fast mapping and imitation 
literatures. However, as expected with different literature, there are many procedural 
differences between the tasks used, as well as problems with terminology and conceptual 
frameworks that overlap in an ill-defined way. Reconciling the conceptual frameworks is 
beyond the scope of this thesis – I focus on the methodologies.  
I maintain three criteria must be met for learning to qualify as fast mapping 
(incidental learning, minimal exposure, and long term retention). Of these three criteria, 
perhaps the most notable similarity between fast mapping and imitation studies, concerns 
the learning of novel artefact actions and functions following brief observation. Some 
imitation studies can be argued to involve the demonstration of an artefact‘s use under 
conditions of minimal exposure (e.g., McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; McGuigan et al., 2007). A 
brief exposure session involves the experimenter’s performing a specific action with a tool 
(artefact) to achieve a specific goal (the artefact’s function). Following brief exposure, 
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children are tested to see what information they have retained. However, one difference is 
that imitation research always tests production, to see if children can copy the actions they 
saw. In contrast, fast mapping research usually tests comprehension (only on rare occasions 
is production tested). 
Of the three criteria perhaps the most notable difference is that, unlike fast 
mapping, imitation research usually involves overt demonstrations of the novel information 
(e.g., Huang & Charman, 2005; McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2010; although there are 
exceptions, e.g., Williamson & Markson, 2006). As mentioned, children are encouraged to 
watch the experimenter performing an action to achieve a goal, and are asked to ‘have a go’ 
themselves. This is arguably not representative of how most learning occurs in early 
childhood: usually young children receive incidental exposures to the information. 
Finally, to truly demonstrate learning it is important to show retrieval of information 
after a delay period. On the whole, most imitation studies require participants to perform 
the actions they have seen immediately following the experimenter’s demonstration. A 
study by Simpson and Riggs (2011) begins to bridge the gap between the immediate testing 
of an imitation task and the delayed testing period necessary for a fast mapping approach.  
Using a puzzle box task (as previously described, used in Horner & Whiten, 2005; 
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009) 3- and 4-year-olds 
were shown a clear box with two apertures, one in the top and one in the front. Once again, 
the block could only be removed by inserting a tool into the front aperture; the top hole was 
seen by the children to not allow access to the block. The experimenter showed the children 
both an irrelevant action, followed by the relevant action. This demonstration was repeated 
three times during one exposure session.  In the control condition children were simply given 
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the apparatus to play with. Half the children were then immediately given a chance to have a 
try themselves, and the other half, five – eight days later.  
Interestingly, Simpson and Riggs found children in the immediate condition usually 
performed the irrelevant action and always followed with the relevant action. However, 
children in the delay condition rarely performed the irrelevant action, and instead simply 
performed the relevant action to achieve their goal. Although direct learning, it appears that 
children were able to successfully map both a novel action and (arguably) a function to a 
novel artefact, and retain this information for later production.  This study provides evidence 
that children can rapidly learn artefact information for use. The ability to recall and 
reproduce relevant (i.e. functional) over irrelevant actions after a delay has been 
demonstrated in infants as young as 12 and 18 months (Óturai, Kolling, Hall & Knopf, 2012). 
Although it is a step towards what we are trying to research, we cannot be clear 
exactly what the children have mapped to the artefact used in the Simpson and Riggs (2011) 
study, to be able to draw any concrete conclusions. As Simpson and Riggs recognise 
themselves, it is unclear whether the children have successfully mapped the physical 
outcome of the box (i.e. the block being removed from it), the experimenter’s goal in 
retrieving the block, the tool’s function, or simply an experimenter’s novel action. It would 
certainly be premature to conclude that children had successfully learned a relationship 
between the novel tool and the action made to produce its function. In contrast to imitation 
research, fast mapping research focuses very explicitly on the learning of a specific link 
between an individual piece of information (e.g., a word) and a particular category (e.g., a 
kind of artefact).  So for example, what is learnt in Markson and Bloom’s (1997) fast mapping 
study is a specific link between a novel word and a novel artefact. Whether or not children 
are making such links is largely ignored in imitation research.  
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1.5 What Do We Learn About Artefacts? Extension and Categorisation  
 
In essence, fast mapping studies try to understand what the imitation studies do 
not: have children successfully learned a link between a novel artefact and the novel 
information for use (artefact name, action or function)? There are a number of questions fast 
mapping researchers ask at test to establish whether or not the participant have learned this 
link. As previously mentioned, I believe, in line with Carey and Bartlett’s (1978) original 
research, that learning can only be demonstrated after a significant delay period.  
After a delay, the majority of fast mapping studies use comprehension tasks as 
standard to test for learning. At test, the children are required to select the target artefact 
from a group of objects (Markson & Bloom, 1997; Spiegel & Halberda, 2011; Vlach & 
Sandhofer, 2012). Some studies have also tested production, asking children to reproduce 
the word by asking what the target artefact is called (Carey & Bartlett, 1978, Heibeck & 
Markman, 1987; Gershkoff-Stowe, 2002; Horst & Samuelson, 2008). These data suggest 
word production is much harder than word comprehension. Extension, in contrast, offers a 
more stringent test of comprehension. It provides evidence that children have linked a word 
to category, rather than just remembered something about an event they previously 
witnessed. In addition, examining what information children extend helps us understand 
what features they believe to be characteristic of that category. 
 
1.5.1 Extension Tasks 
Within fast mapping research, an extension task allows children to show what they 
have learned in relation to an artefact category (Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Deák & Toney, 
2013). Researchers question whether children believe that the information learned is only 
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relevant to the individual target item seen during exposure, or whether it can be extended to 
other examples from the same category. Making and retaining that word-category link is at 
the heart of vocabulary growth (Horst & Samuelson, 2008). Children who form this link are 
then able to extend the use of the novel word to new exemplars of the same category.  
In an extension task children undergo minimal training to attach a novel name to a 
novel artefact. At test, children are shown some within-category examples of the artefact, 
matched for shape, but differing in colour, size or texture (see shape bias – section 1.2.9), 
and some between-category examples that do differ in shape. Children are then asked 
whether there are any other examples of the named category (Markson & Bloom, 1997; 
Waxman, 1999; Deák & Toney, 2013; Waxman & Booth, 2000). For example, Waxman and 
Booth (2000) investigated the extension of novel words and facts. The experimenter 
introduced 4-year-olds to ten items in a bucket (four familiar, six unfamiliar). She then, 
picked up the target artefact and either labelled it, “It is called a koba”, or introduced a novel 
fact about it, “My Uncle gave it to me”, and then replaced it in the bucket. Each of the 
remaining items were pulled out in turn and either named or a fact introduced. At the end of 
the training period, children were asked a comprehension question, (e.g., “Please can you 
hand me the one that is the koba?”) to ensure they had correctly mapped the target 
artefact.  
After a one-week delay, children completed three tests. In the first test the children 
were shown the original 10 items used in training, and the initial comprehension question 
was repeated. The children were then shown 13 new items: the original target artefact from 
the training set and two new exemplars of it; also two novel exemplars of each of the five 
remaining novel artefacts from the training set. The novel extension exemplars were the 
same shape as the target artefact but differed in colour, patterning, texture and size. 
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Children were presented with two extension tasks (order counterbalanced across 
participants). In the Yes/No task, children were presented each item in turn and asked, “Is 
this one a koba?” (or “Is this the one my Uncle gave me?”). In the Choice task the 
experimenter displayed all of the extension items at once asking, “Can you show me one that 
is a koba?” Once a choice had been made, the experimenter asked: “Are there any other 
ones that are kobas?” This was repeated until the child said no, or all of the 13 artefacts had 
been chosen.  
Waxman and Booth (2000) reported that even after a one-week delay, children 
were able to successfully extend the novel name correctly onto the new target exemplars 
while excluding others items. This study suggests that the children haven't just attached the 
novel word to one target item, but understood that this word was appropriate for all 
examples of the novel category. In contrast, children did not extend novel facts about in the 
same way – suggesting that extension applies to word but not verbally presented facts. 
However, there is a potential limitation of Waxman and Booth conclusion that facts are not 
extended. It may be that the kinds of fact they used do not logically extend to other category 
members (Bloom & Markson, 2001). For example, your uncle may have bought you a pen, 
but naturally that does not mean that all pens in the world have been bought by your uncle.  
In the previously mentioned (Section 1.3.3) Deák and Toney (2013) article, children 
were able to attach facts (some containing novel words) as well as labels and pictograms to 
novel artefacts. Deák and Toney’s ‘facts’ did not seem any more extendable (as per Bloom & 
Markson’s assertions) than the original Waxman and Booth’s facts (e.g., “This one came from 
Saybu” or “My sister gave me this one”). Yet, at test, children were able to extend these facts 
(using both familiar and unfamiliar language), artefact labels and non-lexical information (in 
the form of pictograms) onto new, within category exemplars. Contrary to Waxman and 
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Booth (2000), these data suggest children do sometimes extend seeming ‘un-extendable 
facts’.  
Studies examining the rapid learning of artefact function and action (Section 1.3.4) 
have also tested for extension. Childers and Tomasello (2003), following Waxman and 
Booth’s (2000) methodology, investigated the extension of words and actions in 2-year-olds. 
They found that children were able to rapidly learn novel artefact actions. Additionally, the 
children were also able to extend novel artefact actions to other within-category exemplars. 
This suggests that young children understand that an artefact’s action can be constant across 
all category members. Likewise, Casler and Kelemen (2005) observed extension during their 
test of artefact function learning. During the comprehension trials at test, participants were 
shown the target artefact and one other. They were asked which artefact they would use to 
achieve the previously demonstrated function. Both children and adults repeatedly selected 
the original test artefact. During extension trials, they selected novel within-category 
exemplars to achieve the same function.  
Overall, these studies suggest that children can extend all three types of artefact 
information for use: name, action and function. Potentially, children can see this 
information, as both intrinsic and enduring. As such, name, action and function become 
reliable features of an artefact’s category, which are consistent across all category members. 
However, although this gives us an insight into children’s understanding of an artefact’s 
characteristic features, these tasks do not necessarily demonstrate which features children 
believe define category membership. That is, we do not know which of these features must 
be true for an artefact to belong to a specific category. Categorisation tasks can do this by 
requiring children to make rapid, online decisions about category membership. 
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1.5.2 Categorisation Tasks 
Categorisation tasks are designed to investigate which features children use to 
define a novel category (Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988; Kelemen, 1999; Graham & 
Diesendruck, 2010; Deák, Ray & Pick, 2002). These categorisation tasks can involve 
judgements of a more perceptual, or conceptual nature. A task investigating perceptual 
judgement, is similar to the extension procedure describe above. Differences are that it 
requires no learning, but instead has far more trials. Landau, Smith and Jones (1988) 
investigated how 2- and 3-year-old children (and adults) categorise of a large number of 
items varying in colour, size, shape and texture. Participants were shown a novel artefact 
and told its name. This artefact was then placed in view, and participants were then either 
given a yes/no test or forced choice test of further items. In the yes/no procedure, 
participants were shown seven test items, one by one, and asked, “Is this a Dax?” In the 
forced choice procedure, participants were shown pairs of artefacts and asked, “Which of 
these is a Dax?” This allowed researchers to gauge how the different features were ranked 
relative to one another. Landau, Smith and Jones found that of these features (colour, size, 
shape and texture), children and adults were biased towards shape. Moreover, this appeared 
to increase in strength between the ages of 2- and 3-years-old. 
A more conceptual investigation examines how children respond to artefacts that 
perform the same function, but have different shapes. When learning new artefact labels, 
should the label extend to other artefacts of the same shape or those that perform the same 
function? The argument surrounding this research question, and how children learn to 
extend artefact names, began in the 1970’s. Historically, Clark (1973) proposed that, when 
naming novel artefacts, children attend to shape. Nelson (1973) put forth the opposing view, 
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that children’s initial word meanings are predominantly based on dynamic, functional 
information. 
In one of the first studies to examine this, Gentner (1978) tested children from 2½-
years-old up to adults with two different artefacts: a ‘jiggy’, which made funny faces when a 
lever was depressed; and a ‘zimbo’, which dispensed jellybeans when a similar action was 
performed. The artefacts looked different, and performed different functions, but the action 
was the same. They were shown a third item which had the outward appearance of a jiggy, 
but instead of changing faces, it dispensed jellybeans like a zimbo. Participants were then 
asked what this third object was called. Children from 2½ to 5 years tended to categorise by 
shape. Children from 5 to 15 years preferred function. Many adults attempted to give it a 
hybrid name, such as ‘jiggy-zimbo’, but when pushed, were more likely to respond based on 
shape- this adult finding has not been replicated in subsequent categorisation research with 
adults (e.g., Diesendruck, Hammer & Catz, 2003).  
Studies such as Gentner (1978) and Landau at al. (1988) provided the first evidence 
for a shape bias. This shape bias can be described as young children’s preference to 
categorise novel artefacts by their shape. This is largely well established and robust finding in 
the literature (Graham & Diesendruck, 2010; Deák, Ray & Pick, 2002; Graham, Williams & 
Huber, 1999; Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988). Two main theories have been proposed to 
explain the shape bias (for reviews see Keil, 2008; Elman, 2008). This has continued for the 
last 40 years, remaining largely unresolved today. I am not claiming to do so now, I will 





1.5.3 Attentional Learning Account (ALA) 
Smith and colleagues propose an Attentional Learning Account (ALA) of the shape 
bias (Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996; Landau, Smith & Jones, 1998; Samuelson & Smith, 1999; 
Smith, Jones, Yoshida & Colunga, 2003). The ALA describes learning mechanisms, which 
come into play at around two years of age, when children begin a ‘vocabulary spurt’. It is 
during this second year that the shape bias is said to develop. Smith and Samuelson (2006), 
make three main claims. First, a child’s learning environment presents correlations between 
object properties and object categories. Young children are exposed to many count nouns, 
often regularly repeated (e.g., ball, cup or chair). Children learn that these nouns tend to 
refer to rigid, solid things. Smith and colleagues (Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe & 
Samuelson, 2002) describe this as the first step in a four-step model, which demonstrates 
how children learn object names (and thus more specifically, artefact names), and proposes 
a name-shape correspondence that is bi-directionally and causally related. This learning of 
individual artefact names sets up step two. Children then begin to understand that the same 
noun tends to refer to artefacts of the same shape (Samuelson & Smith, 1999; Jones & 
Smith, 2002; Colunga & Smith, 2005). For example cups are cup-shaped and balls are round. 
This second step is described as a first-order generalisation (Smith et al., 2002). 
Step three describes a second-order generalisation, that artefact names generally 
label categories of similar shaped things. This is the ALA’s second claim, that when learning a 
name for a novel artefact, this understanding begins to direct children’s attention towards 
shape. As children attend to shape more regularly, they begin to infer that an artefact’s 
shape determines its name. Thus, artefact names denote an association between words and 
perceptual features. The third claim, and final step of higher-order generalisation, is that as 
this association grows, children are able to use this as an automatic and non-strategic 
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mechanism to allow them to categorise novel artefacts by their shape. Past learning, 
activated by contextual cues, directs attention to just the right property (shape) and as such 
children can now rapidly learn and extend the name for novel artefacts and their categories 
(Smith & Samuelson, 2006). 
Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe and Samuelson (2002), gave 17-month-olds 
seven weeks of training during play sessions. During this play, infants were introduced to a 
novel artefact, which was given a novel name. A second item was also introduced, that was 
the same shape but differed in colour, size or texture – and was also labelled with the novel 
name. A third item was introduced, which differed in shape but matched either the colour or 
texture of one of the target artefacts, but the experimenter dismissed this as not a [novel 
name]. After eight weeks, children were shown an original target artefact, labelled with its 
novel name, and then asked to pick another from a choice of three further items. One 
matched in shape, one matched in colour, and one in texture. Children extended the novel 
name via shape 88% of the time. In week 9, children were tested with new exemplars and 
new names, and continued to extend these novel name using shape 70% of the time. Finally, 
parents completed vocabulary checklists on week 1 and week 8. Children in this training 
condition showed a greater increase in their productive vocabularies than a control group.  
Smith and colleagues (2002) proposed these data support an ALA because, they 
suggest, the more children learn about the association between artefact names and shapes, 
the more automatic this learning becomes. After training children to attend to shape, not 
only did it encourage them to attend to shape when extending novel names in a laboratory 
environment, but it also dramatically increased their learning of artefact names in their 
everyday lives. As the association between names and shapes develops the learning 
mechanism becomes more automatic, allowing young children to successfully learn more 
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object names, and to successfully extend this across same shape categories. Supporters of an 
ALA believe that the shape bias is specific to language acquisition, and more specifically still, 
to artefact naming (Jones, Smith & Landau, 1991).  
The ALA also proposed that, due to a core mechanism providing top-down control 
of attention, more conceptual information (e.g. artefact function), has little to no effect 
when naming artefacts. Furthermore, ALA suggests that when put in direct conflict with one 
another, children categorise by shape and will ignore other characteristics such as size, 
colour, texture and function. ALA proponents cite a variety of studies that suggest that 
children categorise by shape while adults categorise by function (e.g., Smith, Jones & Landau, 
1996; Landau, Smith & Jones, 1997; Graham, Williams and Huber, 1999).  
 
1.5.4 Shape-as-Cue Account (SCA) 
An opposing theory to the ALA, proposes that category formation and learning 
about artefact kinds is a much more conceptual process (Bloom, 2000; Ware & Booth, 
2010). The Shape-as-Cue Account (SCA) suggests that shape cues artefact categories, 
because artefacts with the same function usually have the same shape. Like ALA theorists, 
they think children use shape to determine the category to which an artefact belongs, BUT 
only because shape reflects function. When discussing children’s categorisation of artefacts, 
Bloom (2000) argues that we should not simplify the debate as perception versus 
conception; it is not simply a matter of shape versus function. Taking inspiration from 
philosophical theories of essentialism (Locke, 1960), Bloom (2000) describes the SCA as a 
theory which suggests children categorise artefacts by shape because it cues the functional 
intentions of the artefact’s designer: its essential reason for being created.  
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For real–world artefacts, the relationship between their appearance and their 
intended functional is often transparent. Literature discussing functional understanding 
often speaks of affordances, where the physical shape of an artefact gives clues to its 
functional capabilities (Michaels, 2003; Symes, Ellis & Tucker, 2007). With regards to 
categorisation of artefacts, Bloom (2000) uses the example of a chair to illustrate that when 
labelling a chair we do not simply judge that it looks like other chairs we have experienced. 
More precisely, we evaluate whether it appears to have been created with the same 
intentions as other chairs we have experienced.  
Numerous studies have suggested that children regard function as central to an 
artefact’s identity. Evidence is striking, even in young children. Studies, particularly by 
Kemler Nelson and colleagues (Kemler Nelson & Students, 1995; Kemler Nelson, 
Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000; Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000), indicate that 
when functions are clear and plausible, even 2-years-olds will categorise by function rather 
than shape.  There is also evidence to suggest that children can categorise artefacts by the 
designer’s original intended function, rather than by their current use (Kelemen, 1999; 
Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003; Jaswal, 2006; Defeyter, Hearing & German, 2009). 
Furthermore, children demonstrate an understanding that a broken artefact, which is 
functionally impaired, still belongs in the same category – presumably because its intended 
function is unchanged (Kemler Nelson, Herron & Morris, 2002; Kemler Nelson, Holt & Egan, 
2004). 
Ware and Booth (2010) suggest that, for children, learning function information 
facilitates categorisation by shape. Also proposing a stepwise process, they provide a more 
conceptual description of how intended function and the shape bias are related. Firstly, 
children’s direct experiences with artefact functions allow them to distinguish artefact 
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categories. Ware and Booth (2010) use the example of spoons and forks. The labels ‘spoon’ 
and ‘fork’ describe two similar artefacts (e.g., similar overall shape, material, and action). 
However spoons are used for mashed or liquid food, whereas forks are for eating solid foods. 
Next, this attention to function allows children to notice functionally relevant properties (i.e. 
a spoon has a concave head for holding liquid, whereas a fork has tines for securing solids). 
This attention to these functional features allows them to identify the relevant shapes 
associated with these properties, thus enabling identification and extension to new category 
members. Finally, this repeated recognition that ‘shape denotes function’ lead to a general 
assumption that shape is a useful cue when organizing artefact categories. Shape is 
particularly useful, when more reliable, but perhaps more subtle properties, are not 
immediately clear. 
Ware and Booth (2010) tested this theory, replicating Smith et al. (2002), except 
that children were trained to attend to function, rather than shape. During training sessions, 
17-month-olds were given extensive experience of four pairs of similarly shaped artefacts 
performing the same function (a control group were also given the artefacts to play with, but 
did not have their functions demonstrated). As with Smith et al. (2002), a third artefact was 
introduced; differing in shape, but matching either the colour or texture of one of the test 
artefacts. The experimenter commented that this artefact could not perform the same 
function as the other two, “Oh look! I can’t do that with this one”, and put it away. When 
tested on the trained-artefacts children in both the functional-training and control groups 
categorised by shape.  
In a further test, children were shown four new artefacts: a target artefact, a shape 
match, a colour match, and a texture match. Participants did not observe the function of any 
of these new artefacts. Children were then asked to select one of the three artefacts to 
 42 
match the target. The functional-training group selected the shape-matched artefacts 
significantly more often than the control group (who performed no different to chance). 
These data suggest that children had learned the importance of shape during the functional-
training, leading them to categorise the new artefacts by shape. Booth and Ware (2010) 
concluded that these data corroborate the SCA: they suggest that learning about function 
promotes the understanding that shape is a reliable cue to category membership.  
The SCA is compatible with the proposal that young children adopt the design 
stance. The design stance suggests children understand that artefacts are intentionally 
created with a particular purpose in mind (Dennett, 1987; German & Johnson, 2002). They 
may also understand that their shape is the product of intentional design. As with an ALA, 
researchers supporting a SCA believe that children’s level of understanding improves with 
age. However, this is because although children are able to grasp some threads of a design 
stance (e.g., artefacts intentionally created by humans, or can be categorised by functions 
rather than appearance), they have not yet fully understood that each artefact is ‘made 
intentionally for this singular purpose’ (German & Johnson, 2002).  
This explains why ALA researchers, when placing shape and function in conflict, can 
find evidence of children using shape to categorise novel artefacts (Smith, Jones & Landau, 
1996; Graham, Williams & Huber, 1999). Firstly, proponents of SCA claim that ALA studies 
use poor examples of function in their experiments. When the function is unclear, or more 
specifically when the relationship between the function and its perceptual properties are 
unclear, it forces participants to revert back to shape-as-cue for categorisation. This is 
exacerbated in younger children whose understanding of design is still ‘shaky’. The SCA 
clearly recognises the importance of shape to category membership. However, the account 
proposes that when placed in conflict, if the function information is clear, it can override 
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shape as the defining feature of category membership (Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & 
Jones, 2000; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000, Kemler Nelson, 1999). 
Finally, in opposition to ALA claims, the SCA proposes that shape can be a category 
cue either when an artefact is named or simply when asked to categorise it. A feature of the 
SCA is that a shape bias is not specific to verbal labelling (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003). 
Diesendruck and Bloom (2003) asked children to select within-category exemplars from a 
group of novel artefacts to match a novel target. In the naming condition children were 
asked, “Which one of these is also a patoo?” In the kind condition, children were asked, 
“Which one of these is the same kind [pointing to a novel target]?”; in the goes-with 
condition children were asked, “Which one of these goes with this [the target]?”  
Diesendruck and Bloom found no differences between the three conditions. According to a 
SCA interpretation, this is because shape is a cue to an artefact’s function, not its name.  
 
1.5.5 The On-going Debate: ALA versus SCA 
As one might expect when two conflicting and, as of yet, largely unreconciled 
theories dominate in a literature, the precise details of the tasks used become critical. When 
examining shape versus function categorisation in forced choice tasks, ALA supporters report 
that young children (2- to 4-year-olds) categorise artefacts based on shape (Gentner, 1978; 
Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996). These results can seem definitive, as even when children are 
given lots of function information, they still categorise by shape (e.g., Graham, Williams & 
Huber, 1999). Often SCA supporters contend that the function information was not 
sufficiently clear (e.g., Kemler Nelson et al., 1995; Kemler Nelson, 1999). Consistent with this, 
there are studies which suggest that, when functions are sufficiently clear, and there is no 
time pressure to answer, children categorise artefacts based on function not shape (Kemler 
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Nelson et al. 1995, Kemler Nelson 1999, Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000; Kemler 
Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000). More recently, Booth, Schuler and Zajicek (2010) 
report that artefact function information facilitates early categorisation in infants as young 
as 16-months-old.  
Although there is debate regarding children’s early categorisation, researchers do 
agree that older children (5- to 7- years-olds) rely increasingly on function, and are more 
adult like in their categorisation of artefacts. For example Diesendruck, Hammer and Catz 
(2003) examined how children and adults map categorical similarities in novel artefacts. 
Children were presented with a computer generated target artefact, and then shown a 
further 10 images. The level of physical or functional similarity varied, to see at what point 
children (and adults) would reject further exemplars as no longer belonging to the same 
category as the target. Diesendruck et al. (2003) found the 4- to 5-year-olds used both shape 
and function similarity, rejecting exemplars with either a high physical or high functional 
dissimilarity. Whereas, adults focused more clearly on function (Diesendruck, Hammer & 
Catz, 2003; Hammer & Diesendruck, 2005).   
Functional fixedness literature is also consistent with children’s increasing 
recognition of the importance of function to artefact categorisation. Using problem-solving 
tasks requiring children to inhibit a familiar function to achieve a new goal, Defeyter and 
German (2003) indicate that children’s concrete functional one-to-one correspondence isn’t 
fully developed until approximately 7-years-old. This will be discussed more in Chapter 4. 
The conflict between ALA and SCA theorists is on-going (Cantrell & Smith, 2013; 
Augustine, Smith & Jones, 2011; Booth, 2014; Kemler Nelson, O’Neill & Asher, 2008; Ware & 
Booth, 2010). Both sides of the debate seem unwilling to recognise the possible significance 
of the findings of the other. Or, perhaps more frustratingly, just re-interpret the results in a 
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fashion that then supports their own argument (e.g., Smith & Samuelson, 2006). I shall not 
be ‘taking sides’ in this debate, however in Chapter Four I suggest that the role of action in 
categorisation has previously been overlooked, and investigate the relative importance of 
action, function and shape in artefact categorisation.  
 
1.5.6 Differences Between Extension and Categorisation Tasks  
Although extension is linked to categorisation, it is important to remember that 
categorisation and extension studies are actually asking different questions. As such, they 
give us slightly different insights to what children understand about artefacts. 
Delayed extension tasks test learning about artefact features. They test which information 
children remember as being consistent with belonging to a previously encountered artefact 
kind. For example, if children extend by artefact action, we can conclude that, for them, 
action is a memorable marker of category membership. The target and new exemplar are 
usually similar in appearance. They have the same shape and only differ in ways that humans 
of all ages often regard as trivial – that is they are a slightly different size, or different colour 
or have a different texture. Thus the level of conflict between features (e.g., shape versus 
size) is small. 
In contrast, categorisation tasks tend to require more theoretical judgements under 
greater conflict. After all, these tasks try to determine what feature defines category 
membership. Usually, in a forced choice procedure, participants are asked to make an 
immediate, online decision regarding which test artefacts are the same as the target. 
Children are asked to make an immediate judgement of which one of two conflicting 
characteristics determines category membership. In these situations we are asking a tougher 
question: perhaps the most fundamental question about category membership. What 
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defines a category: what makes a spoon a spoon? Categorisation tasks often put into conflict 
two features that we know can be used as markers of category membership (e.g., shape and 
function, Gentner, 1978; Graham, Williams & Huber, 1999; Landau, Smith & Jones, 1996; 
Kemler Nelson, 1999) or even previous function and current function, Asher & Kemler 
Nelson, 2008; Chaigneau, Castillo & Martinez, 2008; Diesendruck, Markson & Bloom, 2003). 
As a result, there is no easy answer.  
 
1.6 This Thesis 
 
I have defined the information required to successfully use an artefact: its name 
(verbal label), its action (the way it is held and manipulated) and its function (the outcome of 
the action performed with it on a substrate to create change or achieve a goal). There is 
currently limited research on how children learn action and function, and whether the same 
processes that underpin the acquisition of artefact names are used to learn artefact action 
and function as well. In the real world, I assume that children are not overtly taught about 
most of the artefacts they encounter. Children are simply ‘around’ when others (usually 
adults) are using artefacts. In order to learn the names, action and functions associated with 
them, they must acquire this knowledge from their casual observation of artefacts being 
used and talked about. 
Fast mapping seems the ideal cognitive process for learning artefact information.  
According to the original stringent definition I use, it requires brief exposure, no explicit 
teaching, and leads to a long lasting memory. While previous studies have investigated the 
learning of artefact action and function (Childers and Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & 
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Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Casler & Kelemen, 2005, 2007), none have met this stringent 
definition.   
With regards to empirical observations of incidental learning of artefact information 
for use, there are examples of the different elements being learned separately. There are 
word-learning studies demonstrating children’s ability to learn a novel artefacts name using 
a real world, fast mapping approach to learning (Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Markson & 
Bloom, 1997; Waxman & Booth, 2000; Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Deák & Toney, 2013). A few 
studies have examined the rapid learning and retention of artefact action (Childers & 
Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010). A couple have investigated rapid 
learning of function (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Casler 2014). Childers and Tomasello (2002, 
2003) and Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) report that children can rapidly learn a novel 
artefact’s action. However, the demonstrations in these studies were both purposeful and 
overt. Casler and Kelemen (2005) demonstrated children’s rapid learning of artefacts 
function, however did not test if this information was retained after a delay. Alongside these 
articles, imitation studies (e.g., Simpson & Riggs, 2011) also find that children are able to 
rapidly learn and demonstrate retention of novel artefact action (and perhaps function) – 
but again, following overt demonstration. 
Combined, these studies suggest that children may be capable of learning artefact 
action and function using a stringent fast mapping methodology. As of yet, no single study 
has produced a methodology using all three factors simultaneously (brief, incidental, long 
term). This is what I aimed to do in six experiments of Chapters Two and Three. 
Finally, I have discussed categorisation, and the conflicting theories used to explain 
the presence of a shape bias in children. The ALA (proposed by Smith & colleagues: 1988, 
1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008) suggests that early noun learning teaches children to 
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attend to shape when categorising novel artefacts. An artefact’s shape and name are 
associated. This attention to shape develops into an automatic mechanism, which allows 
children to learn new artefact names and create new categories (Smith et al., 2002). The SCA 
argues that children attend to shape as it is proven to be a relevant cue for an artefact’s 
function. In this account an artefact’s function defines its name, but its shape is a reliable 
marker of that function. This account suggests that we categorise artefacts by function, but 
when obvious functional information isn’t available, children will rely on shape (Bloom, 2000; 
Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003; Kemler Nelson & colleagues, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004). In 
Chapter Four I test whether children and adults use function or shape to make category 
judgements using a procedure developed in Chapter Three.   
 
The Next Chapter  
The next chapter describes Experiments 1 to 3. Experiment 1 compares children’s 
referent selection when hearing a novel word or seeing a novel action. Experiment 2 
employs a stringent fast mapping methodology (incidental learning, minimal exposure, long 
term retention) to directly compare artefact action and word learning. Furthermore, 
Experiment 2 examines whether children extend artefact actions and words to novel 
exemplars. Experiment 3 investigated the specificity of the action mapped. Exposure was 
identical to that in Experiment 2, however at test, children were shown a new action.  All the 
data are consistent with the proposal that children map action to artefacts in the same way 










Parallels in the Cognitive Processes that Map 
Names and Actions to Artefacts 
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It is important to understand proposals for real-world word learning, before we are 
able to examine real-world learning of artefact information for use. Gentner (1983) noted 
that in many different languages, artefact names were the most common type of word found 
in early infant vocabularies (re-examined and confirmed by Mervis, 1990). As an artefact’s 
name is one of three key components for information for use, is it possible that children are 
able to use the same learning processes to learn an artefact’s action and function? Having 
touched upon some assumptions of word learning in Chapter One, I will discuss them in 
more detail here, suggesting how these processes could apply to artefact action learning.  
 
2.1.1 Principles of Word Learning 
As previously noted, children are able to learn huge numbers of words without 
direct teaching. Before children reach 12-months-old they have often begun acquiring the 
names of commonplace artefacts (Bergelson & Swingley, 2013). There are a number of 
explanations as to how this rapid word learning is possible. One school of thought is that 
language has its own unique, domain specific, learning processes. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
Markman (1990) proposed a number of word learning assumptions including whole object 
bias and a mutual exclusivity principle. In another key article, Golinkoff, Mervis and Hirsh-
Pasek (1994) define a series of domain-specific lexical principles used to label artefacts. They 
propose two tiers in the development of six principles, which children use to learn novel 
words. I will briefly explain the three principles I feel are specifically relevant when 
considering how children learn artefact information for use. Firstly, in the lower tier and thus 
an earlier developing principle, Object Scope. Golinkoff and colleagues (Golinkoff et al., 
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1994) ‘object scope’ principle suggests, much like Markman's whole object bias, that novel 
words are assumed to refer to whole objects, and not one of its parts or attributes. This 
whole object principle is proposed by many researchers, and so is widely supported 
(McNamara, 1982; Mervis, 1987; Markman and Wachtel, 1988; Gleitman, 1990; as cited in 
Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994).  
The second principle of interest, as detailed in Golinkoff, Mervis and Hirsh-Pasek 
(1994), was first proposed by Mervis and Bertrand (1993): the Novel Name-Nameless 
Category Principle (N3C). The N3C principle suggests that children will automatically attach a 
novel term to a novel, whole object that does not already have a known name. It posits that 
upon hearing a novel name, we actively seek out a novel object to be its referent. As noted in 
Chapter 1, this type of novelty bias allows children to successfully complete referent 
selection tasks, which can underpin successful fast mapping. Referring back to Markman's 
Mutual Exclusivity Principle, we can see there are many similarities, but one primary 
difference. Mutual Exclusivity also claims that young children assume that an object can only 
have one name. The Mutual Exclusivity principle proposes that children will map a novel 
label to a previously unknown and unlabelled object, as they will actively avoid attaching a 
second label to the already familiar object. Thus the Mutual Exclusivity Principle suggests an 
active evasion of familiar objects. Although the outcome is the same (novel label attaches to 
novel object) the N3C principle posits an active preference for unfamiliar objects, rather than 
an avoidance of familiar ones. 
A further explanation has since been suggested to explain why we attach a novel 
label to an unfamiliar object that reflects pragmatic, social cues (Diesendruck & Markson, 
2001). When children are faced with a comb and a novel artefact, if the experimenter asks 
for the ‘dax’ the children reason, ‘If you had meant for me to give you the comb, you would 
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have asked for the comb, as you did not, I must assume you are referring to the unfamiliar 
artefact’. Here I make no claims about which theory offers the best explanation of the 
observed behaviour (i.e., selecting a novel artefact in response to a novel name). I merely 
point out that this simple phenomenon is commonplace and can be explained in a variety of 
different ways. Also, if the observation that this phenomenon extends beyond words (to 
artefact actions) it would provide evidence that domain-specific theories should be 
abandoned. 
The final, potentially important principle from Golinkoff et al.'s (1994) proposal is 
labelled ‘categorical scope’ (also called ‘taxonomic bias’). Relevant when discussing artefact 
information for use (name, action and function) as categorical features of an artefact, this 
principle suggests that children will extend a novel artefact name to other artefacts they 
deem to belong to the same category. Children seem able to categorise artefacts using a 
number of different features including shape and function (which we will return to in 
Chapter 4). The important point here is that children will rapidly categorise artefacts using 
appropriate kinds of novel information: it simply needs to be established whether action and 
function appropriate kinds of information when categorising artefacts.  
 
2.1.2 Fast Mapping and Domain Specificity 
There are a number of studies that have aimed to replicate and further investigate 
Carey and Bartlett’s (1978) original fast mapping methodology (e.g., Horst & Samuelson, 
2008; Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012). Carey & Bartlett's methodology was specifically designed to 
investigate real-world word learning in a controlled environment. In traditional fast mapping 
studies, children inferred a novel word-artefact mapping in a referent selection task. To 
successfully complete any of these tasks, we can speculate that a number of the 
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aforementioned learning principles were in place. Domain-specific theorists propose that 
these principles are unique to word learning. Moreover, that it is these domain-specific 
processes, which make us such proficient word learners at such a young age. To be such 
skilled word learners, researchers suggest that something specific to language acquisition 
must be driving learning (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002). If fast mapping were specific to 
word learning, then it follows it would only be used for learning novel words. 
Aiming to investigate whether these principles were specific to word learning, 
Waxman and Booth (2000) studied the extension of artefact names and linguistically 
presented facts. Although children were required to map the novel information in a rapid 
learning environment, and children were tested after a delay period, exposure was explicit. 
As such, although often cited as a fast mapping study, this methodology does not meet my 
criteria outlined in Chapter 1 for a stringent fast mapping procedure (incidental learning, 
minimal exposure, and long term retention). 
 Children were shown 10 artefacts (four familiar and six unfamiliar), one at a time, 
and exposed to a novel name-artefact mapping or a novel fact-artefact mapping. The target 
artefact was either labelled "It is called a Koba" or the children were told a fact "My uncle 
gave this to me". Children were tested on the extension of this information either 
immediately or one week later. They were then shown the target and a 12 new items (two 
novel exemplars of each of the unfamiliar items seen during exposure). Children extended 
the novel names to the novel exemplars in the word condition, but did not extend the novel 
facts in the fact condition.  
In their discussion, Waxman and Booth argued that the results suggest that 
different learning mechanisms are used when learning words than when learning facts. They 
hypothesise that children in the word learning condition rely on a dedicated, domain-specific 
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word learning mechanism allowing them to categorise and extend the novel name; this 
mechanism is not engaged when learning novel facts. They further proposed that arguments 
against domain-specificity hypothesis were "premature" (Waxman & Booth, 2000). 
However, there is growing body of research that suggests word learning may not be 
as domain specific as initially believed. The principle criticism of Waxman and Booth's (2000) 
conclusions is that facts like 'my uncle gave me this' are obviously not extendable (Bloom & 
Markson, 2001). A number of researchers argue against a domain-specific mechanism and 
propose that it is just one example of a more domain-general phenomenon (e.g., Bloom & 
Markson, 2001; Childers & Tomasello, 2003). Another approach suggests that, at least the 
referent selection component of fast mapping relies on an understanding of social cues 
(Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Grassmann, Stracke & Tomasello, 2009).  
 
2.1.3 Domain General Approach to Fast Mapping 
Childers and Tomasello (2003) aimed to investigate extension of artefact 
information as a direct comparison to Waxman and Booth (2000). Highlighting the criticism 
that the facts used were not logically extendable to other within-category members, Childers 
and Tomasello discuss non-linguistic behaviours that might be expected to extend in a 
manner similar to words, and chose to compare artefact name and artefact action learning. 
They suggest that children typically learn how to use novel artefacts by watching adults 
interact with them. They proposed that should children extend both the novel words and 
novel actions in the same way, this would suggest that word learning is part of greater, more 
domain-general learning mechanism. This is exactly what they found, following the training 
methodology (and even using the same artefacts) as Waxman and Booth (2000), their results 
indicated that 21/2-year-old children extend artefact actions as readily as names. 
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More recently, and also in contrast to Waxman and Booth's analysis, Deák and 
Toney (2013) obtained evidence consistent with word learning tapping domain general 
processes.  In their research, once again following a similar methodology, they claim that 
children were able to fast map novel words, facts and pictograms. Moreover, they 
successfully extended this information to novel exemplars of the same category. Although 
the authors claim fast mapping results, once again this methodology did not meet the fast 
mapping criteria, as exposure was focused and explicit. 
In a series of three experiments, children were taught four artefact-name mappings, 
artefact-fact mappings or artefact-pictogram mappings during an exposure to a series of 13 
familiar and four novel items. The children were tested on comprehension, production and 
generalisation (extension). They found that children retained facts containing novel words 
(e.g. this came from Saybu) faster than the words themselves (e.g. this is a Saybu). Also 3- 
and 4-year-old children extended novel names, facts and pictograms equally. They 
hypothesise that rather than the word learning processes, it is the developing lexicon itself 
that is unique, because of how large and complex it gets. They conclude that fast mapping is 
a general learning process and indeed word learning is part of a greater general learning 
mechanism. 
As noted in Chapter 1, none of these studies meet my definition for fast mapping 
(brief exposure, no explicit teaching, leads to a long lasting memory).  Deák and Toney (2013) 
describe fast mapping as ‘one trial learning’. Although children were given very brief training, 
it was explicit – children were explicitly told that they would learn about some new objects 
and they should try to remember what they learn. Childers and Tomasello (2003) were a 
little less explicit, the children were not told that they were learning anything or to try to 
remember it but (as with Waxman and Booths original study), it lacked the implicit nature of 
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the referent selection task. All items, familiar and unfamiliar, were introduced with equal 
vigour, for example, "Look at this, this one is so special to me. And you know what? It's called 
a koba". In this way naming was absolutely explicit, rather than being introduced implicitly 
through lexical contrast (e.g., “…bring me the koba, not the comb, the koba…).  
A further limitation is that children were only tested in an immediate condition: so 
no long term retention was demonstrated. Childers and Tomasello (2003) only tested 
children immediately after the training session. Only Deák and Toney's (2013) third 
experiment introduced a one-week delay (and then without extension). Moreover, children 
were tested immediately after training (with feedback) and again a week later. One could 
argue that feedback actually provided a further exposure session.  
While the previous research provides evidence consistent with the fast mapping of 
artefact actions, it does not demonstrate it. In my first three experiments I sought to 
demonstrate that actions could be fast mapped. In Experiment 1, I undertook an 
investigation into whether young children use a novel action to referently select a novel 
artefact. Children were not told that the action demonstrated by the experimenter was the 
action related to the artefact’s use. Experiment 2, went on to examine whether after a brief 
exposure, children can retain and extend this information: that is whether actions could be 
fast mapped. Experiment 3 investigated whether children had simply remembered that a 
novel action had been performed on the novel artefact, or whether they retained the specific 
novel action performed by the experimenter. Should the word learning principles outlined 
above be the product of more general learning process, then the artefact actions 
demonstrated in these experiments could be fast mapped. If however these principles are 
specific to word learning, then I should find no evidence for the fast mapping of actions.  
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2.2 Experiment 1:  Do Children Use a Novel Action to Select a Novel Artefact? 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The potential principles needed to successfully complete such a task (for example 
novel referent selection or mutual exclusivity bias) are widely discussed within the language 
literature (Markman, 1990; Mervis & Bertrand 1993; Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek 1994). 
No one has previously tested whether or not children display the same propensity to use a 
novel action to select a novel artefact as they do with novel words. This was the simple 
premise behind the first experiment: when presented with a familiar artefact and novel 
artefact, which would children select as the referent of a novel action?  
Experiment 1 used a simple design. I chose an artefact whose familiarity has been 
established from parental report in a previous study – a door key (Holland, 2014). This 
artefact also has the advantage of being associated with a highly distinct action (a rotation of 
the wrist). The unfamiliar artefact was a four-way radiator key of similar size (also used in 
later research, displayed in Table 3.1). Both artefacts had similar physical properties, and 
both afforded the same action while have distinctively different shapes. Children were 
allocated to either a novel word or novel action condition. In the novel word condition, the 
experimenter asked children to "…pass the koba". I predicted that they would select the 
unfamiliar radiator key. If children behaved in the same way with novel actions as novel 
words, then they would also choose the radiator key when asked to, "…pass me the one we 
do this with [pantomiming a novel action]." If however, children do not follow the same 
referent selection principle with actions as they do for words, then children should show no 





Data were collected from 90 reception-aged children (4- and 5-year-olds) with a 
mean age of 4 years 10 months. For more detailed participant information breakdown please 
see Table 2.1. All the children attended primary schools in a Greater London Borough. Head 
teachers and class teachers gave initial consent and parents were given the opportunity to 









 This experiment used a between participants design. The children were 
unsystematically allocated to two groups testing the conditions of the independent variable: 
Information Type (Novel Word / Novel Action). The dependent variable was selection 
accuracy - selecting the novel artefact. 
 
Materials 
Two artefacts were used during the experiment, one familiar to children (a door 
key) and one unfamiliar (a 4-way radiator key) the ‘koba’.  Each participant required one 
piece of blank paper and some colouring pencils for use during the drawing game. 
Table 2.1: Experiment 1 – Breakdown of Age and Gender of Participants. 
Measure Novel Word Novel Action 
n 45 45 
Mean Age (years; months) 4; 10 4; 10 
Age Range (years; months) 4; 6 – 5; 6 4; 6 – 5; 6 
Gender (M/F) 17 / 28 23 / 22 
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Procedure 
All the children were invited to play a drawing game with the experimenter, one at a 
time, and tested individually, in a quiet corner in their classroom at school. The experimenter 
sat at the table with some blank paper, a set of colouring pencils and the two artefacts, 
placed on the table close by to the child and the game. The child was initially asked to pick 
their favourite colour colouring pencil from the selection provided. The first and introductory 
task asked the children to draw around their own hand and then draw around the 
experimenter’s hand.  The paper was then turned over. The experimenter then asked the 
child one of two questions depending on the condition. Either “Please can you pass me the 
koba for us to draw around?” in the novel word condition; or “Please can you pass me the 
object we do this with to draw around?”, whilst demonstrating a pantomimed action of 
rubbing their hand against the upper arm. This action was clearly different from the familiar 
action associated with a door key (wrist rotation with the hand oriented away from the 
body).  Whichever artefact the children select was then used as a drawing template. This also 
served as a record of the selected artefact.  
 
2.2.3 Results and Discussion 
As you can see from the Table 2.2, the majority of participants selected the novel 
artefact in both naming and action conditions. As there were only two items to choose from, 
children had a 50% chance of selecting the unfamiliar artefact. Binomial distribution 
calculations indicate that participants in both conditions selected the novel artefact 
significantly more often than chance (p <. 001). Furthermore, Chi-squared analyses revealed 
no significant difference was found between the two conditions (χ2 (1) = 2.736, p = .098). 
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These data suggest that children are equally likely to use a novel action to select a novel 
artefact as they do with novel words. 
 
These data suggest that children treat novel actions in the same way that they treat 
novel words: that is novel actions should be associated with novel artefacts. These data were 
submitted for publication in an article that went on to become Riggs, Mather, Hyde and 
Simpson (2015).  These data do not appear in the final version of this paper.  A reviewer of 
the original article pointed out that our methodology did not demonstrate that children 
associated novel actions with novel artefacts.  It merely demonstrated that children have a 
preference for novel artefacts.  This limitation was addressed using data collected by another 
researcher, and so those data do not appear in my thesis.  However, I return to the question 
of whether children associated novel information with novel artefacts in Chapter 4. 
Despite the methodological concern, these data do support the proposal that 
children have a novelty bias – that is they tend to select novel items. There is evidence for 
this in the word learning studies of Mather and Plunkett (2012) and Horst, Samuelson, 
Kucker and Murray (2011). In both these studies, children completing a novel referent 
selection task were given the choice between a previously seen, but un-named novel 
Table 2.2: Experiment 1 – Number of Children Selecting the Novel or Familiar Artefact. 
 Condition 
 
Name  Action 
n (of 45) %  n (of 45) % 
Novel Artefact 40* 88.9%  34* 75.6% 
Familiar Artefact 5 11.1%  11 24.4% 
*exact binomial p (one-tailed) < .001  
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artefact, and a new ‘supernovel’ artefact. Two-year-olds chose the supernovel artefact when 
hearing a novel name, despite also not knowing the name for the previously-seen novel 
artefact. It would appear that although there was no logical reason to exclude the 
previously-seen novel artefact as a target, this is exactly what children do: favour the most 
novel item. As with my data above, it doesn’t tell us what processes are at work in word (or 
action) learning, simply that children have a preference for novelty. Could this broader 
preference for novelty undermine claims about the specificity of word learning principles? 
This next experiment aimed to test this proposal further.  
 
2.3 Experiment 2: Investigating Fast Mapping and Extension of Artefact Names and Actions 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Data from Experiment 1 suggest that children may use the principles of mutual 
exclusivity to pass a referent selection task, which maps a novel action onto a novel artefact. 
Confident that children are capable of this kind of referent selection, I wished to test 
whether they are able to fast map and thus retain the novel artefact action over a longer 
period of time. As mentioned previously, there have been a limited number of studies that 
begin to investigate fast mapping of non-lexical information (Deák & Toney, 2013; Childers & 
Tomasello, 2002 & 2003; Campbell & Namy, 2003).  
Original fast mapping research (which does meet strict fast mapping criteria- brief 
exposure, no explicit teaching, leads to a long lasting memory) suggests children also fast 
map novel facts (Markson & Bloom, 1997). However none of these studies since, which are 
often cited as fast mapping, meet the original criteria (Carey & Bartlett, 1978 Markson & 
Bloom, 1997), which I have adopted here. This further research suggests children may also 
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map novel facts using both familiar language and also facts containing a novel word (Deák & 
Toney, 2013). It has also been established that children map novel verbs to novel actions 
(Merriman, Marazita & Jarvis, 1995; Merriman, Evey-Burkey, Marazita & Jarvis, 1996). With 
regards to non-verbal information, Deák and Toney (2013) also found that children were able 
to map pictograms, and other research proposes evidence of children’s fast mapping of 
actions or melodic sequences (Childers & Tomasello, 2002 & 2003; Campbell & Namy, 2003 
respectively).  
The design of my second experiment endeavoured to further the work of Childers 
and Tomasello (2002, 2003) and Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) using a strict fast 
mapping methodology, as originally designed by Carey and Bartlett (1978). Childers & 
Tomasello, (2002) describe the learning of artefact action as perhaps the most natural non-
verbal learning that young children will engage in. Once again, I wanted to directly compare 
the action learning to word learning. Neither the Childers and Tomasello (2002 & 2003) nor 
the Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) were specifically designed to be fast mapping studies, 
although they are often cited as such due to the relatively brief exposure of the novel 
information.  
However, both the Childers and Tomasello (2002, 2003) and Hahn and Gershkoff-
Stowe (2010) were designed to investigate whether it was possible to retain and extend 
artefact-actions. In consequence it was appropriate for them to use very explicit teaching of 
the novel information: for example, “This is called a booma, see the booma? Can you say 
booma?” (Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010). Thus their methodologies clearly differ from 
Carey and Bartlett (1978) in which the novel name is only presented ‘in passing’ as part of an 
interaction which is not about the explicit teaching of anything. 
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Secondly, and of equal importance, are the amount of exposure and delay in testing. 
In the Childers and Tomasello (2002), children were exposed to the novel information 
repeatedly over a series of days. This means that although the children were required to 
retain the information over a significant period of time (e.g., 7 days), they were also given 
the opportunity to re-establish the original mapping. In Childers and Tomasello (2003) and 
the Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010), children were only given one brief exposure to the 
novel information. However, they were not required to retain and recall this information 
after a significant delay: thus not demonstrating long-term learning. I needed to incorporate 
both factors simultaneously: children were only exposed to the novel information in a single 
exposure session, and were required to retain and recall this information for six - seven days 
(without further training).  
 Another precaution taken in this experiment was to ensure that the artefacts did not 
afford their actions and that the action was ‘effectless’. For real-world artefacts, the physical 
shape of an artefact can give clues to its action and functional capabilities and the action that 
should be made to achieve them (Michaels, 2003; Symes Ellis & Ticker, 2007). For example, 
shears afford holding the object by their handles, and opening and shutting the blades about 
the pivot. Even if you had never seen shears you might be able to work out what action to 
make with them.  As in both the Childers and Tomasello articles (2002, 2003) and Hahn and 
Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) it was important to establish that the children could not infer the 
action from the shape of the artefact. Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) are careful to 
highlight the arbitrary nature of the actions performed, ensuring they were not related to 
the object’s structure as “actions related to an object’s form could be inferred through an 
object’s structure or parts rather than retrieved from memory” (Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 
2010; p.288). 
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Likewise I wished to ensure that children could not infer the action by recalling the 
target artefact’s function. If children saw the target artefact achieve its function, they could 
use this information to infer the action that should be made with that artefact (even if they 
have not remembered it). For example, inferring a hammering action by remembering that 
an artefact’s function is to ‘break things’. As the action on the target artefact caused no 
obvious effect (i.e., produced no inferable function), children needed to recall the action 
rather than rely on inferring it from the function. 
Finally, this experiment aimed to test whether children will extend novel artefact 
actions in the same way as novel artefact names (i.e., to new exemplars of the same shape 
but different size and colour). The categorical scope principle (Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-
Pasek, 1994) suggests that children understand that a novel artefact’s name will also apply to 
other exemplars from the same category. An artefact’s action can arguably be described as a 
feature that is consistent across all members of an artefact category. This certainly reflects 
our everyday experience – where the same action is usually appropriate for all members of 
an artefact category.  Childers and Tomasello (2003) found that, when tested immediately 
after exposure, children would extend novel actions in the same way as novel names. They 
suggest that children will extend all artefact information that is deemed a characteristic 
feature of its category. Therefore, if the categorical scope principle is applicable to non-
lexical features, as Childers and Tomasello (2003) suggest, then children should readily select 








This study (and all those following) recruited new children who had not been 
previously tested. In this study, participants were slightly younger than Experiment 1 to see if 
a mutually exclusive understanding of action was also demonstrated at a younger age. Data 
were collected from 78 children aged 3 to 4-years-old (38 girls and 40 boys with a mean age 
3 years, 11 months). The children attended nursery schools in outer London (see Table 2.3 










Using a between participants design children were unsystematically allocated to one 
of two conditions testing the independent variable: Information Type (Novel Word or Novel 
Action). The dependent variable was comprehension selection accuracy after a five to seven 




Table 2.3: Experiment 2 – Breakdown of Age and Gender of Participants. 
Measure Novel Naming Novel Action 
N 39 39 
Mean (years; months) 3; 10 3; 11 
Range (year; months) 3; 3 - 4; 11 3; 2 - 4; 11 
Gender (M/F) 13/16 10/19 
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Materials 
In total, the procedure required 10 artefacts, five during the exposure session and 
five during testing. Following the procedures of Bloom and Markson (1997), Waxman and 
Booth (2000) and Childers and Tomasello (2003), there was a mixture of familiar and novel 
items. During the exposure session the two familiar artefacts were a green felt pen and a red 
pencil sharpener. The three novel artefacts were a white ‘T’ shaped plastic plumbing fitting, 
an orange ‘L’ shaped plastic bracket, and a black staple remover.  
The use of each item as the target artefact was counterbalanced across participants. 
The artefacts used in the testing session were the same shape, but varied from the originals 
seen in exposure in both colour and size. During the testing session, artefacts included: an 
orange felt pen and green pencil sharpener and a smaller black plumbing fitting, a larger 
white L shaped bracket, and a larger red staple remover. Care was taken to ensure that none 
of the artefacts afforded the novel action. 
 
Procedure 
Each child was asked to play a game with the Experimenter (E), individually, in a 
quiet corridor of the school. E sat across the table from the child and placed a piece of paper 
displaying the outline drawings of the five test artefacts. E emptied the artefacts from a 
brown bag onto the table and asked the child to play a matching game, matching the 
artefacts with their pictures. Although most children found this task easy, help was given if 
required. Once the artefacts had been successfully ‘matched’ E told the child that they were 
going to put each of the toys away into either the red or blue bag. One by one E pointed to 
an artefact and instructed the child to hand it across the table. The child was allowed to pick 
which bag the artefact went into (red or blue), and E placed it inside. E followed this 
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procedure for the five artefacts in the following order: novel artefact, familiar artefact, novel 
target artefact, familiar artefact, novel artefact. When collecting the third, target, artefact 
each child was exposed to novel information (differing depending on their condition 
allocation).  
In the novel word condition, E pointed to the novel target artefact and asked the 
child to pass them the ‘koba’. When E received the artefact the child was asked which bag 
the koba should go into. The artefact was placed into the bag the child selected. In the novel 
action condition E once again pointed to the novel target artefact and asked the child to pass 
them the artefact “we do this with” (whilst pantomiming the action of rubbing her right hand 
on her left upper arm). Similarly when given the artefact, E asked into which bag she should 
place “the one we do this with” (this time demonstrating the same action, but with the 
artefact in her hand). In both conditions the children were exposed to two demonstrations of 
the novel information. In neither condition were the children explicitly told the new 
information for example, “This is a koba, we use it as an arm-scratcher like this 
[demonstration].” Neither were the children instructed to try and remember the information 
for later. Once all the artefacts were packed away the children were allowed to return to the 
nursery. 
The test session took place five to seven days later. E repeated the matching game 
again, this time with the aforementioned five novel test artefacts (same shape, different size 
and colour). After all the artefacts had been successfully ‘matched’ and placed on the paper, 
E asked either “Can you point to the koba?” for children in the novel word condition, or “Can 
you point to the one we do this with” (pantomiming action of rubbing upper arm) for the 
children in the novel action condition. Children were then thanked for their help with the 
game and shown back to the nursery.  
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2.3.3 Results and Discussion 
When tested five to seven days after initial exposure, the majority of children 
correctly choose the target artefact from those on display. The results were very similar 
across both conditions: 66.7% in the Novel Word condition and 61.5% in the Novel Action 
condition at levels significantly above chance (Table 2.5). Overall, children selected the 
correct target artefact at a rate significantly above chance performance. This is true both if 
children had assumed all five artefacts were suitable novel referents for attaching their novel 
information (20%, binomial p<.001), or if they assumed only the novel artefacts were 
possible referents (33%, binomial, p<.001). There was no significant difference between the 
accuracy results of the two conditions (odds ratio = 1.25, p = .64). These data suggest that 
children are able to rapidly and enduringly map novel action information onto a novel 
artefact. Furthermore, they were as successful at achieving this with artefact actions as 
artefact names (an ability often proposed for children of this age).  
When examining this in greater detail we can see exactly what they have achieved. 
Three- to 4-years-olds observed only two incidental demonstrations of a novel action (or 
word) during one brief exposure session, where learning was not the primary objective of 
the interaction with the experimenter. After a five to seven day interval, children were able 
to successfully recall which artefact related to the novel information presented (either its 
name or action). Moreover, not only were they able to retain and recall this information for 
successful use a week after exposure, they also managed to further use this knowledge to 
extend it to another novel exemplar of the artefact category (based on shape). This has also 
previously been seen for children learning novel artefact names (Waxman & Booth, 2000).  
Arguably, although the above data implies that this is the case, it could be reasoned 
that perhaps the demonstration of the action (or name) alone stood out from the rest of the 
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procedure. Perhaps children hadn’t recalled that a specific action was performed on the 
target artefact, merely that something was done with this specific artefact. If the children 
were shown a different action at test would they continue to select the target artefact as the 
one that was acted upon during exposure? 
 
2.4 Experiment 3: Examining the Specificity of Action Fast Mapping 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
As an extension of Experiment 2 it was felt necessary to clarify whether or not the 
children had in fact formed a real mapping in the novel action condition, and if so, what 
specifically they had mapped. If the children had merely recalled which artefact had been 
acted upon, this would not require any long-term artefact-action mapping, simply the ability 
to recall which one item had been ‘singled out’ during the first matching game. Additionally, 
if an action has been mapped, have the children retained the specific action initially used 
when demonstrated upon said artefact or simply a ‘strange action’?  
I sought to overcome this limitation of Experiment 2 by further comparing 
performance on two action conditions which only differed at test.  I compared performance 
on a novel action condition (as before) to a second novel action condition in which a 
different novel action was performed during the testing session. The reasoning was that if 
children had simply recognised that a ‘strange action’ had been performed on the artefact, 
but not mapped the action specifics (rubbing up and down the upper arm), then they would 
continue to select the target artefact even when a new novel action was performed at test. 
However, if children had successfully mapped the specific action to the target artefact then 
they would not consider the original target artefact was a referent for the new novel action. I 
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proposed that under these circumstances children would instead pick one of the alternative 
novel artefacts due to mutual exclusivity (or whatever bias caused children to select a novel 




Data were collected from 60 3- and 4-year-old children (29 girls & 31 boys; mean age 3 
years, 10 months). All the children had not been previously tested and attended a nursery in 
Greater London. The children were unsystematically allocated to half in each experimental 









Design and Materials 
The design followed that of Experiment 2, with the two experimental conditions 
being novel action or second novel action. The materials used were the same initial five 
artefacts used in the exposure session of the previous experiment.  
  
Table 2.4: Experiment 3 – Breakdown of Age and Gender of Participants. 
Measure Novel Action Second Novel Action 
n 30 30 
Mean (years; months) 3; 10 3;10 
Range (year; months) 3; 4 – 4; 6 3; 3 – 4; 6 
Gender (M/F) 17/13 14/16 
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Procedure 
 The exposure session was identical to the novel action condition outlined in 
Experiment 2. The Experimenter once again demonstrated the action of rubbing her right 
hand on her left upper arm. In the testing session the two familiar and three novel artefacts 
were placed on the table between the Experimenter and the child. This time children in both 
conditions were asked to ‘point to the one we do this with’ but the experimenter changed 
the action for children participating in the second novel action condition. For children in the 
novel action condition E performed the same action as used at exposure; for children in the 
second novel action condition E performed a circular motion on the table (a previously 
unseen action). This second test action was different from the initial exposure action, both in 
how it was performed (linear motion vs. circular motion) and the substrate it acted upon 
(arm vs. table).  
 
2.4.3 Results and Discussion 
In the novel action condition performance was similarly successful to that reported 
in Experiment 2 (see Table 2.5) with the majority of children (24/30, 80%) selecting the 
correct target artefact: binomial distribution calculation, p<.001 (with chance at 1/3). In the 
second novel action condition, just 16.7% (5/30) of the children selected the original target 
artefact; significantly less than predicted by chance (binomial, p=.020). Nearly all the 
remaining children selected one of the other unfamiliar artefacts (23/30, 76.7%). The final 




Table 2.5: Experiment 2 and 3 – Percentage of Children Selecting the Target Artefact.  
Selection 









Target Artefact 66.7%* 61.5%*  80.0%* 16.6% 
*exact binomial p (one-tailed) < .001 
 
These results, following Experiment 2, strengthen the proposal that young children 
are able to successfully retain, recall and extend a novel artefact–action mapping; rather 
than just demonstrating a more general target preference. Moreover, as children didn’t 
continue to select the original target artefact in the second novel action condition, it would 
suggest that children are more than merely remembering a ‘strange action’ performed on 
the target, but retaining an accurate sensorimotor representation of the novel action. 
Additionally, these results further support the findings from Experiment 1, that children will 
attend to a novel action in the same way they will a novel word, by excluding referents for 
that novel action for which they have already know an action. The majority of children 
shown a second novel action would did not select the target artefact, as even after their 
initial brief exposure it was understood that the first novel action was the specific action 
associated with the target artefact. Therefore a second novel action must belong to one of 




2.5 General Discussion 
 
The results from these three experiments suggest that children can rapidly and 
enduringly learn actions associated with artefacts. This is an exciting first step towards 
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understanding the learning of artefact knowledge for use. In these experiments, I directly 
compared children's novel word and action learning, and the results proved similar 
throughout. 
Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that young children have the ability to 
correctly perform a novel referent selection task for both novel artefact actions and names. 
However, only testing children using a novel condition did not address the alterative 
explanation that children simply have a general novelty bias (Mather & Plunkett, 2010, 
2012). My experiment was followed-up to address this methodological concern. A new group 
of 61 participants were tested over four trials using four familiar and four novel artefacts 
(these data are presented in Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015). The children were once 
again allocated to either the action or word condition; however, in this experiment children's 
responses to familiar actions and words were also examined. In two trials children were 
asked to select an artefact on seeing a relevant familiar action/name, and in two trials they 
were exposed to a novel action/name.  
Children chose novel artefacts when presented with novel information (76.7% novel 
words; 70.9% novel actions; binomial, p < .001); and familiar artefacts when presented with 
familiar information (86.7% familiar words; 80.6% familiar actions; binomial, p < .001). To be 
clear, in familiar trials, children selected the familiar artefact associated with that familiar 
action (e.g., a brush making a hair brushing action). These results allow us to discount a 
simple novelty bias, because children did not continue to select the novel artefact when a 
familiar action was demonstrated.  I investigate referent selection further in Chapter Four.  
Following the results of both of my Experiment 1 and those presented in Riggs et al. 
(2015), it seems justified to suggest that children do use similar learning principles when 
faced with a novel artefact action as a novel artefact name. That is, when faced with novel 
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action and names children tend to associate them with novel artefacts. It may also be the 
case that, under the right condition, children have a more general attentional bias towards 
novel stimuli (Mather & Plunkett, 2012) or even away from the familiar (McMurray, Horst & 
Samuelson, 2013). Whatever the precise mechanism, based on the current data I propose 
that a domain general process is used to map both words and actions.  
In the second experiment, children retained and recalled artefact names and 
actions, gleaned from a minimal exposure, after a week later. Once again there was no 
significant difference between the novel word and novel action conditions. Moreover, 
children were able (after a week’s retention) to extend this new information onto novel 
exemplars from the same artefact category. Finally, from Experiment 3, I obtained evidence 
for the fidelity of children’s artefact action learning. Children did not simply remember that a 
novel action had been performed on the novel artefact (with no care as to what that action 
was). When faced with a new novel action at test (different from the novel action used in the 
exposure session), they did not select the target artefact. Instead, having remembered the 
original novel artefact action mapping, children seemed to assume that this new novel action 
must be associated with one of the other novel artefacts.  
Overall the data from these three experiments clearly add to the literature.  These 
data support and extend those obtained by Childers and Tomasello (2002; 2003) and Hahn 
and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) suggesting that children are able to learn novel artefact action 
mapping as readily as they learn novel artefact names. In particular my data demonstrate 
that children can fast map artefact actions – using Carey and Bartlett’s (1978) original, 
stringent criteria (incidental learning, minimal exposure, and long term retention). 
Children have exhibited similar learning behaviour, under identical exposure 
conditions, for novel artefact actions and novel artefact names. It appears as if they can 
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potentially learn how a novel artefact is manipulated (its action) in the same way they learn 
what it is called. These findings certainly support the view that word learning does not rely 
on specific word learning processes (Markson & Bloom, 1997; Bloom, 2000; Bloom & 
Markson, 2001; Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Deák & Toney, 2013). Furthermore, it would 
suggest that proposed domain specific word learning principles (e.g., mutual exclusivity and 
categorical scope – Markman, 1990; Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994) required to 
perform referent selection tasks and category extension are not in fact restricted to word 
learning. Instead, whatever these principles are and however they operate, they do not 
seem to be restricted to words. 
Moreover, fast mapping does not appear unique to word learning. With these 
experiments following a stricter fast mapping methodology than most preceding studies 
(Childers & Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010), I have more convincingly 
demonstrated that fast mapping is a domain-general process (or at least not a uniquely 
lexical process). That being said, it is also likely that children do not fast map everything. In 
Riggs, Mather Hyde and Simpson (2015), we include a fourth experiment (again, not 
presented here, as I did not collect the data). In this experiment we test whether visual facts 
are fast mapped. This is a replication of Markson and Bloom’s (1997) visual fact condition in 
which a sticker is attached to the target artefact. We report that in the novel action 
condition children once again successfully recalled the target artefact after a week’s delay 
(69% correct); however in the visual fact condition, they were not able to recall which 
artefact the sticker was attached to (23% correct – no better than chance). Thus these data 
support Markson and Bloom’s (1997) proposal that not all information is fast mapped. 
I have suggested that the novel action made with the target artefact in my 
experiments (e.g., rubbing on the experimenter’s arm) was 'effectless'. In the real world we 
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rarely, if ever, see actions made on artefacts that are effectless. Despite this, children 
remembered the novel action in my experiments. The ability to remember effectless actions 
is consistent with imitation research, in which children are good at learning actions that have 
no obvious purpose (e.g., White, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & Hopper, 2009; see section 
1.4.1). Nevertheless, on reflection we think that it is not absolutely certain that children 
inferred no function in my experiments.  They could, for example, have inferred that the 
target artefact’s function was as an arm scratcher.  Thus we cannot be absolutely certain that 
children are remembering simply the novel action in my experiments, rather than 
remembering a function and merely inferring the action.  With this in mind we aimed to 
improve our methodology in the next chapter. 
 
The Next Chapter 
The next chapter investigates the learning of function knowledge using strict fast 
mapping criteria (incidental learning, minimal exposure and long term retention). 
Experiment 4 directly compares comprehension of name, action and function information 
following demonstrations of a novel artefact in use. Experiments 5 and 6 examine the effect 
of labelling and reduced exposure on comprehension. Experiment 7 investigates production 














Children Fast Map Artefact Functions as Efficiently as Artefact 
Names, but Artefact Actions are Learnt Most Easily 
 
 
Some of the methods and data that appear in this chapter have been published in Holland, 
A., Hyde, G., Riggs, K. J., & Simpson, A. (in preparation).  Young children learn the actions 





Results from the previous chapter suggest that children are excellent learners of 
artefact actions. They successfully select a novel referent based on its action. Furthermore, 
children can retain novel action-artefact mappings for a week, and extend this mapping to 
novel within-category exemplars. This coupled with previous research (Childers & Tomasello, 
2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010) suggests that children have the ability to rapidly 
and enduringly learn the action information needed for artefact use. My next research 
question is, ‘Can children fast map artefact function, and how does this ability compare to 
their learning of names and actions? 
An artefact name is spoken aloud and its action is visually observed. Both are 
directly perceptible: this must benefit the learning of these types of artefact information for 
use. Artefact function is usually the outcome of a specific action on a substrate, which brings 
about a change in that substrate (e.g., a bread knife acting upon a loaf of bread, changes 
bread from loaf to slices). Functions are not therefore directly perceptible, they must be 
inferred.  Children must compare the state of the substrate before and after the artefact’s 
required action has been performed with the artefact, in order to determine the substrate 
change. A proper, adult-like, causal understanding requires that the role of the artefact and 
action in bringing about that change, is inferred. 
Carey and Bartlett (1978), who first investigated the fast mapping of words, 
suggested that incidental learning occurred when children did not think that they were 
engaging in formal learning. Is an artefact’s function information harder to learn incidentally, 
due to its more conceptual nature, and the amount of information that must be integrated 
to understand it? Are children able to fast map function as something distinct from action?  
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Children could understand function as something that you do, rather than understanding it 
as a substrate change distinct from action. From here I will review previous research in this 
area, before detailing the design of my own methodology. 
 
3.1.1 Detailed Review of Casler and Kelemen (2005) Investigation of Function learning  
Previous research suggests that children are effective learners of function 
information. Casler and Kelemen’s (2005) data suggest that children as young as two years of 
age can rapidly learn artefact function.  In the first of two experiments in this article, 4- and 
5-year-olds (and adults) were familiarised with two novel artefacts (the target and a foil).  
Participants’ exposure to each novel artefact was kept to one minute.  One had its function 
demonstrated, launching a foam toy from a tube, whilst the other was slotted into a similar 
tubular container for storage, and the participants were told a novel fact about it. The 
functional part of the target artefact was the same shape as the foil, and both could be used 
to perform the functional action (e.g., be inserted into the tube to launch the toy). Thus, 
although only one of the artefacts had its function demonstrated, they were both physically 
capable of being used to achieve this function (i.e., they both afforded it).  
Immediately following this, the participants were asked eight questions in a fixed 
order to test their commitment to the artefact-function mapping. There was a basic recall 
and two extension questions. Participants were asked to choose which artefact they would 
need to achieve the demonstrated function (make the toy go flying): once with the original 
artefacts (recall), then once with the same artefacts in a different colour (extension one), and 
once with the artefacts in a slightly different shape and colour (extension two). Three ‘effort’ 
questions required the participants to make an effort to get the target artefact: target was 
out of reach (effort one), target was in a closed container (effort two) or target was a 
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different colour whereas alternative foil artefact was unchanged (effort three). Two 
‘dissociation’ questions were included to see which artefact participants would choose when 
asked to perform a different function (crushing crackers). Both artefacts were equally 
capable of completing the new task, so these questions assessed the mutual exclusivity of 
the artefact-function mapping (i.e., does an artefact have a single function, in the same way 
that it has a single name? e.g., Markman, 1990).  
Overall Casler and Kelemen report both children and adults were more likely to 
choose the target artefact to achieve the demonstrated function in both the extension and 
effort trials. Children and adults alike chose the target artefact even if it was a different 
colour, slightly different shape, or required more effort to select. However, although children 
chose the target artefact significantly less often when asked to achieve a different function, 
only the adults consistently chose the foil in the dissociation trials; the children did not select 
the foil more often than predicted by chance (i.e., half the time).  
As the first study only showed moderate evidence that children apply mutual 
exclusivity to artefact function, a simplified version of the task (with fewer questions) was 
used to test younger children in the second experiment. Two-year-olds, 3-year-olds and 4-
year olds were once again shown two novel artefacts. As before one of the artefacts had its 
function demonstrated: it was inserted into a thin slot in a box to turn on a light. The foil was 
not shown to have any function, but the experimenter did point out that the bottom edge of 
the foil matched the bottom edge of the target. The foil was placed into a holder, so the 
action performed on both artefacts was the same.  
Following exposure, with both artefacts in front of them (or colour variants), 
children were then asked a series of four (rather than eight) questions: two extension 
questions, asking which one was needed to turn the light on (demonstrated function); and 
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two dissociation questions, asking which one they would need to crush crackers (new 
function). Following a one to three day delay, the same children then completed a further 
four trials; again, two extension and two dissociation. One of each of these questions tested 
children’s understanding of social convention of artefact-use, “If your teacher wanted to turn 
on the light which one would she need?” For the extension questions, children consistently 
choose the target artefact when asked to turn on the light (77% of 2-year-olds, 86% of 3-
year-olds and 86% of 4-year-olds).  T-tests for each group revealed that children chose the 
target artefact more often for the generalisation trials than the dissociation trials (all ps < 
0.001). For the dissociation trials, both the 2-year-olds and 4-year-olds chose the foil at levels 
significantly above chance during (age four, p = 0.016; age two, p = 0.048); the 3-year-olds 
data approached significance (p = 0.083).  
Overall, Casler and Kelemen data suggest that children as young as two years of age, 
understand that an artefact is ‘for’ a specific purpose (i.e., has a single function). 
Furthermore, this function can be leant in only a one-minute exposure session. This 
knowledge was retained after a couple of days delay, and after repeated questioning (which 
often promotes answer switching in young participants). Moreover, children aged two to 
four years appeared to view this function as an inherent property of the target artefact’s 
category, and thus extendable to other items from the same category. Finally, when asked to 
achieve a different function children were more likely to use a different artefact. This 
suggests that mutual exclusivity is applied to artefact function. If an artefact is used for one 
function, then it should not be used for a different function, despite even if it affords the 
second function.   
Casler and colleagues’ research (Casler & Kelemen, 2005, Casler & Kelemen, 2007; 
Casler Terizyan & Greene, 2009) suggests that children are able to understand function as a 
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normative and unchanging property of an artefact; and that once learned, children can 
retain this function information long term (both a key feature and a result we were keen to 
investigate). Despite this, there are a number of concerns with the methodology this 
research has used.  
 
3.1.2 Methodological Considerations with Casler and Kelemen's (2005) Research 
In order to create my own fast mapping methodology it was important to 
concentrate on the three key criteria: incidental learning with minimal exposure leading to 
long-term retention. Firstly, I will discuss the ways in which Casler and Kelemen’s 
methodology did not meet these criteria (of course, this is not a criticism of their research – 
as they were not trying to follow my criteria). Secondly, I will briefly discuss a few questions 
concerning how they interpret their results, with a view to creating a robust methodology for 
my own research. 
Casler and Kelemen (2005) are often cited for its rapid learning and minimal exposure 
approach (e.g., Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Sommerville, Hildebrand & Crane, 2008). 
However, considering my fast mapping criteria, the approach taken to demonstrate the 
novel information to the children was very explicit. The experimenter introduced themselves 
to the children and then immediately proceeded to show them the new artefacts and 
demonstrate its function. Although, the target artefacts were not described as ‘for’ any 
particular function, children were encouraged to use it themselves. Whilst this method does 
provide evidence that children learn artefact function from one exposure session, it does not 
meet my criteria of incidental learning. Secondly, Casler and Kelemen claimed children had 
learned the novel function after a one to three day delay. However the same children were 
tested both immediately after the exposure session, and after the delay. Repeat testing may 
 83 
have encouraged the children to remember the target artefact-function mapping. To 
demonstrate long-term retention following brief exposure, a between-participants design is 
preferable. It is therefore questionable whether Casler and Kelemen (2005) demonstrate 
long-term retention. 
The remaining issues concern what exactly children learned in Casler and Kelemen’s 
(2005) study. Although Casler and Kelemen concluded that children learnt artefact functions, 
I suggest that it is difficult to be sure of this. It could be argued that children have merely 
learned an association between the target artefact and the substrate (the substrates were 
the tube and light box). Children may have simple learnt a stimulus-stimulus (artefact-
substrate) association, and know nothing about the artefact’s function. As the substrate was 
still in view during the test session, children could have used their memory of the artefact-
substrate association to select the correct artefact. Alternatively, children could have been 
remembering the artefact action (e.g., to insert the target artefact into the tube). This would 
allow children to pass many of the test questions, again without having learned the function 
of the target artefact. Is it merely the association between the target artefact and an action 
on the substrate children retain? In order to be more confident that children really have 
learnt an artefact-function mapping the substrate needs to be removed when the test 
questions are asked. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the properties of artefacts and the actions and 
functions associated with them are causally related (e.g., Symes, Ellis and Tucker, 2007; 
Michaels, 2003). For example, when looking at a pair of scissors, we can see that they are 
designed with holes into which fingers can be inserted; the blades are sharpened and 
pivoted in the middle. Thus when handling a pair of scissors, even for the first time, there is 
very little doubt as to how you hold them. Furthermore, only one functional action can 
 84 
performed with them. By performing that action on a suitable substrate you demonstrate 
scissors’ function. Thus, scissors afford their action and so their function.  
In Casler and Kelemen’s study the target artefacts shape afforded its function. Casler 
and Kelemen designed their foils so that they afforded the same function. They suggest that 
as the foil is afforded the demonstrated function, children could not use the fact that target 
artefacts afforded its function to help them remember the target artefact. However, simply 
using the targets may have drawn children’s attention to this affordance more for the target 
artefacts than for the foils (even if implicitly so). Therefore the children may have simply 
remembered the affordance of the target artefact (that it has the potential to be inserted in 
the substrate), rather than specifically its function. 
In conclusion, it is not clear that children needed to remember an artefact-function 
mapping in order to pass the questions used in Casler and Kelemen’s study.  I aimed to 
ensure that the only way to pass my function comprehension question in the following 
experiment was to remember this mapping. 
 
3.2 Experiment 4: Investigating Fast Mapping of Artefact Information for Use 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
My aim for this experiment was to design a methodology that allowed children to 
observe a novel artefact being used, whilst creating a learning experience as ‘real’ as 
possible. This needed to meet my three criteria of fast mapping (incidental learning, minimal 
exposure and long-term retention). It also required equal incidental exposure to its name, 
action and function. As an aside to a game, that participants believed to be the goal of the 
experimenter-participant interaction, children saw an experimenter (in response to a 
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request made by a hand puppet) demonstrate an artefact being used. One of four novel 
artefacts was used to perform a specific action on a novel substrate (a music box). As the 
action was performed the experimenter operated a secret foot pedal to start the music 
playing, so that it appeared that the target artefact acting on the substrate had 
demonstrated its function, (turning on the music). 
Regarding incidental learning and minimal exposure, to ensure that the artefact 
information was introduced incidentally it was embedded in a game (as in Experiment 2). 
This meant that the children were engaging in other tasks using the target and three foil 
artefacts during their time with the experimenter; and ensured that the experimenter did 
not interact with the target artefact much more than these foils. During their time with the 
experimenter, the children completed a warm-up task and a distractor task with all the 
artefacts, before the exposure session, and then a further distractor task.  
During the warm-up task the children were asked to remove four novel artefacts 
from a box, one at a time, and place them on the table. Children were given time to interact 
with the artefacts as the experimenter recorded the participant’s details. In both distractor 
tasks the children were asked to match the four novel artefacts individually to either black 
and white photos (matching shape) or coloured cards (matching colour). This ensured that 
children interacted with all of the artefacts equally.  
Whilst working with the children the experimenter used a puppet, which served two 
purposes. Firstly, to ensure children were not told to attend to the artefact’s use. When 
discussing the use of the target artefact in the exposure session, the experimenter spoke 
directly to the puppet. The experimenter demonstrated the artefact’s use twice during the 
minimal exposure session, both times apparently prompted by the puppet and, 
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demonstrated to the puppet. Secondly, the puppet also helped ensure children remained 
engaged with the experimenter. 
With regards to long-term retention, Casler and Kelemen performed testing in a 
delay condition after 1 – 3 days. For many researchers examining fast-mapping or rapid 
learning procedures, this constitutes a ‘proper’ delay. In fact some fast mapping research 
with 2-year-olds have used delays of 24-hours (Goodman, McDonough & Brown, 1998), or 
just 5 to 10 minutes (Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Horst & Samuelson, 2008). To be a more 
stringent test of learning, I felt the delay period should be longer, in line with original fast-
mapping studies (Carey & Bartlett, 1978 & Markson & Bloom, 1997). I therefore used a delay 
of one week. Additionally, my participants were either tested in the immediate condition or 
the delay condition to avoid repeat testing, which could encourage children to remember 
the target artefact.  
 I also wished to ensure that it was not possible to infer either the artefact action or 
function from any other information. If children passed the action and function 
comprehension questions, I could be confident that they had retained this specific 
information. The novel artefacts used in the experiment were: a red, plastic adhesive 
spreader; a yellow, metal four-way radiator key; a green, plastic, air-vent cover; and a blue 
plastic tumble dryer ball (See Figure 3.1). Each artefact was small enough to be held in one 
hand and had no features suggesting how it should be held or manipulated. Care was taken 
to ensure that their shape didn’t afford a specific grip (e.g. handles), or action, or the 
function that the artefact achieved. The music box substrate was a plain white box. There 
were no obvious holes for speakers, or buttons, dials or switches as would normally be 
associated with a music-playing device. As such, it appeared as if the only way to switch it on 
was for the target artefact to act upon it. In reality the experimenter operated the music 
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with a secret foot pedal in order to start the music in time with the end of the action. The 
specific action made by the experimenter was to ‘bounce’ the target artefact along the top 
of the box three times. Looking at either the artefacts or the substrate, one could not have 
inferred that this was the action required. 
At test, children were required to answer one of three questions, depending on 
their allocated condition. In the naming condition they were asked, “Which one is the 
koba?”; in the action condition they were asked, “Which one do we do this with?” 
(pantomiming the novel action); and in the function condition they were asked, “Which one 
starts the music playing?” During the testing session the substrate was removed from view 
to avoid providing a substrate-artefact cue. As mentioned previously, by having the substrate 
in view when asked the function question, could support retrieval of the target artefact (i.e., 
I remember this thing was used with the music box). By careful selection of the novel 
artefacts and action, and by removing the substrate from view I aimed to ensure that 
children could only answer the test questions correctly by remembering the relevant 
information.  
When deciding upon a suitable age range, I considered previous function research. 
There is evidence consistent with the proposal that 2- to 3-year-olds understand that 
function is a normative property of an artefact (Casler & Kelemen, 2005, 2007; Casler, 
Terziyan & Greene, 2009). Additional research indicates 3- and 4-year-olds understand that 
artefacts were designed by a creator with a specific label and function (Jaswal, 2006), and 
that 3 – 4-year-olds can understand that an artefacts structural properties are designed to 
achieve a function (Asher & Kemler Nelson, 2008). Even that 2-year-olds may understand 
that an artefact category name can be extended to novel exemplars with the same function  
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(Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000). These studies suggests that children in this age 
range understand something about artefact function – without testing their ability to fast 




 All the children attended primary schools in the Greater London area. Data were 
collected from 144 children (69 girls), 72 3-year-olds (mean = 3,7; range 3,1 - 3,11) and 72 5-
year-olds (mean = 5,2; range 5,0 - 5,6). Both head teachers and class teachers gave 
permission for their pupils’ participation, and then parents were given the opportunity for 
their children to opt out of the study.  (For further breakdown of participant information 
across conditions please see Table 3.1). 
 
Design 
 This experiment used a between participants design. The independent variables 
were time interval (immediate / delay) and information type (name / action / function). The 
children were then unsystematically allocated to one of six experimental conditions (name 
immediate, name delay, action immediate, action delay, function immediate, function delay) 







Table 3.1. Experiment 4 – Table to Show Age and Gender Breakdown Across Conditions. 
Age 




n 12 12 12 
age (yrs, months) 3, 7 3, 6 3, 8 
range (yrs, months) 3,1 – 3,11 3,1 – 3,11 3,3 – 3,11 
Gender (M/F) 9 / 3 6 / 6 5 / 7 
Delay 
 
n 12 12 12 
age (yrs, months) 3, 7 3, 6 3, 8 
range (yrs, months) 3,1 – 3,11 3,3 – 3,11 3,2 – 3,11 




n 12 12 12 
age (yrs, months) 5, 2 5, 3 5, 2 
range (yrs, months) 5,0 – 5,4 5,0 – 5,6 5,0 – 5,4 
Gender (M/F) 4 / 8 10 / 2 5 / 7 
Delay 
 
n 12 12 12 
age (yrs, months) 5, 3 5, 3 5, 2 
range (yrs, months) 5,0 – 5,5 5,0 – 5,6 5,0 – 5,4 
Gender (M/F) 4 / 8 9 / 4 4 / 8 
 
Materials 
 The experimenter used a puppet (a ginger cat) to interact with the children. 
Four unfamiliar artefacts were used with each child: a metal, yellow, four-way radiator key, a 
green round plastic air-vent cover, a blue spiky tumble-dryer ball, and a red tile adhesive 
spreader with a box to keep them in (Figure 3.1). Each of the artefacts were of a similar size 
and could easily be held in one hand. The target artefact was counterbalanced between 
children. There were also four coloured card swatches to match the colour of the artefacts 
and black and white photographs of each of the artefacts to match the shape. The 
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experimenter used a ‘music box’ (never labelled) to demonstrate the action and function of 
the artefacts. This was secretly activated via a foot pedal under the table so it appeared that 





Each child was invited to play a game individually with the experimenter (E) in a 
quiet corner of the classroom. E introduced herself and her friend Mittens (the puppet), and 
asked the children if they would help her teach Mittens all about different shapes and 
colours by playing a game (all the children agreed). The overall structure of the task was: the 
warm-up task, first distractor task, exposure session, second distractor task, and test session.  
As a warm-up task, E asked the children to help her get all of her things out of the 
box individually and put them on the table. As they did this, E recorded the participant’s 
details allowing them freedom to inspect each artefact in their own time. During the first 




















distractor task E laid the black and white photos of the four novel artefacts on the table in 
front of the child, and explained that they were teaching Mittens about shapes. She asked 
the child to match all the artefacts by placing them on top of the picture that looked the 
same. After the child had matched all four artefacts, Mittens appeared to whisper in E’s ear, 
to which she replied, “Ok but we have to use the Koba” (demonstrating the novel name) 
whilst selecting the target artefact.  
This marked the start of the exposure session. The target artefact was 
counterbalanced across participants, once selected E then ‘bounced’ it along the top of the 
music box making contact with it three times in a straight line (demonstrating the novel 
action).  As the target artefact was lifted from the surface of the music box on the third 
bounce, E pressed a foot pedal (unobserved by the participant) to activate the music 
(demonstrating the novel function). This was a 20 second sound clip from a popular 
children’s television theme tune. As the song finished, Mittens “whispered” to E for a second 
time to which she replied, “Ok, but this is the last time, we have lots to do. We have to use 
the Koba”, thus repeating the name and going on to demonstrate the action and function a 
second time. After Mittens whispered a third time she replied, “No, we have too much to 
do” and put the music box away under the table. This removed the substrate from view in a 
way that would make sense to the participant.  
The child was then engaged in a second distractor task, and asked to match the four 
artefacts to cards of the same colour, and to name the colours out loud for Mittens to hear. 
For children in the immediate condition, the test session followed directly after the second 
distracter task, whereas children in the delay condition were tested six to seven days later. In 
the test session, with the four novel artefacts (but not the substrate) on the table, children 
were asked one of three questions depending on the experimental condition. In the naming 
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condition they were asked, “Which one is the koba?”; in the action condition they were 
asked, “Which one do we do this with?” (pantomiming the novel action); and  in the function 
condition they were asked, “Which one starts the music playing?” After their help children 




The data obtained in Experiment 4 were very clear (Figure 3.2). In all six conditions, 
most children correctly selected the target artefact (75% - 88%). Using binomial distribution 
calculations (chance performance, 1 of 4 novel artefacts), performance was well above 













Although not expecting any interactions when observing the raw data, a hierarchical 
four-way log–linear analysis (Time Interval, Information Type, Age and Accuracy) produced a 
final model that did not retain any significant main effects or interactions.  The likelihood 




























ratio of this model was χ2 (16) = 1.043, p > .999, indicating that the model was a good fit of 
the data. 
Further log-linear analyses were run to check for any unexpected interactions 
between artefact, gender or age group and accuracy. A four-way log–linear analysis 
produced a final model that did not retain any significant main effects or interactions. The 
likelihood ratio of this model was χ2 (36) = 11.329, p > .999, indicating that the model was a 
good fit of the data.  
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Children in this study, in both immediate and delay conditions were able to 
successfully comprehend artefact names, actions and functions after a brief incidental 
exposure. These data suggest that children are excellent learners of all knowledge needed 
for artefact use (name, action and function) – supporting previous research (Casler & 
Kelemen, 2005). The current experiment extends this previous research by providing the 
most convincing evidence to date that children can fast map this information. 
These data suggest that children's learning of artefact function is as good as their 
action and word learning. This is striking, when the greater complexity of function is 
considered.  Functions must be inferred, rather than merely perceived (as with actions and 
words).  Likewise, at test, children are presented with the pantomimed physical action and 
spoken word.  In contrast they a give a verbal summary of the function (i.e., “Which one 
starts the music playing?”). The experimenter did not speak these words during the exposure 
session.  It is up to the child to realise that the words spoken by the experimenter at test 
relate to the function that they observed during exposure.  Children’s ability to recall their 
fast mapped function knowledge is therefore particularly impressive. 
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It could be argued that there are different learning mechanisms working in my fast 
mapping task; for example, one processing words and one processing actions and functions. 
However, there is nothing in my data, from any of the first four experiments, to suggest that 
one specific mechanism is used to learn artefact names (i.e., words), and that a different one 
is used to learn artefact action and functions.   
My data suggest that learning artefact action and function can be just as impressive 
as words. In fact, recent research on word learning has suggested that children do not always 
fast map words (e.g., Horst & Samuelson, 2008; Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012). For example, in 
Horst and Samuelson (2008), 2-year-olds were introduced to novel artefacts and their names 
using a single exposure on a standard referent selection task. The children were shown a tray 
containing three artefacts, two familiar and one unfamiliar, and asked to pass the 
experimenter the “fode”.  The children were successful at the referent selection tasks, but 
after a five-minute delay, were generally unable to extend, produce or even simply retain 
this information. These results were consistent across Horst and Samuelson’s first three 
experiments in a series of four. It wasn’t until the final experiment, where they included an 
ostensive naming condition (the experimenter very explicitly labelled the novel artefact 
whilst holding it), that they saw any evidence for retention after a delay.  
More recent research suggests that fast mapping is context dependent.  Children 
can fast map words very effectively, but it is dependent on the way that the novel 
information is introduced (Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012; Holland, 2015). How did I obtain such 
effective retention of artefact names (action and functions) after a one-week delay, when 
researchers such as Horst & Samuelson (2008) saw none after five minutes?  
Horst and Samuelson’s used a referent selection task, which I did not.  My thesis 
investigates the fast mapping of the knowledge needed to use of artefacts: name, action and 
 95 
function. I wished this information to be presented in a context in which children are likely to 
learn most of their artefact knowledge. That is, for children to incidentally observe a novel 
artefact being used, and being named as part of that use. This kind of casual observation was 
not consistent with a referent selection task. In contrast, in a referent selection task, just one 
piece of information is used to exclude a familiar artefact and select a novel one. This 
approach does not fit with the incidental observation of a novel name, action and function 
together. A particular problem is that the experimenter would have to verbally describe the 
novel function (e.g., selecting between scissors and a novel artefact, the experimenter would 
say “Give me the one we use to make the music play, not the one we use to cut paper”). I did 
not want to verbally describe this function; I wanted children to observe it being produced. 
Perhaps children are particularly inclined to learn information presented when a 
novel artefact’s use is observed. Children in a western, artefact rich environment, need to 






3.3 Experiment 5:  Investigating the Effect of Number of Demonstrations and Verbal 
Labelling on Long-Term Comprehension 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 5 I wanted to create a more demanding test of function comprehension. 
Although ceiling performance in the previous experiment demonstrated young children’s 
ability to learn about artefacts, I needed some poor performance in order to dissociate 
artefact name, action and function learning.  In Experiment 5 I focused on children’s learning 
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of function in the long term, and made two manipulations in an effort to obtain ‘some poor 
performance’ on my fast mapping task. I considered that testing function learning in the 
long-term was likely to be the most demanding combination. 
The two manipulated variables were: number of demonstrations during exposure 
(Single-Demo versus Two-Demos) and the verbal labelling of the target artefact (With-Label 
versus No-Label). In a 2x2 factorial design children were allocated to one of four 
experimental conditions (No-Label, Single Demo; No-Label, Two-Demos; With-Label, Single-
Demo; With-Label, Two-Demos). If I observed poor performance on one or more of these 
four conditions, this would provide a methodology for comparing name, action and function 
learning. Thus creating a more stringent methodology for future experiments, and possibly 
resulting in dissociation between these three kinds of artefact information. 
As discussed, previous mutual exclusivity research suggests that children understand 
that each category has only one label, as such they will avoid attaching a second label to a 
familiar category (Halberda, 2003; Markman et. al 2003). This mutual exclusivity principle is 
also suggested to prime learning novel artefact names on the premise that hearing a novel 
label for a novel artefact draws attention to a new category to be learnt. For example 
Mather and Plunkett (2010) found that even at 10-months-old infants’ interest in novel 
artefacts was increased after hearing a novel name. If artefacts are not labelled in the two 
no-label conditions, this may make children less likely to attend to new information (i.e., the 
artefact’s shape and the action and function associated with it). Will this in turn make them 
less likely to retain this information under conditions of minimal, incidental exposure?  
Also, are two demonstrations of artefact use required during the exposure session or 
can a single demonstration lead to long-term retention? Vlach and Sandhofer, (2012) found 
that with only a single demonstration at exposure children were able to correctly 
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comprehend a target artefact in the immediate condition, but not after one week. Part of 
the difficulty associated with incidental learning, is that by definition the learner does not 
know that some new information is about to be presented.  A potential problem with this is 
that by the time the learner has realised that new information is being presented, the 
opportunity to attend to it properly has already passed.  In the task used in the previous 
experiment, children may not have realised that the action and function associated with a 
novel artefact was being demonstrated until the first demonstration was completed.  This 
may have interfered with their ability to encode this information.  However, in the previous 
task, the action and function were then demonstrated a second time.  Children may have 
then been ready to encode this information – making a link between the target artefact, 
action and function.  With just a single demonstration, children would not get the 
opportunity.   
More generally, I have noted that even fast mapping of artefact names is not 
guaranteed – and seems to depend on exactly how the new information is presented (Horst 
& Samuelson, 2008).  It was therefore possible that the two manipulations used in 
Experiment 5 could affect children’s ability to retain functional information after a brief 




Participants were drawn from the same sample as the previous experiment 
(although had not been previously tested). There were 100 participants, aged 4 & 5-years-





This experiment used a between-participants 2x2 factorial design. The independent 
variables were label (With-Label / No-Label) and number of demonstrations (Single-Demo / 
Two-Demos). Children were unsystematically allocated to one of four experimental 
conditions (No-Label, Single Demo; No-Label, Two-Demos; With-Label, Single-Demo; With-
Label, Two-Demos). The dependent variable was comprehension accuracy. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
The methodology was identical to that of Experiment 4 until the exposure session. 
Mittens appeared to whisper in E’s ear but at this point the children either heard “Ok but we 
need to use the Koba” in the ‘with label’ condition or “Ok but we need to use this one” in the 
‘no label’ condition. Similarly, in the two-exposure condition as in the previous experiment, E 
continued to demonstrate the action and function again for Mittens a second time before 
Table 3.2: Experiment 5 – Table to Show Age and Gender Breakdown Across Conditions. 
No of Demo. Measure With Label No Label 
Single 
Demonstration 
N 25 25 
Mean age (yrs, months) 5, 0 4, 10 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,5 – 5,4 4,3 – 5,2 
Gender (M/F) 13 / 12 12 / 13 
Two 
Demonstrations 
N 25 25 
Mean age (yrs, months) 5, 0 4, 11 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,4 – 5,3 4,5 – 5,4 
Gender (M/F) 9 / 16 13 / 12 
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putting the music box away. Whereas, in the one-exposure condition, after the first time the 
music played the experimenter skipped straight to putting the music box away. The same 
distractor task was then completed and all the children were sent back in to the nursery to 
play. The testing session occurred 6 – 7 days later and all the children were asked “Which 
one makes the music play?" 
 
3.3.3 Results 
 Primarily a series of binomial analyses tested whether the children had successfully 
recalled the target artefact at levels above chance (1 in 4, 25%). Across both demonstration 
and label conditions the children recalled the target artefact after a weeks’ delay to levels 
above chance (all ps < 0.05). However, on first inspection it appears that children’s ability to 
retain functional information is not affected by whether or not they hear a label but may be 




































Binomial  p (one-tailed) < .05 (all conditions) 
1 Demonstration
2 Demonstrations
Figure 3.3: Experiment 5 – Graph to Show Retention Accuracy Across Conditions. 
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Using 3-way, hierarchical, log-linear analysis, the overall model was not significant 
(Label*Demonstrations*Accuracy: χ2 (1) = 0.245, p = 0.621). When examining the eliminated 
effects we also established that there were no significant differences or interaction effects in 
the label conditions (Label*Accuracy: χ2 (1) = 0.667, p = 0.414). These results suggest that 
whether or not children heard the name of the artefact, this did not affect their ability to 
retain or recall other information needed for use. However, there was a significant 
interaction between the number of demonstrations and accuracy in selecting the target 
artefact. (Demonstrations*Accuracy: χ2 (1) = 4.167, p = 0.041). Retention was reduced when 
children only saw the artefact demonstration once. A further 3-way log-linear analysis found 
no significant gender or age group differences or interactions (gender*age group*accuracy: 
χ2 (1) = 0.108, p = 0.742). 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
 Even under these more challenging conditions (fewer demonstrations and without 
the target artefact being labelled) children were still able to retain the artefact-function 
mapping at levels significantly above chance. Once again this would suggest children’s ability 
to fast map artefact information for use is well developed. However, the log-linear analysis 
demonstrates that retention was far poorer with only a single demonstration than with two. 
Perhaps as Vlach and Sandhofer (2012) suggest, reducing the number of exposures 
weakens the memory trace. Although they investigated this by comparing six explicit, 
demonstrations at exposure to just one incidental demonstration – so the difference 
between their two conditions was much greater than mine. It is also is possible that children 
in a single demonstration condition did not know new information was being presented until 
the opportunity to attend to it had passed – interfering with their ability to encode this 
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information. In the two demonstrations conditions the action and function were then 
demonstrated for a second time enabling them to make the link between the target artefact, 
action and function. 
In contrast, the children’s retention was unaffected by whether or not they heard 
the novel artefact labelled. They did not need to hear a novel name to recognise that there 
was novel artefact information to learn. Thus children do not require an artefact to be 
labelled in order to direct them to learn the action and function associated with it. With 
hindsight, it is perhaps unsurprising that children’s fast mapping of the actions and functions 
associated with artefacts is unaffected by whether or not they are named during use.  Adults 
are probably not likely to name an artefact they are using (or about to use), they just ‘get on’ 
and use them. It would be rather limiting if children only fast mapped action and function 
when a novel artefact was also named. 
I have now obtained some poor performance on a fast mapping task.  Can we use 
this task to produce a dissociation between children’s learning of artefact name, action and 
function knowledge? 
 
3.4 Experiment 6:  Investigating Fast Mapping of Artefact Information for use Under 




Having seen from Experiment 5 that 4- and 5-years-olds found the methodology 
with only one demonstration during exposure more challenging, this experiment tested 3-
year-olds to see whether, in this more difficult learning environment, we would find a 
dissociation between information types when testing comprehension. We hoped that under 
 102 
more difficult testing conditions with reduced demonstrations during exposure we would be 
able to tease apart the different information categories necessary in knowledge for use. 
Having seen no significant difference between the immediate and delay data in the previous 
experiments, and as I believe to demonstrate learning children must be able to retain and 
recall information after a delay, all children were tested in a ‘delay’ condition, 6 – 7 days 
after exposure. I felt that if the accuracy results in one information type were higher this 
would indicate a more salient feature and potentially suggest which information type was 
assimilated first.  
To test the generalisability of my findings, a different substrate and function were 
used in this experiment. Using a second substrate, demonstrating a second function, tested 
whether these effects would extend beyond the music box used previously. In the drawer-
box condition the experimenter performed the specific action (bouncing along the top of the 
box three times), using the target artefact to open a drawer in the side of the box.  This 
drawer was once again operated by a hidden foot pedal. Half the children performed this 




All the children attended nursery schools and permissions were granted following 
the same procedure as previous experiments. Data were collected from 60 3-years-old 







 This experiment used a between-participants design. The independent variables 
were information type (name / action / function) and substrate (music box / drawer). The 
children were unsystematically allocated to one of the six experimental conditions to test the 
dependent variable, comprehension accuracy. 
  
Materials 
For the music box conditions the experimenter used the materials as in the previous 
experiments: a puppet (a ginger cat named Mittens), 4 unfamiliar artefacts and a box to keep 
them in, four coloured card swatches, four black and white photographs of the novel 
artefacts and a ‘music box’. In the drawer conditions the experimenter used the same 4 
artefacts, photographs and colour swatches but instead of a music box had a wooden box 
Table 3.3: Experiment 6 – Table to Show Age and Gender Breakdown Across Conditions. 
Substrate Measure Name Action Function 
Music Box 
N 10 10 10 
Mean age (yrs, months) 3, 5 3, 7 3, 7 
Age range (yrs, months) 3,1 – 3,10 3,2 – 3,11 3,3 – 3,11 
Gender (M/F) 8 / 2 5 / 5 7 / 3 
Drawer 
N 10 10 10 
Mean age (yrs, months) 3, 6 3, 6 3, 6 
Age range (yrs, months) 3,1 – 3,11 3,1 – 3,10 3,2 – 3,10 
Gender (M/F) 4 / 6 6 / 4 5 / 5 
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with a hidden drawer that popped open when secretly operated by foot pedal (as music 
box), inside the drawer was a necklace. 
 
Procedure 
The first half of the experiment followed the same procedure as the previous 
experiments. Children were engaged in the warm-up task and first distractor task leading to 
the exposure session where mittens “whispered” in the experimenter’s ear to which E 
responded, “Ok but we need to use the Koba”. 
 Music Box task:  As before, the experimenter then selected the target artefact and 
bounced it along the top of the music box 3 times, pressing the secret foot pedal to activate 
the music (a 20 second sound clip from a popular children’s television theme tune). As the 
song finished Mittens “whispered” to E for a second time to which she replied “No, we can’t 
do it again, we have lots to do!” and put the music box away under the table (removing the 
substrate from view to prevent any visual memory cues or associations during testing).  
 Drawer Box task: The drawer condition was identical apart from the substrate. E 
similarly selected the target artefact and said, “Ok, but we need to use the Koba” and 
bounced it along the top of the drawer box 3 times. Unseen by the child, the experimenter 
pressed the foot pedal that activated the drawer release. The drawer opened and the 
experimenter took a necklace from it, which she placed around the puppets neck. As before, 
Mittens “whispered” to the experimenter again, but she said “No, we can’t do it again, we 
have lots to do!” and placed the drawer-box on the floor under the table (removing the 
substrate from view).  
In both conditions, the children were then engaged in the second distractor task and 
the testing session followed 6 – 7 days later. During the testing session, with the original four 
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novel artefacts on display, children were asked one of three questions depending on their 
experimental condition allocation. In the naming condition they were asked, “Which one is 
the koba?”, in the action condition “Which one do we do this with?” (pantomiming the 
action) or in the function condition “Which one starts the music playing?”.  
 
3.4.3 Results 
As you can see from Figure 3.4 we have a large disparity between the results of the 
knowledge type conditions. Action information appears notably easier for the children to 
learn (retain and recall) than both name and function information under these more 
challenging exposure conditions. 
 
Running a 3-way, hierarchical, log-linear analysis, the overall model was not 
significant (substrate*information type*accuracy: χ2 (2) = 3.122, p = 0.210). Examining the 

































eliminated effects indicates no significant interaction between the substrate used and 
accuracy (substrate*accuracy: χ2 (1) = 1.745, p = 0.186). However, a significant interaction 
was found between information type and accuracy (information type*accuracy: χ2 (2) = 
23.857, p < .001). 
Chi squared analysis further confirms that the only condition in the model that has a 
significant effect on comprehension accuracy is information type (information type * 
accuracy: χ2 (2) = 22.127, p ≤ 0.001). Running binomial distribution analyses, only children in 
the action condition recorded accuracy levels that found them successfully selecting the 
target artefact significantly more often than chance, set at 25% (action exact binomial, p < 
.001). A final Chi-squared analysis revealed no significant differences between gender (χ2 (1) 
= 0.380, p = .538). 
 
3.4.4 Discussion 
Using the original fast mapping methodology (two incidental demonstrations during 
one brief exposure) young children were able to retain and recall all novel artefact 
information at the same rate (Experiment 4). However, once we increased the demands of 
the task, children only retained one type of information: action. Examining 3-year-olds on a 
comprehension test, following a single demonstration of use during the exposure session, 
produced good retention of the artefact-action mapping, but poor retention of the artefact-
name and artefact-function mappings.  This indicates that children may find it easier to learn 
the actions associated with artefacts than their functions and names. Moreover, these 
findings were replicated when using a new function and substrate. There were no significant 
differences found between the music box and drawer box conditions. I have not pursued this 
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further in my thesis but future research will be needed to investigate the extent to which my 
findings generalise to other artefact-substrate-functions combinations. 
Finally, I do not claim, based on these data, that children always learn artefact-
action mappings after one demonstration, and artefact-name and artefact-function 
mappings after two. Many other factors will influence children’s learning about artefacts.  
Sometimes children will recall all three kinds of information, and other times they will learn 
nothing. However, my data suggest that action learning is favoured over name and function 
learning. So if children are only going to remember one mapping after observing a novel 
artefact name, action and function, it seems likely to be the artefact-action mapping that is 
retained. Once children can successfully understand and comprehend this artefact 
information, it is then necessary to learn how to replicate and produce it for themselves.  
 
 




Ultimately, to successfully use an artefact in an ‘adult like’ fashion you must not only 
be able to understand its name, action and function, but be able to produce them yourself. 
In the word learning literature several studies document how hard children find word 
production following brief incidental exposures, even when comprehension is good (e.g., 
Carey & Bartlett, 1978; Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Childers & Tomasello, 2002). As 
previously mentioned, there is little prior research into children’s comprehension or 
production of action (and function). There are two key articles that have previously 
investigated action production:  Childers and Tomasello (2002) and Hahn and Gershkoff-
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Stowe (2010).  Neither of these studies meet my definition of fast mapping (see section 
1.2.1); and used actions that were arguably functionless (see section 2.5).  My Experiment 7 
is the first to test of production following fast mapping observing an artefact in use, with an 
action that produces an obvious function. 
 The first to investigate learning of artefact action were Childers and Tomasello 
(2002). Under various training conditions children were taught either six novel words (six 
nouns or six verbs) or six novel actions through ostensive labelling of a novel artefact; 
children were tested on both comprehension and production. In the comprehension 
condition, children were very good at recalling the target artefacts in all word and action 
conditions. However, children were able to reproduce more novel actions more accurately 
than they were able to reproduce novel words (nouns and verbs). In the verb condition, 
children often reproduced the physical action represented by the verb, instead of the word 
label.  The second article, Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe (2010), compared the mappings of novel 
artefacts’ names and actions. Immediately after the exposure session children were assessed 
on their comprehension and production knowledge. The young children, as expected, passed 
comprehension tests for both conditions, but whilst being able to successfully produce the 
many actions, they produced far fewer names. 
I compared comprehension and production using the earlier fast mapping 
methodology from Experiment 4. Having found no significant difference between 
comprehension accuracy for names and action, would the same pattern be observed for 
production accuracy? I compared actions and names, but not functions. It is impossible to 
produce a function independent of an action. A function is the goal achieved by making a 
specific action with a specific artefact on the appropriate substrate. In terms of ‘real life’ use, 
we start with a function or goal in mind (e.g., slicing bread from a loaf) and select the correct 
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artefact (e.g., a bread knife) and perform the correct action (e.g., a sawing motion) to 
achieve it. As such, we would be unable to ask children to physically produce the function 
without them reproducing the action – and if they produce the action It is impossible to be 
sure whether they expect the function to be its consequence. Although, asking children to 
describe an artefact’s function in words is ‘sort of’ producing its function, it relies on 
children’s ability to translate their understanding of function into a coherent description. I 
felt that as this could be a challenging task for young children, the data were likely to under-
estimate their function knowledge. 
Using the fast mapping methodology from Experiment 4, 4-5-year-old children were 
given the same incidental demonstrations during exposure, and during testing were asked 
only one question (depending on their allocated condition). A 2x2x2 factorial design was 
used with, information type (name vs. action), test type (comprehension vs. production) and 
time delay (immediate vs. delay). I hypothesised, based on previous studies, that the 
comprehension of both name and action would remain good: however, that action 
production would be better than name production. Having observed no difference between 
immediate and delayed comprehension in Experiment 4, I had no grounds to predict 
differences in production in this experiment.  Nevertheless it was worth testing both time 





128 four and 5-year-old children took part, (range 4;1 - 5;4, mean age 4;8), 63 boys 
and 65 girls (see Table 3.4). As in Experiment 4, all children were from a primary school in 
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Greater London.  As before, permission was given by both head teachers and class teachers 
and parents were given the opportunity for their children to opt out of the study. 
Additionally, at this school parents had already signed permission slips allowing their 
children to be photographed and filmed at school.  
 
Design 
The experiment used a 2x2x2 factorial design. The independent variables were 
information type (name / action), task type (comprehension / production) and time interval 
(immediate / delay). The dependent variable was comprehension and production accuracy. 
3.4: Experiment 7 – Table to Show Age and Gender Breakdown Across Conditions. 
Test Type Time Delay Measure Name Action 
Comprehension 
Immediate 
n 16 16 
Mean age (yrs, months) 4,9 4,8 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,7 – 5,1 4,3 – 5,4 
Gender (M/F) 10 / 6 9 / 7 
Delay 
n 16 16 
Mean age (yrs, months) 4,10 4,8 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,6 – 5,1 4,2 – 5,0 
Gender (M/F) 5 / 11 7 / 9 
Production 
Immediate 
n 16 16 
Mean age (yrs, months) 4,8 4,7 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,4 – 5,2 4,1 – 5,2 
Gender (M/F) 6 / 10 9 / 7 
Delay 
n 16 16 
Mean age (yrs, months) 4,8 4,8 
Age range (yrs, months) 4,4 – 5,1 4,2 – 5,2 
Gender (M/F) 8 / 8 9 / 7 
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Materials and Procedure 
All the materials and procedure were identical to the previous experiment until the 
testing session. Once again children were unsystematically allocated to the immediate or 
delay condition and asked either of following questions (depending on their allocated 
condition) whilst the experimenter was holding the target artefact: “Can you tell me what 
this is called?” and “Can you show me how you use this?” The responses to the action 
question “Can you show me how to use this?” were filmed so if necessary, a second 
experimenter could confirm the correct actions were performed. 
 
3.5.3 Results 
Merely looking at the percentage accuracy scores (Figure 3.4), we can already see a 
large difference between comprehension and production results. The comprehension results 
replicate that of Experiment 4, each condition were equally successful in retaining and 
recalling the correct information. However, in the production data we can see that there was 
a strong difference between name and action conditions when asked to reproduce the 
information. 
Only three children produced names that replicated the original: koba, kuba and 
kaba. Two children produced names that were similar but ultimately incorrect: skuba and 
kroba and three children gave the artefact a new name of their own: poppal, quata and pepi. 
Five children named the artefact based on its appearance: green circle, ball, helicopter, fan, 
and spiky ball. The remaining 19 children gave no response, mostly remaining silent following 





As clearly visible in Figure 3.4, the children found it far easier to replicate the action 
they had seen rather than the name they had heard. It was not possible to analyse a four-
way log-linear model (information type, time interval, test type, accuracy), as there was no 
variance in the delayed name production condition (no one produced the name after a 
delay). However, a preliminary chi-squared test revealed no significant association between 
time interval and accuracy (χ2 (1) = 0.876, p = 0.349) allowing data across this variable to be 
collapsed. 
A three-way log linear analysis included information type (name or action), task type 
(comprehension or production) and accuracy produced a final saturated model retaining a 
three-way interaction between task type*information type*accuracy: χ2 (1) = 17.451, p < 
0.001. To break down this effect, individual chi square tests were performed. As expected we 
saw significant associations between accuracy and test type, whether the children undertook 






































Figure 3.4: Experiment 7 – Graph to Show Percentage Accuracy Results Across Conditions. 
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association between accuracy and information type, whether they were asked to recall 
artefact name or artefact action. (χ2 (1) = 15.444, p = 0.001). The odds ratio is a useful 
measure of effect size, in this instance we can see that children are likely to produce a novel 
action 25 times more, than they are likely to produce a novel word. 
As before, running a final three-way log linear analysis age group*gender*accuracy 
we found no significant differences or interactions between any of the participants’ naturally 
occurring groups (χ2 (1) = 0.537, p = 0.467). 
 
3.5.4 Discussion 
Experiment 7 investigated comprehension and production accuracy. As with the 
previous comprehension data from Experiment 4, these data suggest that young children are 
able to of fast map artefact names and actions after a brief, incidental exposure and 
demonstrate their knowledge in a comprehension test one-week later. Also as with previous 
data, there were no significant differences between the immediate and delay condition. 
These data suggest that, when it comes to a test of comprehension, children’s memory is 
relatively stable over a week. 
In contrast, there were significant differences between artefact name and action 
production. Perhaps most strikingly, children were unable to reproduce the name even in 
the immediate condition. Whereas, children in the action production condition were still 
able to successfully produce the target action after a one-week delay. In addition, there 
appears to be no loss of information for action production after a long-term delay. If children 
had mapped the action in the short-term, it appears it was retained for the long-term. Thus 
my data suggest that children’s ability to produce artefact actions is substantially better than 
producing artefact names.  
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It is difficult to assess the rate of loss of information loss for name production, as 
children were unable to produce the name even in immediate condition. It is worth noting 
that even this condition included a short delay as a distracter task followed the exposure 
session. It would be interesting to compare performance immediately after exposure, to that 
following the distracter task. This would indicate whether children are able to successfully 
produce the name after just hearing it and then, whether there is rapid information loss 
even during the short delay of the distractor task. 
 Although I hypothesised that action production would be better that name 
production, what is surprising was size of the difference. This striking difference is even more 
pronounced than in Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010). If even two demonstrations can lead 
to near perfect action production, then in previous studies with more demonstrations (e.g. 
approximately six times in Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010), researchers may have under-
estimated the difference between action and word production results.  
So why do we find such disparity between the production but not comprehension of 
actions and names? The following discussion considers the complexity of the stimuli (actions 
versus words) and the relationship between their input and output representations (e.g., 
seeing making an action versus hearing speaking a word). This analysis is speculative, 
although there are data from other literatures to support it. 
Firstly, it could be that actions are just simpler than words. One way to explain why 
words are so hard to produce relates to their complexity (Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister & 
Riggs, 2013; Simpson & Carroll, 2014). Words are more complex than actions, because they 
comprise a very precise series of transient phonemes produced at speed. It has been long 
established that humans cannot distinguish non-speech sounds presented at the same speed 
at which phonemes are produced in words during typical speech (Liberman, 1957). It may 
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therefore be very difficult for children to encode all the phonemes in a novel word with 
sufficient precision for them to be able to produce it.  Nevertheless the word representation 
may be sufficiently detailed to pass a comprehension test – with children remembering the 
artefact that was named and having some idea of word used.  In contrast the action used in 
my task (e.g., three bounces on the upper surface of the music box) was simpler and 
produced more slowly than the word.  It may be much easier to create a sufficiently detailed 
representation of this action, and so output it in the production test. 
Imitation research suggests that when children (.g., Taylor & Diamond, 1996; Simpson 
& Riggs, 2011) and adults (for a review see Brass & Heyes, 2005) watch an action, this 
automatically activates an output representation of this action. The discovery of mirror 
neurons (Rizzolatti, 1992; Iacoboni et al., 1999) goes some way to explain why seeing an 
action may automatically generate an output representation of that action. Neuroscientists 
discovered that the motor system is activated both when making the actions and 
experiencing them. This would suggest that, in my task, when children see the novel action 
performed with a novel artefact, a representation of how to produce this action is formed. 
Thus when seeing the artefact again, this motor representation is available to be produced.  
Recent research has suggested that the link between the sound of a word and the 
motor gesture used to make it may also be automatically activated with the discovery of 
echo neurons (Kohler, Keysers, Umilta, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2002).  In addition 
several studies with adults have suggesting that perceiving speech sounds does indeed 
activate the motor code associated with those sounds (Kohler et al., 2002; Watkins, Stafella 
& Paus, 2003; Fadiga et al., 2002). However studies conducted with children have found no 
evidence for such automatic activation (Simpson, et al., 2013; Simpson & Carroll, 2014).  
Simpson and colleagues compared automatic activation of actions and words in children. 
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They obtained evidence that actions were automatically activated while words were not.  
This is consistent with the proposal that seeing an action generates an output, motor 
representation of that action, but hearing a word does not generate such an output 
representation. 
At present it is not clear why the action production is so much better than word 
production following fast mapping.  One possibility is that seeing an action generates a 
motor representation that can be used in a production test; whereas hearing a word 
generates no such representation.  This difference may be related to the great complexity of 
words. 
 
3.6 General Discussion 
 
3.6.1 Summary of Results 
This chapter aimed to investigate learning of the information required to use 
artefacts. In Chapter 1 I discussed that we need to know information about an artefact’s 
name, action and function as a prerequisite for using it and understand how it works. 
Chapter 2 results indicate that children are able to fast map novel artefact name and action. 
Using the same stringent definition of fast mapping (incidental learning, minimal exposure 
and long-term retention), Chapter 3 investigated whether this would extend to learning 
artefact function. The methodology for Experiment 4 used substrate (music box), action 
(bounce along the top of box), name (koba) and function (making the music play).  It was 
carefully designed to allow ‘real-world’ brief, incidental observation of a novel artefacts use. 
This procedure facilitated direct comparison of name, action and function. Comprehension 
tests suggested that young children are good learning all this artefact knowledge: with 
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excellent performance in both the immediate and delay conditions (after a week). I saw no 
significant differences between the name, action and function data. 
 In Experiment 5 the exposure conditions were manipulated: whether the novel target 
artefact was labelled and the number of demonstrations (one or two), to see if either would 
affect long-term retention of the artefact-function mapping. Children’s results were not 
affected by whether or not the experimenter labelled the novel artefact. In both the with-
label and no-label condition children were able to recall the target artefact at levels 
significantly above chance after a one week delay. However, results were affected when 
children only saw one demonstration of the artefact in use. Although children recalled the 
target artefact at levels above chance in both conditions, children who saw two 
demonstrations recalled the target artefact significantly more than children who saw only 
one demonstration. Experiment 6 aimed to obtain a dissociation between artefact name, 
action and function learning. The more challenging, single demonstration during exposure 
was used, and performance compared on two substrates (a music box and a drawer box). No 
significant differences were found between the two substrates – providing initial evidence 
that my results are generalisable. With regards to information type, only the artefact-action 
was retained after a week, performance on the name and functions conditions was no better 
than chance.  
 In Experiment 7, using the same methodology as Experiment 4, children were tested 
on naming and action production. As with Experiment 4 there were no significant differences 
between the immediate and the delay conditions, children either performed well or poorly in 
both conditions. Comprehension results matched that of Experiments 2 and 4, children were 
successful at selecting the target artefact in both the immediate and delay conditions. 
However, production results demonstrated that 75% of children could still successfully 
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produce the novel artefact’s action after a week’s delay; only 19% could produce its name 
even in the immediate condition. Whilst children had mapped the information sufficiently 
well to pass a comprehension test, production of the novel artefact action was clearly much 
better than production of the novel artefact name.  
 In short, two key findings have emerged regarding artefact information 
learning. Firstly, that following a strict fast mapping regime children can rapidly learn 
artefact mappings to name, action and function. However, if this ability is put under real 
pressure – by providing just a single presentation of the novel artefact information or by 
asking children to produce rather than just comprehend the information – then it breaks 
down.  Under the most stringent tests children seem to remember the artefact-action 
mapping, while forgetting the name and function mappings. 
 
3.6.2 Action Learning and Embodied Cognition 
In the most challenging conditions children only retain the artefact-action mapping. 
Why is this the case? Theories of embodied cognition suggest that children first learn about 
the world through sensorimotor input and only later turn this knowledge into a conceptual 
representation (e.g., Boncoddo, Dixon & Kelley, 2010; Lockman, 2000). Embodied cognition 
was first historically proposed by Herbart (1825) but arguably, it is with Piaget (1952), that 
this idea is most clearly applied to child development. Embodied cognition researchers now 
consider sensorimotor input to be a crucial element in the processes by which children 
acquire knowledge and achieve representational changes (e.g., Lockman, 2000; Rakison & 
Woodward, 2008; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010).  
Embodied cognition theorists propose that action provides the foundation for the 
development of conceptual representation. Lockman (2000) proposes that early motor skills 
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of neonates and young infants develop into early instances of artefact use. Motor patterns 
produced in early infancy are then repeated as infants start to interact with objects. For 
example hand to mouth action develop to enable infants to feeding themselves (Connolly & 
Dalgleish, 1989), or a side to side action becomes the first mark making behaviour and will in 
time lead to drawing (Palmer, 1989). Having mastered these (relatively) simple sensorimotor 
skills, infants are then ready to focus on the affordance of artefacts and problem-solving tool 
use (Lockman, 2000).  In time, I believe, these sensorimotor skills can help young children to 
make sense of many of the artefacts that they see adults using (Sommerville, Woodward & 
Needham, 2005).  This notion of sensorimotor foundation extends to young children learning 
novel words; they derive meaning and learn artefact names using the same systems to 
assimilate novel word information to previously stored sensorimotor representations. 
Moreover, this works bi-directionally, when retrieving a word, the sensorimotor 
representations associated with it are also activated (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).  
Recent research suggests that the effect of action on cognition continues well beyond 
infancy (Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Boncoddo, Dixon & Kelley, 2010). With regards to 
artefact use, it is suggested that artefacts are represented through the patterns of activation 
elicited in the sensorimotor system. As an example, Boncoddo, Dixon and Kelley (2010), 
investigated the role of action in the emergence of new representations in 3- to 5-year-old 
participants using gear-system problems. They suggested that children of this age would not 
spontaneously understand the physics behind a series of gears (i.e., gears in direct contact 
turn in opposite directions). They hypothesised that children would need to follow the 
direction of the gears turning by physically using their hands to the direction of movement of 
the arrows.  They found that the more children used this manual force-tracing method, the 
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faster they understood how the gears worked. Boncoddo and colleagues (2010) suggested 
that their results supported the embodied cognition proposal that new conceptual 
representations emerge from physical interactions with the environment and are ultimately 
grounded in action. 
Looking at the results from this chapter, it appears that young children are most 
receptive to artefact action knowledge.  Broadly these data are therefore in keeping with the 
embodied cognition approach.  If, as my data suggest, children may learn the actions 
associated with artefacts first, the first representation that a child has of a novel artefact 
may contain a mapping between the artefact’s shape and the action made with it.  More 
information about the artefact’s name and the function that it performs may only be added 
later. 
 
The Next Chapter 
To investigate this further I examine young children’s category formation. For 
children to form artefact categories, they have to recognise similarities in artefact 
characteristics. Firstly, I establish which artefact information children see as characteristic 
features of an artefact. Experiment 8 investigates whether children will demonstrate 
mutually exclusive behaviour with regards to an artefacts name, action and function. If 
children were reluctant to attach more than one name/action/function to a novel artefact, it 
would suggest that they see these features as characteristic of that category.  
Experiment 9 uses a forced-choice procedure to establish which of these 
characteristic features children deem definitive. That is, which feature defines category 
membership? Young children are often seen to categorise by shape, however there is an on-
going deliberation as to why this occurs (Cantrell & Smith, 2013; Booth 2014). The 
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Attentional Learning Accounts (ALA) and Shape-as-Cue Accounts (SCA) contest whether 
shape is a cue to an artefact’s name or its function. There is evidence that children will 
categorise simply by shape (e.g., Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996). Others suggest that when 
function is clear and plausible, young children will categorise using function (e.g., Kemler 
Nelson, 1999). However, no previous research has considered action (embodied cognition 
theories) to be a feature that children may use to categorise artefacts. In Experiment 9 I 













Chapter Four  
 
Do Children Regard Action and Function as Defining or Merely 








Data from the previous chapters suggest that children can fast map a variety of 
information, notably, artefact name, action and function. However, this is not the case for all 
novel information (Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015; Holland, Riggs & Simpson, 2015). It 
has been suggested that children will only fast map “socially transmitted information” 
(Bloom, 2000; Childers & Tomasello, 2002). This socially transmitted information includes the 
names, action and functions associated with artefacts. Clearly, names can only be learnt 
from other people. Likewise, information made available when an artefact’s use is 
demonstrated (i.e., action and function), is not available again without further 
demonstrations, and thus should to be mapped efficiently as soon as it is observed. In 
contrast, placing a sticker on an artefact is stored visually in its environment. Placement of a 
sticker on a novel object has previously been used to investigate what children will, and in 
this instance, won’t fast map (Markson & Boom, 1997; Riggs et al., 2015). Potentially in a 
week’s time that sticker will still be in place, so there is no need to retain that information 
when one can simply see it again.  
Another significant feature of the type of information children will fast map about 
artefacts, is that it is all relevant to artefact categories (Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Riggs et 
al., 2015). Usually, the name, action and function associated with an artefact are properties 
common to all the items that belong to that artefact’s category. Maybe children simply learn 
the information that is most reliably associated with a category. There is little point trying to 
retain information that is only relevant to an individual item that you may never encounter 
again, it is more important to remember information that is relevant to all items of a 
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particular kind. This would suggest that children understand (if perhaps only implicitly) that 
an artefact’s name, action and function are characteristic features of the artefact’s category. 
Initially we need to examine exactly what information children understand to be a 
characteristic feature of an artefact kind. What information do they believe to be an intrinsic 
feature of the artefact, consistent across other category members? By ‘category-
characteristic’ information, I do not necessarily mean information that is category defining 
(i.e., information that must be true of an item for it to belong to a category). When it comes 
to artefacts, it is possible that name, action or function, are all category-characteristic 
information. One way to examine this is to investigate whether children apply the principal 
of mutual exclusivity to this information. 
It is well established that children will not attach more than one name to an artefact 
kind (Markman, 1990; Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; 
Riggs et al., 2015). An artefact’s name is seen to be a characteristic feature of that category. 
It is socially agreed, enduring and extendable to other within-category members (Golinkoff, 
Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994, Waxman & Booth, 2000; Childers & Tomasello, 2003; Riggs et 
al., 2015). Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson (2015) obtained evidence consistent with children 
applying a similar mutually exclusive principle with regards to artefact action in referent 
selection tasks. In Experiment 1, I obtained evidence consistent with children applying the 
similar mutually exclusive principle to artefact action in referent selection tasks. In 
Experiment 2 I obtained evidence that children can fast map this information and extend it 
(i.e., apply it to other category members) with long-term retention. We have similarly 
demonstrated fast mapping and long-term retention of function, but do children show 
mutual exclusivity with function as well? 
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4.1.1 Mutual Exclusivity and Referent Selection Tasks 
The term ‘mutual exclusivity’ has previously been strongly associated with word 
learning principles. Fast mapping was also initially believed to be specific to word learning; 
however, we have now found it applies to artefact information needed for use. Perhaps we 
should think of ‘mutual exclusivity’ as the domain-general behaviour of only attaching one 
piece of category-characteristic information to a category. 
As with a discussion on fast mapping, there are two main accounts used to explain 
mutual exclusivity. The first is a domain specific approach, suggesting mutual exclusivity is a 
behaviour unique to word learning and the acquisition of lexical categories. Certainly, when 
learning a novel word, children by two years of age seem to understand that one cannot 
attach more than one label to each artefact (Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Golinkoff, Mervis & 
Hirsch-Pasek, 1994; Merriman & Bowman, 1989). That is to say, when given one familiar and 
one unfamiliar artefact and presented with a novel name, children in their second year will 
assume that the unfamiliar label attaches to the unfamiliar artefact (17 months – Halberda, 
2003; 18 months – Markman, Wasow & Hansen, 2003; 24 months – Horst & Samuelson, 
2008).  
The second explanation follows a domain general approach, suggesting that this 
mutually exclusive behaviour will be observed with any category-characteristic information.  
There is clear evidence that children apply the mutual exclusivity principle to artefact actions 
in a referent selection task (Experiment 2, Chapter 2; Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015).  
Indeed, children seem to apply the mutual exclusivity principle to any information that can 
be used to distinguish two items in a referent selection task. For example, Diesendruck and 
Markson (2001) detail three studies in which three-year-olds are given referent selection 
tasks and asked to identify the target exemplar based on a novel label or a novel fact. The 
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children were shown two novel artefacts; the experimenter labels one (e.g. zev) or tells the 
children a novel fact about it (e.g. my sister gave me this). Children are then asked to pass 
the artefact with a different label (e.g. bem) or expressing a new fact (e.g. my dog likes to 
play with).  
Diesendruck and Markson (2001) observed that children were equally reluctant to 
attach two facts to an artefact, as they were two names. They suggest children take a socially 
pragmatic approach to novel artefact information, which results in a mutually exclusive 
behaviour. Simply, if the experimenter had meant for me to select the first artefact then they 
would have used the same name they labelled it with (or the same fact expressed) before. 
Once a child has observed an adult attach a fact to an item, they then expect the same fact 
to be used to label that item in future. If a different fact is then mentioned, children tend to 
assume that it must apply to another item – leading to mutually exclusive behaviour with 
facts. 
Results from an action referent selection task (Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015) 
indicate that children must possess a similar level of understanding that each artefact will 
have its own specific action. As such, children demonstrate similar mutually exclusive 
behaviour when encountering action-based referent selection tests. We have demonstrated 
an understanding that an artefact’s action is normative and enduring (consistent after a 
week’s delay) as children extend this novel action mapping to novel exemplars within the 
same category (Experiment 2, Chapter 2; Riggs, Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015; Childers & 
Tomasello, 2003). Moreover, these data suggest that children demonstrate mutually 
exclusive, one-to-one mapping (one artefact has one action) with regards to artefact action 
(Experiment 3, Chapter 2; Riggs Mather, Hyde & Simpson, 2015). When shown a second 
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novel action, children avoided selecting the original novel target and instead selected an 
alternative novel artefact. 
 
4.1.2 Testing Mutual Exclusivity and Function using Referent Selection  
  Children demonstrating mutually exclusive behaviour indicate an understanding of a 
one-to-one correspondence between an artefact and characteristic information (e.g., one 
artefact-one action). Ultimately, I want to know if children understand there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between an artefact and a function? No one has previously tested mutual 
exclusivity of function using referent selection tasks. However, some research provides 
evidence of mutually exclusive behaviour using other tasks, outlined below (e.g., Casler & 
Kelemen, 2005; Casler, Terizyan & Greene, 2009; Defeyter & German, 2003; Casler, 2014). 
Casler and colleagues (2005, 2007, 2009) have previously investigated what children 
understand about the properties of an artefact’s function. Casler and colleagues believe 
young children display evidence that they understand artefacts are made for something, 
even if they do not yet know what that something is (Casler, Terizyan and Greene, 2009). 
Casler and Kelemen (2005 – methodology detailed in section 3.1.1; 2007) demonstrated a 
novel artefact performing a novel function, in the presence of physically similar foils. They 
found that when asked which item was needed for achieving the demonstrated novel 
function, children as young as 2-years-old would repeatedly select the target artefact, even if 
alternative artefacts with the same physical affordances were available. Casler and Kelemen 
(2005) suggest that after just one exposure to an adult intentionally using a novel artefact 
children rapidly and enduringly construe that artefact as for that specific function. This 
certainly indicates that children are beginning to understand a specific artefact-function 
correspondence. 
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Casler, Terizyan and Greene (2009) aimed to investigate young children’s awareness 
of artefact function exclusivity. Two and 3-year-olds were shown four familiar and four novel 
artefacts, and their functions demonstrated by an experimenter (E1). The children were also 
invited to try the function for themselves. A second experimenter (E2) then entered (having 
not seen the original demonstrations) who wanted to demonstrate the function themselves. 
In two of the demonstrations, E2 attempted to use the artefact in a way that directly 
contravened E1’s use (e.g. a key stirring food). The children’s behaviour was examined to see 
if they reacted to the incorrect usage (e.g., did they try to show E2 how to use it correctly or 
laugh at them doing it wrong?). After each trial the children were asked what each item was 
for, to test to see if they treated E2’s demonstrations as the artefact’s intended use. 
Overall, when asked what each item was ‘for’, both 2- and 3-year-olds reported E1’s 
original demonstrated use, suggesting once again that children understand an artefact to be 
for a specific function. Regarding the second novel action of E2, 3-year-olds’ behaviour 
consistently suggested that E2 was perceived as ‘wrong’. This included directly reporting to 
E1 about E2’s errant actions, attempting to teach E2 how to do it right, and questioning E2’s 
behavior (this behaviour was less marked in 2-year-olds). Moreover, this was consistent for 
both the familiar artefacts, with well-known functions, and the novel artefacts, whose 
functions they had just learned. Casler, Terizyan & Greene (2009) suggest that by two years 
of age children are starting to develop this understanding of exclusive artefact-function use. 
They propose that it is not yet a complete or a ‘robust grasp’ but that this was more 
pronounced by 3-years-old. 
Casler and colleagues’ data (2005, 2007, 2009) suggest that at two years of age, 
children have not yet formed exclusive artefact-function correspondence. Specifically, 
although consistently choosing the target artefact to perform the original function, 2-year-
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old children would not always reject it when asked to perform a second function. However, 
by the age of 3-years-old, children are beginning to understand that an artefact’s function is 
both stable and exclusive. Reviewing Casler and colleagues work (2005, 2007, 2009) would 
suggest that this understanding strengthens between the ages of 2- and 5-years-old. It 
appears that once children do understand an artefact’s function, it is clear it should not have 
a secondary function- its function is fixed; indicative of a one-to-one artefact-function 
correspondence. 
Once again using a different approach (to both my referent selection tasks and that 
of Casler and colleagues), other researchers have investigated this ‘functional fixedness’ 
(German & Defeyter, 2000; Defeyter & German, 2003; Defeyter, Avons & German, 2007). 
German and Defeyter (2000) describe functional fixedness as a behaviour demonstrated 
when participants are “hindered in reaching the solution to a problem by their knowledge of 
an artefact’s conventional function” (p. 707). In other words, when children’s one-to-one 
artefact-function correspondence is fixed, they then struggle to use an item to perform a 
second function to solve a problem.  
Defeyter and German (2003) tested 5- and 7-year-olds using problem solving tasks. 
The children were required to inhibit the conventional use of an artefact to successfully solve 
a problem, using its features in an unconventional manner. They suggest that the more 
concrete the children’s understanding of functional fixedness the longer it will take to inhibit 
the tool’s conventional function and complete the task. This is exactly what they found; the 
5-year-old children were faster at completing the task as they were less constrained by a 
tool’s normative function. For children to complete the functional fixedness task successfully, 
it required them to override their usual mutually exclusive behaviour in order to, if only 
temporarily, attribute a second use to a single artefact. This was easier for the younger, 5-
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year-old participants, suggesting that this one-to-one artefact-function correspondence is 
not yet fully defined. The children’s results suggest that this deeper understanding of 
artefact function is not fully developed until approximately 7-years-old. 
In line with Defeyter and colleagues’ view that this one-to-one view of function is not 
developed in younger children, more recently, Casler (2014) has reported an investigation 
suggesting 2-year-olds do not utilise a mutually exclusivity principle with regards to artefact 
functions. Over the course of two days children took part in a series of trials testing whether 
they apply mutual exclusivity to novel names, facts and functions. Children were shown two 
novel artefacts. In the function condition, the first artefact was demonstrated fully 
performing a function (e.g., striking a bell). Initially, no function was demonstrated with the 
second artefact, but it was wrapped in paper to increase salience.  A cracker was placed on 
the table between the two artefacts. The experimenter then shielded the cracker and 
artefacts with a large screen, and crushed the cracker. The experimenter ensured an artefact 
banged the table, so children could hear there was a tool in use, and not simply the 
experimenter’s hand. The screen was then removed to reveal the end state of crumbs, but 
without revealing which artefact had been used. The experimenter placed both the bell box 
and a new cracker on the table with both the artefacts and asked the children “Can you show 
me how to do it?” The children could choose to either crush the cracker or ring the bell. 
Later a different colour ‘dax’ was included to test for extension.  
Casler (2014) found that two-year-olds did not show mutual exclusivity with function.  
In fact 92% of children returned to the first artefact (the one whose function had been 
demonstrated), when asked to perform the second function.  In contrast young children did 
show mutual exclusivity with both names and facts (e.g., My mum gave it to me).  Casler 
(2014) concluded that although 2-year-olds are efficient mappers of artefact function, they 
 131 
do not demonstrate mutually exclusivity with this kind of artefact knowledge (i.e., one 
artefact - one function) – as older children and adults do. Casler suggests her data are 
consistent with the proposal that function learning does not use the same mutual exclusivity 
principle as fact and name learning.  
Overall, the data described in this section suggest a developmental increase in 
children’s understanding of artefact function as an enduring and exclusive characteristic 
feature. Perhaps children are only able to form more general conceptual understandings 
around the age of 3-years-old (e.g., artefacts are made for something), but do not fully 
develop a concrete one-to-one correspondence of artefact-function fixedness until around 7-
years-old. 
 As the methodologies in these previous experiments can be quite complex, I decided 
that seeing how children respond in a simple referent selection task makes a good starting 
point. In Experiment 8 I endeavour to administer a clear and definitive test of mutual 
exclusivity in young children using a referent selection task. Improving the methodology 
from Experiment 1 children were tested with both familiar and unfamiliar artefact 
information. I aim to replicate the results from Riggs et al. (2015) with artefact actions and 





4.2 Experiment 8: Do Young Children Treat Action and Function as Characteristic Features 
of an Artefact Category in a Referent Selection Task? 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In Experiment 8 I investigated two questions. Firstly, do children have a novelty bias 
or do they use the principle of mutual exclusivity in referent selection tasks with artefacts? In 
Experiment 1 I tested children with a novel name or action and this led to the selection of a 
novel artefact. This behaviour could reflect the application of mutual exclusivity or it could 
simply reflect a preference for picking a novel artefact – irrespective of how it was labelled.  
To distinguish these two possibilities in the current experiment I used both novel and familiar 
artefact information. If children consistently selected the unfamiliar artifacts, regardless of 
the familiarity of the artefact information, it would suggest that children were applying a 
simple novelty bias. For a mutually exclusive behavior to be demonstrated, children in the 
familiar condition should choose the familiar artefacts, and children in the novel condition 
should choose the novel artefacts.   
Secondly, do children treat names, action and functions as equally characteristic of an 
artefact category? If name, action and function are all seen as category-characteristic 
features, then they should all be used in a referent selection task – to select the familiar 
artefact when a familiar piece of information is used, and a novel artefact when a novel 
piece of information is used. If children do not see these as typical characteristics, then the 
novel name, action and function could be attached to either the familiar or novel artefact at 
random. 
There are some data to suggest that younger children treat artefact functions as 
category-characteristic features, perhaps even category defining features (e.g., Casler & 
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Kelemen, 2005; Casler, et al., 2009).  However, there are also data that suggest children do 
not treat functions as category-characteristic features until middle childhood (e.g., Defeyter 
& German, 2003; Defeyter, et al., 2007). In this experiment I tested 3-year-olds on a referent 





 Data were collected from 60 children, 31 boys and 29 girls, aged three to four years 
old with a mean age three years and eight months (for further breakdown please see Table 
4.1). All the children were enrolled in nursery classes at a Greater London Primary School. 
Both head teachers and class teachers gave permission for their pupils’ participation and 
then parents were given the opportunity for their children to opt out of the study. 
 
Design 
This experiment used a mixed design. The independent variables were familiarity 
(familiar information / novel information) and information type (name / action / function). 
The variable of familiarity was assessed between participants; the children were 
Table 4.1: Experiment 8 – Breakdown of Age and Gender of Participants. 
Measure Familiar Information Novel Information 
n 30 30 
Mean age (yrs; months) 3; 9 3; 8 
Age range (yrs; months) 3; 3 – 4; 3 3; 3 – 4; 2 
Gender (M / F) 14 / 16 17 / 13 
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unsystematically allocated to one of two experimental conditions (familiar information / 
novel information). Each child (in both groups) performed three separate trials, in a counter-
balanced order encompassing the within-participants variable of information type (name / 
action / function). Their judgements were recorded to examine the dependent variable of 
novelty selection.  
 
Materials 
Six artefacts were used during the experiment. There were three familiar artefacts (a 
key, a cup and a spoon), and three novel artefacts (a four-way radiator key, an adhesive 
spreader and a plastic air vent. The artefacts were grouped into a familiar and novel pairings 
as follows: 1) Large metal key & red plastic adhesive spreader, 2) Small plastic cup & green 
plastic round air vent cover and 3) Metal dessert spoon & black metal four-way radiator key. 
Each pairing was placed into a paper gift bag. The bags were of different sizes (small, 
medium and large), so that the experiment could ask the participant to look in a specific bag. 
The experiment also required colouring pencils and paper for the children to draw around 
their selected artefacts. 
 
Procedure 
All the children were tested individually with the experimenter in a quiet corner of 
their classroom. The children were invited to play a drawing game with the experimenter. 
The children were allowed to pick their favourite colour pencil and were asked to draw 
around the experimenter’s hand as a warm-up task. The children’s attention was then drawn 
towards three bags, each different in size and each containing one of the three pairs of 
artefacts. All children completed three trials, each trial focused on one information type 
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(name, action or function). At the beginning of trial the children were asked to select one of 
the bags (small, medium or large), remove the artefacts and put them on the table.   
 
Children in the familiar information condition were given demonstrations matching 
the familiar artefact (the target artefact’s name, action or function), and children in the novel 
information condition were given novel demonstrations on each trial. There were six 
different kinds of request that the experimenter made – familiar name, familiar action and 
familiar function or novel name, novel action and novel function. The same novel name, 
novel action and novel function questions were used for each child in the novel information 
condition. The artefacts were similarly counterbalanced in the familiar information 
condition; as such name, action and function questions were prepared for each of the three 
familiar artefacts. The order in which the pairs were presented, the information type order 
Table 4.2: Experiment 8 – List of Procedural Questions. 
Artefact Name 
Action 
Pantomiming action Function 
Novel 
Please can you 
pass me the koba? 
Please can you pass me the one 
we do this with? Rub artefact 
on arm 
Please can you pass me 
the one we use to clean a 
toaster? 
Key 
Please can you 
pass me the key? 
Please can you pass me the one 
we do this with? Pantomime 
turning key in lock 
Please can you pass me 
the one we use to open 
doors? 
Spoon 
Please can you 
pass me the 
spoon? 
Please can you pass me the one 
we do this with? Pantomime 
scooping soup to mouth 
Please can you pass me 
the one we use for 
eating? 
Cup 
Please can you 
pass me the cup? 
Please can you pass me the one 
we do this with? Pantomime 
lifting cup to mouth 
Please can you pass me 
the one we use for 
drinking? 
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and thus, which artefact pairs were attached to each information type, were 
counterbalanced to prevent any order or artefact bias. The 12 questions asked (name, action 
and function for each of the three familiar artefacts plus the novel name, action and function 
questions) are listed in Table 4.2.  
Once the children had selected the artefact they were then asked to draw around it, 
this also created a record of their selections. The child then helped tidy the artefacts back 
into the bag and proceeded with the next trial.  
 
4.2.3 Results 
 For children to demonstrate mutually exclusive behaviour they should select the 
familiar artefact when presented with a familiar word, action or function. In contrast, when 
presented with a novel word, action or function, children should select a novel artefact. As 
seen in Table 4.3, the majority of children demonstrated this mutually exclusive behaviour at 
levels above chance (50%) for all information types (binomial analysis, p<.001). Overall 92% 
of all participants demonstrated mutually exclusive behaviour selecting the familiar artefact 
in the familiar condition and the novel artefact in the novel condition. 
 
Table 4.3: Experiment 8 – Number of Participants Demonstrating Mutually Exclusive 
Behaviour Across Conditions. 
Information Type Familiar Information Novel Information 
Name 30/30* 29/30* 
Action 27/30* 25/30* 
Function 27/30* 28/30* 
*exact binomial p (one-tailed) < 0.001 (all conditions). 
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Further chi-squared analysis did not show any significant differences between the 
familiar or novel conditions for each information type: Name, χ2 (1) = 1.017, p = .313; Action, 
χ2 (1) = 0.577, p = .448; Function, χ2 (1) = 1.017, p = .301. Furthermore, there were no 
significant differences in the overall amount of children performing mutually exclusive 
behaviour in the novel or familiar conditions: χ2 (1) = 0.083, p = .773.  Following this, 
McNemar’s tests examined any differences between information types. Similarly we saw no 
significant differences between information types (see Table 4.4). 
 
These results support the Experiment 1 data (Chapter 2) and replicate Riggs, Mather, 
Hyde and Simpson (2015), in that when faced with a novel action, children once again 
excluded for potential referents any artefact whose use they were already familiar with. 





These results would certainly corroborate that children display a certain level of 
functional understanding by the age of 3-years-old. It appears that children will demonstrate 
equally mutually exclusive behaviour with regards to artefact name, action and function. This 
behaviour suggests that children do have some understanding that an artefact’s name, 
action and function are all consistent and enduring characteristic features across within 
Table 4.4: Experiment 8 – p value Results from McNemar’s Analyses. 






Familiar p = .250 p = .250 p > .999 
Novel p = .219 p > .999 p = .219 
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category members. If not, children would have been more willing to attach an unfamiliar 
function to a familiar artefact. Moreover, we are able to dismiss an attention to novelty 
explanation (as suggested after Experiment 1), as the children in the familiar condition did 
not simply pick the novel artefact. 
What cannot be discussed following these data alone is how children’s mutually 
exclusive reasoning is developed. As detailed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.1) there are a number 
of proposed principles in explanation for mutual exclusivity (ME), each precipitates the same 
outcome – children will attach a novel name to a novel artefact. As before, the aim of this 
research wasn’t to investigate which theory offers the best explanation of the observed 
behaviour. These results simply indicate that this phenomenon extends beyond words to 
artefact actions and functions. Discussion hereafter of ‘rejecting the familiar artefact’ or 
‘selecting the novel artefact’ is not indicative of an opinion on the process, merely the result.  
These results are consistent with the results from Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) and 
replicate those in Riggs, Mather, Hyde and Simpson (2015) finding that children will 
demonstrate mutually exclusive behaviour when observing artefact action. We can now 
further suggest that both artefact function and action were treated with equal regard to 
artefact name. This would certainly suggest that pre-school children seem to understand 
that artefacts have a specific name, action and function. Whilst children understand that an 
artefact should not have two names, they will also only attribute one action and one 
function to an artefact. 
However, these results initially appear inconsistent with Casler (2014), who reports 
that children were more willing to use an artefact to perform a second function. Casler took 
a very different approach to this investigation; as such there are a few methodological 
differences that could explain the differences in results. Firstly, there appears to be an 
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inequality in the approach towards each of the three information types she examined (name, 
fact and function). It is the differences in results that lead Casler to conclude against a 
general learning model yet it could the differences in exposure accountable.  
In the first experiment, the approach to testing was unbalanced. Children were asked 
a comprehension question regarding name and fact and then asked to produce the function. 
We know from both the research detailed in Chapter 3, and previous rapid learning research 
(Childers & Tomasello, 2002; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010), that production is likely to be a 
harder task. Moreover, a great deal more information is required to produce a function than 
comprehend a name. To produce the function the child will need to have encoded the tool, 
potentially the substrate, the physical action and the function (thus substrate change) and 
recalled all of that for successful re-use. This would be particularly difficult when they did not 
see the second demonstration of the tool, its action or its function. 
Casler explains that had function been merely explained (“This tool is for ringing 
bells”) that essentially the function task would not have differed from the fact task. 
However, in a second experiment function was examined as a comprehension test 
(functional fact condition) but this time, the exposure was further reduced. In the second 
experiment, children did not see any of the functional demonstration. The two-year-old 
participants had to infer it. As proposed in the previous chapter, potentially something about 
seeing a tool in use (a demonstration of its full action and function on a substrate) helps map 
its correct information for use. By occluding or not completing the tool functional 
demonstrations of either of the novel artefacts, maybe children did not reach the same level 
of understanding. Perhaps a condition that allowed demonstration of the tool in use but 
then tested all the information types equally using a comprehension question would have 
returned different results. 
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The method for Experiment 8 was far simpler than in Casler (2014), perhaps allowing 
clearer interpretation as a result. As children knew the function of the familiar artefacts they 
were then reluctant to attach a second function (action or name). Instead when presented 
with novel function information, children readily chose a novel artefact as the referent for 
that function.  
Contrary to Casler’s (2014) suggestion, these results suggest that there could be an 
underlying general learning process used to support artefact name, action and function 
learning. In these referent selection tasks children were as quick to attribute a novel function 
to a novel artefact, as they were a novel name or action. They rejected artefacts for which 
they already knew these features, thus demonstrating mutually exclusive behaviour. 
Although these results suggest children are starting to develop a one tool – one function 
rule, we cannot go as far as to suggest a fully concrete functional fixedness. This would 
require further investigation; perhaps a good place to start would be to replicate Experiment 
3 (Chapter 2) with regards to functional information. 
 Although demonstrating mutually exclusive behaviour is indicative of category 
formation, it is not a complete reflection of it. Referent selection tasks require an immediate, 
online judgement to be made when faced with two artefacts. This automatic judgement 
allows novel information to be rapidly attributed to a novel artefact. The referent selection 
data indicate that three-year-olds have some basic understanding that artefacts have a 
specific name, action, and function. Understanding that these features are characteristic 
suggests that they are consistent across that artefact kind to other members of its category. 
However, success at a referent selection task does not require learning, simply 
understanding. The fast mapping data (Chapter 3) show children can learn this artefact 
information for use after a brief exposure and retain it. 
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Mutual Exclusivity could be the link between learning and categorisation. In order for 
children to learn about artefacts in the real world, a mutually exclusive understanding is 
necessary to map novel information to novel artefacts. This prevents errors of over attaching 
novel information onto existing familiar artefacts. However, in order for this to occur, 
mutually exclusive behaviour requires an immediate, online judgement to occur, as is also 
required in categorisation tasks. 
Referent selection tasks make use of features that are characteristic of a category. 
However, despite the results from experiment 8, this does not furnish proof that children 
understand the specific one-to-one correspondence. Moreover, although it appears 
reasonable that children understand that name, action and function are characteristic 
features of artefacts, it does not tell us which of these information types is the defining 
feature of their category. Categorisation tasks make use of features that define a category. 
Name, action and function cannot all be definitive as what would happen if they were placed 
in direct conflict? 
Artefact categorisation tasks typically manipulate artefact features putting different 
components in conflict with one another. For example shape vs. colour, size or texture 
(Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988; Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe & Samuelson, 2002) or 
shape vs. function (Gentner, 1978; Smith Jones & Landau, 1996; Kemler Nelson and 
Students, 1995; Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke & Jones, 2000). It could be argued that, as 
shape so often affords function, (as recognised in the Shape-as-Cue Account) that putting 
shape and function in direct conflict with one another is not an ecologically valid way to 
assess categorisation. However, forced choice tasks are the only way to directly test and 
compare the different characteristic features that may be utilised during categorisation to 
see which of these features is deemed definitive. 
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4.3 Experiment 9: Do Children Treat Shape, Action or Function as Defining Features 
of an Artefact Category in a Forced-Choice Selection Task? 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 1 included a more detailed account of the background literature regarding 
children’s artefact categorisation. I detailed the occurrence of a shape bias in young children 
and the two leading accounts in explanation. Firstly, an Attentional Learning Account which 
dictates that children attend to shape as a cue for an artefacts name and thus, its category. 
Secondly, the Shape-as-Cue Account which suggests that children attend to shape as a cue to 
an artefact’s function, which in turn dictates its category. For more information please return 
to sections 1.5.2 through 1.5.5.  
For the remainder of the introduction I will introduce a proposal for potential 
categorisation using action as the definitive feature. I will then outline concerns with 
previous categorisation methodologies, before outlining the design for my own method.  
 
Categorisation Using Action 
No one has ever tested whether children (or adults) will categorise artefacts using 
action information. If, as suggested from fast-mapping data in previous chapter, that children 
can learn action information first, in a rapid learning environment would children first notice 
and thus use action as a criteria for discerning novel artefact categories? As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, an embodied cognition approach to learning suggests that children learn 
about the world through their actions in it. Lockman (2000) suggests that a link between 
artefacts and actions start developing early in the first year of life. Perone, Madole, Ross-
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Sheehy, Carey and Oakes (2008) state, “Action shapes how people experience the world and 
come to represent its contents.” (p. 1242).  
Perone et al. (2008) use 6-7-month-old infant participants to investigate the 
relationship between activity with artefacts and attention to artefact appearance. For the 
infants observing an action on an artefact, the action itself was more salient than the 
artefact appearance. Moreover, once the infants had interacted with the artefact it 
predicted their response to a novel artefact. Perone et al. (2008) suggest these results 
implicate emerging action systems as a mechanism for integrating information about 
artefact action and artefact appearance.  
They further suggest that the process of linking the appearance of artefacts with the 
types of actions performed is integral to recognising artefacts. Moreover, these actions may 
help infants learn important links between how an artefact appears and how it is used. 
Perhaps, if artefact action is of primary importance to assimilating artefact information 
(young children attach artefact shape and function knowledge to a particular action), this will 
emerge as the defining feature in young children’s categorisation. 
Thus far, no categorisation study that examines artefact shape versus artefact 
function as definitive for categorisation, accounts for artefact action. Returning back to the 
beginning of this debate Gentner (1978) briefly mentions actions. She discusses Clark’s 
(1973) and Nelson’s (1973) opposing views, reflecting that Nelson (1973) points out children 
are strongly interested in actions and functions asking questions such as “what is it?” and 
“what does it do?” Nelson (1973- cited in Gentner, 1978) suggests that children first learn 
the words for artefacts that they can physically act upon. She goes on to suggest that “Both 
theories hold that an artefact's normal motion is likely to be included in its early meaning, 
since motion is both perceptually salient and functionally important” (p138). It appears that 
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Piaget’s (1954) theories of learning via action in the world were considered vital to the 
learning of artefact function. However, as Piaget’s views went out of favour, action 
information also seemed to be less considered leaving simply artefact function and shape to 
be debated. 
Researchers since make little to no mention of action, it appears they have always 
included action to be part of a functional understanding rather than as a separate 
characteristic feature. With a new resurging interest in children’s artefact learning with 
regards to artefacts and their actions, perhaps we will see new understanding of the two 
features both separately and together. This experiment aims to establish how children will 




When designing the methodology it is important to review previous studies and 
address any methodological concerns, aiming to create as unbiased an approach as possible. 
It has been suggested that the conflicting results regarding- at the most basic level- shape 
versus function in early categorisation, can simply be attributed to methodologies and 
interpretations. Diesendruck, Hammer and Catz (2003) quite boldly suggest that none of the 
aforementioned studies provide unbiased or definitive contributions regarding physical or 
functional similarity to children’s artefact categories.  
Diesendruck et al. (2003) suggest that many categorisation studies possess potential 
physical and functional imbalances. Either functional information was not plausible or not 
explicitly available (Smith et al., 1996). Or it was overtly described thus making it the more 
salient feature (Diesendruck et al. 2003; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield et al., 2000).  Deák, Ray 
and Pick (2002) similarly note that adults repeatedly demonstrating particular features are 
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unwittingly indicating their intentions or desires, inadvertently guiding the child to select 
that attribute when generalising.  
To ensure methodological impartiality, I tried to ensure each function was equally 
salient, plausible and understandable for a three year-old (turning on a light and sounding a 
buzzer). Similarly, ensuring that both the artefact actions received the same level of 
attention regarding time and dexterity (bouncing three times along the top of the box and 
rubbing in three circles in the front of the box). The artefact shapes were distinctly different 
(one cross and one circle), and neither one afforded an action or a function so that each 
information type could be assessed individually at test. 
To address this further, taking inspiration from the fast mapping exposure 
(Experiment 4 & 6), it was essential that each artefact was observed in use. Furthermore, 
that each characteristic feature (shape, action and function) was demonstrated equally and 
simultaneously so there is no methodological bias. Similarly, the experimenter must not 
draw particular attention to any one feature making it more salient, thus reducing 
experimenter bias. Moreover, although every artefact will perform a clear action resulting in 
an obvious function, the artefact shape must not afford its action or function. This enables 
testing to clearly differentiate what purposeful decisions the participants made. The children 
initially observed the experimenter demonstrating an artefact in use (stating its name then 
performing a specific action on the substrate to produce an obvious function). 
Finally, I felt that not naming the original artefact would be biased against an ALA 
approach to categorisation as the nature of the theory is a word learning account. Although, 
Experiment 5 data (Chapter 3) indicated that naming an artefact did not have any effect on 
whether an artefact was fast mapped, and similarly Diesendruck and Bloom, 2003 did not 
 146 
find naming prevented artefact categorisation, I was reluctant to have any methodological 
bias.  
Bloom (2000) discusses how some of the methodologies previously used in the 
exploration of infant categorisation can allow the results to be interpreted to support either 
an ALA or SCA argument. For example, examining language errors: ALA theorists propose 
that these are demonstrative of a word and category learning approach bound primarily to 
shape (historically: Clark, 1973; Behrand, 1988). It is often observed that children will 
inaccurately name an unknown artefact, which shares perceptual properties and shape with 
a familiar artefact, with the wrong label. For example, if a child labels a round candle “ball” 
(Nelson, 1979). Those representing an ALA argument will suggest that this is because they 
are both spherical in shape and as such have extended the label ball onto a similarly shaped 
artefact.  
Bloom (2000) suggests, that the problem when examining children with limited 
vocabularies is that we are not entirely sure what it is they are trying to convey. They could 
simply be production errors (Gelman et al., 1998), it could be interpreted as “this looks like a 
ball’, or a question “is this a ball?” or a statement “this would make a good ball”. As such, 
Bloom does not consider these investigations particularly informative, as the interpretation 
is both broad and subjective.  
To overcome the nature of production issues and interpretation children were tested 
on categorisation comprehension. In a simple yes or no task participants were asked 
whether or not the novel exemplar was a ‘blicket’ or not? It is suggested that comprehension 
tasks are more representative of children’s understanding as it does not require the child to 
produce the name and as such reduces the chance of a production error (Gelman et al., 
1998). 
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Bloom also discusses these interpretive limitations with regards to methodologies 
using pictures or toy representations of artefacts and preferential looking tasks with younger 
participants. Deák, Ray and Pick (2002) suggest that research asking children to sort or label 
static artefacts or pictures of artefacts only tests children’s ability to draw inferences about 
function from static, pictorial representations. Deák and Bauer (1996) also report that pre-
schoolers rely on shape and colour information more for inferences about pictures than they 
do on artefacts. As such, research utilising pictures of artefacts is skewed towards shape. In 
light of this, it was important to ensure the artefacts were “real” rather than pictures, and 
exposure was dynamic. As such we used two of the objects from previous experiments: the 
four-way radiator key and the circular air vent cover. 
Finally, recruiting five different aged groups (three year-olds, five year-olds, seven 
year-olds, 10 and 11 year-olds and adults) tested comprehensively whether or not there was 
a developmental change in the definitive features used in categorisation. Generally speaking, 
it appears to be understood that between the ages of five and seven years of age we start to 
see a greater reliance on functional information and that by 10 and 11 years old we see 
similar responses to that of adults (Hammer, Diesendruck & Catz, 2003). Three year-old 
responses, as mentioned, are currently inconsistent across the literature and as such we feel 
are the most unpredictable at this stage.  
 
This Experiment 
This experiment tested four groups of children (3-year-olds, 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, 
10- and 11-year-olds) and adults in order to examine whether categorisation definitions shift 
focus with age. All participants completed a warm-up session using familiar artefacts in order 
to help clarify the rules. The experimenter demonstrated a brush’s use (action and function), 
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and told the participants that Mr Rabbit liked to collect brushes. If they saw any brushes they 
should place them in Mr Rabbit’s bucket. The experimenter then brought out the remaining 
four familiar artefacts, demonstrated their use, and asked the participants whether or not 
they were brushes, and where they should be put. The experimenter handed the artefact to 
participants for them to make their selection. If any participant had not completed this 
successfully they would have been excluded, however they all did.  
 This process was then repeated with the novel target artefact. It was named and 
children were shown its use twice. The 12 test trials when then presented with 12 further 
items (Table 4.6). These items varied in shape, and in the actions and functions made with 
them.  There are two types of trial: six exclusion trials and six discrimination trials. In half of 
the exclusion trials, the item was an exact match for the target (same shape, same action, 
same function). In the other half the item was completely different (different shape, 
different action, different function). If participants understood the task they should correctly 
‘collect’ all the items that were identical to the target, and reject the items that were 
different. As such these exclusion trials were used to determine whether a participant’s data 
was sufficiently consistent to warrant analysis. The remaining six trials were the 
discrimination trials. These trials used items with different combinations of shape, action and 
function (Table 4.6). Depending on which items participants collected or rejected, these trials 
were used to determine whether participants were categorising by shape, action or function. 
If children categorise using a specific feature, then they will make a within-category 
selection (put in Mr Rabbit’s bucket) when the target and new item are the same for that 
feature, and a between-category selection when the target and new item are different.  So 
for example, if children think that shape defines category membership, then they will think 
that a new item belongs to the same category as the target, when the new item is the same 
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shape as the target. Likewise children will think that a new item belongs to a different 
category to the target, when the new item is a different shape from the target. In contrast, 
children’s categorisations will be unaffected by whether or not the new item and target are 
associated with the same action or function. 
Three alternative patterns of results can be predicted. Firstly an ALA would predict a 
strong shape bias in young children, such as the 3-year-old participants (e.g., Smith et al., 
2002). Whereas, conceptual accounts such as SCA and the Design Stance would suggest that, 
even young children should demonstrate a function bias (Kemler Nelson et al., 1995, Kemler 
Nelson, 1999). Perhaps both theories would predict a more conservative shape and function 
approach at 5 years old and then a functional approach from aged 7 years and upwards.  
Finally, an embodied cognition approach would suggest that the youngest children should 




 In total, data were collected from 24 adults and 127 children. Four groups of children 
participated, 3 year-olds, 5 year-olds, 7 year-olds and 10 and 11 year-olds. (For a detailed 
breakdown of participants please see Table 4.5). All children attended nurseries and schools 
in a greater London borough. As before, head teachers and class teaches gave consent and 
parents were given the chance to ‘opt out’. Adults were recruited from a wide range of 
backgrounds and asked for the necessary consent before beginning. All participants were 







 The study used a within-participants design. Children and adults each completed 12 
trials encompassing all the independent variable conditions manipulating the shape (same / 
different), action (same / different) and function (same / different) of a novel artefact; trial 
order was counterbalanced across participants. The dependent variable was categorization 
consistency. Children make a within category selection when the target and item are the 
same, and a between category selection when the target and item are different. 
Categorisation consistency refers to the regularity with which participants’ select shape, 
action or function matches. 
 
Materials 
 5 familiar artefacts were used: 3 small hairbrushes, a crayon and a pair of child safe 
scissors. In total, 26 novel artefacts were required, 13 examples of two different hand-sized 
novel artefacts- not all of the artefacts would be used for every participant. During the 
Table 4.5: Experiment 9 – Breakdown of Age and Gender of Participants. 
Measure 3 year-olds 5 year-olds 7 year-olds 
10 & 11  
year-olds Adults 
n 48 28 28 23 24 
Mean 
years; months 3; 7 5; 2 7; 4 10; 11 31 
 
Age range 
years; months 3; 0 – 3; 11 5; 0 – 5; 10 7; 1 – 7; 9 10; 0 – 11; 5 19 – 56 
 
Gender (M / F) 18 / 30 13 / 15 14 /14 11 / 12 7 / 17 
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testing phase, 19 artefacts were used per participant; 13 of one shape (seven as 
demonstrations and six during same shape trials) and six of the alternative shape (all during 
different shape trials). The use of these artefacts as the target shape was counterbalanced 
across participants. A ‘function box’ was used as a substrate to generate the appropriate 
functions by operating one of the two secret foot pedals (either turning on a light or making 
a buzzer sound). Additionally we required a large cuddly toy (Mr Rabbit) who liked to collect 
blickets, a bucket for him to collect them in, and a bag for the experimenter to collect the 
non-blickets items in. 
 
Procedure 
 All the children were tested in a familiar environment, in a quiet corner of their 
classroom at school. Adults were also tested in a familiar environment, either in their 
workplace or at home. Each participant took part in a warm-up and testing sessions working 
individually with the experimenter and her helper Mr Rabbit (cuddly toy). Each session lasted 
approximately 10 – 15 minutes. 
During the warm-up session children were introduced to the experimenter (E) and 
her friend Mr Rabbit and were told that Mr Rabbit liked to collect things. They were asked if 
they could help Mr Rabbit find the things he likes to collect. E told the children that Mr 
Rabbit likes to collect brushes and showed the children a small hairbrush with a 
demonstration of how it works (brushing Mr Rabbit’s fur – its action and function). After this 
demonstration, E showed the children the special bucket Mr Rabbit likes to keep his 
collection in, and placed the hairbrush in the collection bucket, out of sight. E then gave the 
children another 4 artefacts in turn, demonstrating their use (action and function), and asked 
the children to put the brushes in the box for Mr Rabbit and anything that wasn’t a brush 
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back in the experimenter’s bag (all out of sight). E noted where the familiar items were 
placed. These items were then removed from the table. If any children could not complete 
this task they would have been excluded from the remaining test, however, all children were 
successful during the warm up session. 
The testing session followed a similar process. The children were told that Mr Rabbit 
also likes to collect blickets. E then showed them a novel artefact saying, “This is a blicket, 
look”. E demonstrated the novel action and function and placed it in the bucket. Selecting 
another blicket, E repeats this for a second time, “Oh, Mr Rabbit does like blickets, look 
again”- once again demonstrating the novel action and function and placing the item in the 
bucket. The participants were then asked to help Mr Rabbit find the rest of the blickets, 
reminding them, “Remember, if it’s a blicket, we put it in the bucket for Mr Rabbit. If it is not, 
then we put it in the bag.” The experimenter then brings out a series of 12 items whose 
shape, action and function may either be the same or different from the original (see Table 
4.6 for trial combinations)  
For each trial, the children watch the demonstration, then are given the item and 
asked “Is this a blicket? Where shall we put it?” Routinely, the original demonstration of the 
blicket is repeated after every few items so as to remind the children what they are looking 
for. For the three, five and seven year-old participants the original demonstration was 
repeated after every two items. For the 10/11 year-old and adult participants the 
demonstration was repeated after 4 items. After each demonstration the experimenter 
reminded participants “This is a blicket, we put it in the bucket”. Both the target artefacts 
and the order of trials were counterbalanced across all the participants. The experimenter 






Initially we examined the three completely identical and three completely opposite 
trials. For each participant we calculated a score out of six. Each participant scored one for 
every time they correctly selected an exact target match (same shape, same action and same 
function) or successfully rejected the completely different artefacts (different shape, 
different action and different function). Participants were permitted to make one error. 
Naturally had participants been focusing on shape, action or function information to make 
their judgements it would follow that three exact matches were blickets and thus included. 
Similarly, they should reject the three opposite artefacts. If any participants scored fewer 
Table 4.6: Experiment 9 – Table Detailing Shape, Action and Functional Similarity of Test Items 
to the Target Artefact. 
Trial Shape Action Function 
1 Same Shape Same Action Same Function 
2 Different Shape Same Action Different Function 
3 Same Shape Different Action Same Function 
4 Different Shape Different Action Different Function 
5 Same Shape Same Action Different Function 
6 Different Shape Different Action Same Function 
7 Same Shape Same Action Same Function 
8 Different Shape Different Action Different Function 
9 Same Shape Different Action Different Function 
10 Same Shape  Same Action Same Function 
11 Different Shape Different Action Different Function 
12 Different Shape Same Action Same Function 
Trials marked in grey are exclusion trials – children were required to make accurate selections on 
these trials to be included for analyses. Trials marked in black are discrimination trials – these 
trials were analysed to establish categorisation consistency. 
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than five out of six, it was concluded that they were not using shape, action or function as 
criteria for categorisation and thus they were excluded from the remaining analysis. 
Following this criteria, 19 3-year-olds, two 5-year-olds, one 7-year-old and one adult were 
excluded from further analysis.  
 For the participants scoring five and above on the analysis of the initial six trials, 
scores were calculated for their shape, action and function responses. Every time a shape-
matching item was put in the bucket, shape identical scored one. Every time the participant 
rejected an item that was a different shape, shape opposite scored a point. This was 
repeated for every information type, for every participant to generate a means score. 
Of the 6 remaining trials we had three shape matches, three action matches and 
three function matches as seen in Table 4.6 (items in grey have already been analysed and 
excluded). Working through an example, for a participant who uses shape to differentiate 
their categories they will place same shape artefacts three, five and nine in the bucket. 
Artefacts two, six and 12, with different shapes, are rejected and placed in the bag. For each 
of the same shape artefacts placed in the bucket, shape identical scores one. If all three 
same shape items are placed in the bucket shape identical (SI) scores a total of three. 
Looking at the remaining items that have been included, as well as just a shape match, there 
is one shape and action match (number five) and one shape and function match (number 
three). As they have both been included as within category items, action identical (AI) scores 
one and function identical (FI) scores one.  
Looking at the artefacts that were rejected we can see we have three that are 
different shapes so shape opposite (SO) scores a total of three. One artefact that’s a 
different shape and different function (number two) so function opposite (FO) scores one 
and one item that is a different shape and different action (number six) so action opposite 
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(AO) also scores one. Total shape (S), action (A) and function (F) scores are then calculated by 
adding identical and opposite results together. A data entry example of a shape-matching 
participant is shown below (Figure 4.1). 
 
 Information type means were then calculated and compared for each age group. For 
either shape, action or function a score of three suggested that children were relying on this 
information type no more often that one would expect by chance. A score of above three for 
any of the information types suggested the group were using that information as criteria for 
categorising. A score of below three might suggest participants were actively avoiding that 
information type. The means for age group and information type are displayed below. By 
examining the means in Figure 4.2, we begin see how each of the age groups categorized the 
novel artefacts. 
At first glance it appears that the 3 year-olds categorised using shape, function 
information scored at chance levels. The five and seven year-olds had a small reliance on 
shape but mainly used function information. The 10 and 11 year-olds and adults did not use 
shape information at all to categorise. Both groups relied solely on function information. 
Despite what we thought we might find based on the previous chapters’ data, none of the 
groups, not even the youngest participants, categorised the novel artefacts based on their 
action. If anything it appears as if all of the age groups ignored action information when 
defining their novel categories. 
 
Figure 4.1: Experiment 9 – Sample of Data Entry for Participant 4. 
ID 
Age in 
Months Sex SI AI FI SO AO FO S A F 
4 39 M 3 1 1 3 1 1 6 2 2 
 156 
 
A 3 (information type: Shape, Action and Function) x 5 (group: 3, 5, 7, 10 – 11 year-olds and 
Adults) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to examine categorisation consistency. 
Analysis yielded a significant main effect for information type,  (2, 123) = 41.736, p < .001. 
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons indicated that all levels were significantly 
different; participants categorised using function more often the shape (p = .008) and action 
(p < .001) and shape more often than action (p < .001). The main effect for group was not 
significant but approaching it, F (4, 123) = 2.228, p = .070. However, the two-
way interaction between information type and group was significant, F (8, 123) = 5.100, p < 
.001.  
Exploring the interaction, further t-tests examined significance across each the 
different conditions and groups. Firstly one-sample t-tests established differences between 
information types from chance (with chance set at 3). On the whole, both shape and 






















Figure 4.2: Experiment 9 – Graph to Show Information Type Means Scored Across Age Groups. 
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chance performance: Shape (M = 3.45, SD = 1.711), t (127) = 2.997, p = .003 and Function (M 
= 4.20, SD = 1.740), t (127) = 7.821, p < .001. Perhaps most surprisingly, action results show 
participants used action information to categorise significantly less often than one would 
expect to see by chance (M = 2.35, SD = 0.716), t (127) = -10.240, p < .001.  
 
 
One-sample t-tests also examined which information types were used significantly 
most often for each age group. From Table 4.7 we can confirm estimations made when 
examining the means. This data demonstrate that children from 5 years old to adults 
successfully use function information to categorise novel artefacts. 3-year-old participants 











10 & 11 
year-olds Adults 
Shape 
n 29 26 27 23 23 
Mean 4.31 3.38 3.63 2.78 2.91 
Std. Dev. 1.63 1.94 1.78 1.48 1.24 
t-test 4.335** 1.011 1.839 -0.706 -0.336 
Action 
n 29 26 27 23 23 
Mean 2.55 2.00 2.26 2.17 2.78 
Std. Dev. 0.91 0.00+ 0.53 0.65 0.85 
t-test -2.654*  -  -7.322** -6.092** -1.226 
Function 
n 29 26 27 23 23 
Mean 3.00 4.35 4.22 5.13 4.61 
Std. Dev. 1.46 1.98 1.72 1.486 1.27 
t-test 0.000 3.469* 3.698** 6.874** 6.075** 
One sample t-test results when chance is set at 3 
* p < .05, ** p ≤ .001, + t-test cannot be computed when St. Dev. is 0 
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categorised using shape information. Interestingly, no groups relied on action information 
when categorising the novel artefacts.   
These data support a developmental strengthening of functional understanding, this 
is reinforced by a positive correlation in the children’s data between age in months and 
function means r = 0.411, p < .001 suggesting that as children get older they are more likely 
to categorise using functional information. Conversely, there was also a negative correlation 
between age in month and shape means (r = -0.021, p < .05) and age in months and action 
means (r = -0.215, p < .05). Naturally as children tend to rely on function information more 




 This experiment aimed to provide an unbiased insight into the development of novel 
artefact categorisation for children aged 3-years-old and upward. Congruent with the 
literature, I directly compared information types of artefact shape and function but further 
added the component of artefact action to examine whether this would account for the 
discrepancies in previous research results. Moreover, studying such a broad age range 
allowed insight to any developmental patterns. Previous studies have focused on smaller age 
ranges; 3-year-olds (Smith, Jones & Landau, 1996), 3- to 6-year-olds (Kemler Nelson et al., 
1995), 4- and 5-year-olds and adults (Diesendruck, Hammer & Catz, 2003), 4-year-olds, 6-
year-olds and adults (Defeyter, Hearing & German, 2009).   
Initially examining the role of action, both children and adults ignored action 
information when categorising novel artefacts (rejecting an embodied cognition approach to 
categorisation for these age groups). This is a little surprising considering the apparent 
advantage within the fast mapping results of the previous chapter. As you can see for the 3-, 
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7- and 10/11 year-old participants, action information was used to categorise information 
less often than you would expect to see from chance performance. Within the 5 year-old 
children, not a single participant favoured action information and as such returned a 
standard deviation of 0 meaning a t-test result couldn’t be calculated. Adults’ action results 
were non-significant, any action preference or avoidance was simply by chance.  
Perhaps participants did not categorise by action because they were already too old, 
and had already outgrown this approach to categorisation. Certainly from a historic, 
Piagetian account, children outgrow this initial sensorimotor stage at approximately 2-years-
old. Perone et al. (2008) saw action information effecting 6 – 7 month old infants 
understanding of artefacts.  Perhaps categorisation of artefacts by action is something that 
only happens in early infancy. 
 When examining the results for each age group we can see a clear developmental 
shift in information preference, from focusing on shape to focusing on function. A general 
consensus across theoretical approaches suggests that children’s conceptual understanding 
develops and strengthens between five and seven years of age (Defeyter & German, 2003). 
Furthermore, that this conceptual understanding allows adults to categorise novel artefacts 
using functional information (Diesendruck, Hammer & Catz, 2003). This is corroborated by 
these data, which showed a positive correlation between the use of functional information 
to categorise and age in months (and conversely a negative correlation regarding shape 
information).  
However, 3-year-old children did NOT use functional information to categorise 
artefacts, instead relying on shape information (conflicting with a SCA of categorisation). This 
is consistent with many other shape versus function forced choice tasks. For example, Deák, 
Ray and Pick (2002) took a different, perhaps slightly more ecologically valid approach, to 
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studying thus. Using a traditional forced choice methodology they used unusual but genuine 
artefacts. For example, a metal flour shifter, a metal beer jug, (same shape but different 
function) and a ricer/sifter (same function, different shape). Naturally, this meant that these 
artefacts were specifically designed for their purpose and as such did afford their function. 
Through a series of three experiments Deák, Ray & Pick (2002) manipulated the salience and 
instruction of function. Four year-olds without instruction would categorise by shape, 
however if a function rule was demonstrated they would happily switch their focus and 
attend to function. However 3-year-olds, even with reminders regarding function on every 
trial would still categorise shape first. As these and my data suggest, we are still clearly 
finding evidence of a shape bias in 3-year-olds as predicted by an ALA. However, what we 
cannot be sure of from one experiment is why? 
 A large number of 3 year-old participants were excluded (n = 19) for failing to 
demonstrate any obvious pattern of response. For example, had the children only excluded 
the three completely mismatching artefacts (different shape, different action and different 
function) and placed the other nine artefacts in the bucket then they could have been 
described as having a very liberal approach to categorising. Conversely had they only 
included the three items that perfectly matched the target (same shape, same action and 
same function) then they could have been described as very conservative. Either way 
children following this pattern of response would have scored 6/6 in the first analysis as 
having accepted the three exact matches and rejected the three opposites.  
 Seeing this number of children excluded perhaps suggests that the task was too 
complex and that the younger participants simply did not understand what was being asked 
of them. However, all children were successful with the familiar artefacts in the warm-up 
session. Furthermore, for some 3-year-olds this simply wasn’t the case. 29 children did 
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manage to understand the task and of those 29, 22 children scored a perfect 6/6 and with no 
errors, obviously demonstrated a discernible pattern of response (namely a shape bias). 
However, 16 of the 19 excluded 3-year-olds demonstrated an inclusion bias whereby they 
placed 10 or more items in the bucket. Perhaps these 16 were using different information to 
categorise the artefacts. One possible explanation for these responses is that children saw all 
the artefacts acted upon the same substrate. 
 During the procedure all the artefacts interacted with the same ‘function box’. When 
the artefact acted upon it, it either turned on a light or a buzzer. During the design stage I 
felt that this was acceptable as both were very distinctive functions. Previous methodological 
concerns have been that function had to be inferred, or that the function presented was not 
a real function (e.g. simply placing an item into a container- thus not achieving any real goal 
or substrate change). This was not the case here as both functions were realistic and 
separate. Moreover, during the warm up session, children saw two familiar artefacts both 
acting upon the same substrate. Participants saw both a crayon drawing on the paper and 
the scissors cutting it. I felt that this would demonstrate that two artefacts acting upon the 
same substrate was not unusual.  
 However, despite best efforts to cue the understanding of performing two functions 
on the same substrate, and the two functional outcomes being distinctly different, perhaps 
these 16 children included all of the items as within category exemplars as they all acted 
upon the same substrate. As a substrate is key to artefact function, perhaps this 




4.4 General Discussion 
  
Experiment 8 showed that in referent selection tests, requiring understanding of mutual 
exclusivity, 3- and 4-years-olds treated name, action and function equally. When children 
were faced with novel information and a familiar and novel artefact, children choose the 
novel artefact as the novel referent. I was able to reject a simple novelty bias as children in 
the familiar condition, when faced with the familiar name, action or function attributed to 
that artefact, rejected the novel referent. Thus while children understand that an artefact 
should not have two names, they will also only attribute one action and one function to an 
artefact. It appears that children understand that an artefact has a specific name, action and 
function, that these are all characteristic features of an artefact. 
 From here Experiment 9 examined which of these features children would identify as 
the definitive feature in a categorisation task. In a forced choice test – varying shape, action 
and function – children were asked which test item matched the novel target artefact. 
Despite the apparent advantage for action learning presented in the fast mapping data, I 
found no indication that children use action information to categorise novel artefacts. My 
results indicated that 3-year-olds typically categorised the artefacts based on their shape 
whereas children aged 5 to 11 years old (and adults) all categorised artefacts by their 
function.  
It is possible that what we are seeing is not a developmental shift from shape to 
function categorisation, but a more subtle, strengthening of understanding. Ultimately, it’s 
not that children think more about function as they get older; it’s that the way in which they 
think about function changes. Consistent with this, research by Defeyter, Hearing and 
German (2009) established that children aged four to six describe an artefact’s function 
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differently to the way they name it and categorise it. This is important to recognise that the 
way children think about their artefact function knowledge may be applied differently in 
different tasks (Defeyter et al. 2009). Children were shown line drawings of two artefacts and 
told that “Jack made it for carrying goldfish” but “Sally uses it for carrying bottles”. In the 
first experiment children were asked what the item was for; or in other words what was the 
artefact’s function? Children were equally likely to select either the designer’s intended 
function or the current use function. As the object afforded either use, participants selected 
artefact use at random. In the second experiment children were shown the same artefact 
with the same description but asked what it was; in other words what is the artefact’s name? 
Children regularly labelled the object using the designer’s intentions – fish carrier.  
Defeyter et al. (2009) state that “the results point to a dramatic dissociation between 
function judgement and categorisation” (p. 263). Information about an artefact’s designer 
was used when naming the artefact, but not when asked to make a functional decision about 
what it was for. In my research, what 3-year-olds may understand about artefacts having 
specific functions may be useful in a mutual exclusivity, referent selection task (Experiment 
8), but not utilised in a categorisation task (Experiment 9). Although children understand 
something about artefact function, this has not yet been assimilated for use across all 
tasks/domains.  
Recognising that function knowledge may not be utilised across all tasks highlights 
the complexities of function. As previously noted, function on the whole is largely 
conceptual; although we can observe an artefact in use and infer a function occurring, we 
have to understand a great deal to separate the function knowledge from an artefact 
demonstration. As adults we often understand a designer’s intention and object affordances 
in line with laws of mechanics or other scientific knowledge. When faced with a simple 
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artefact, we can often use this knowledge to make sense of an artefact’s function. Yet, as 
adults, we also use plenty of artefacts whose workings we do not understand (e.g., a smart 
phone), while still understanding their function(s) and being able to use them.  
How can young children, with their limited understanding of the physical world, begin 
to make these links between intended design and mechanics, between form and function?  
Many of these questions are unanswerable with such limited research data but important to 
be considered. The embodied cognition approach suggests that children learn about the 
world through their interactions with it. Can these interactions begin to teach infants about 
basic mechanics, affordances and in turn function? For example toys that involve hitting 
something with a hammer may teach children about hammers needing a handle to hold and 
a flat head to make contact with other objects. Once the hammer hits it normally causes 
something, a part on the toy, to hide or make a sound thus creating substrate change. 
Certainly a shape-as-cue account of learning suggests that we understand the affordances of 
artefact perceptual features from a young age, but do not necessarily detail how we come to 
learn this information in the first place.  
In summary, following referent selection tasks I observed 3-year-old children 
demonstrate mutually exclusive behaviour towards artefact name, action and function 
information. It appears that children aged three-years-old understand an artefact to have a 
specific name, action and function. Moreover, that these features are considered 
characteristic of the artefact category, thus relevant to all category exemplars. However, 
when placed in direct conflict to test which is considered the defining feature I found 3-year-
olds demonstrated a shape bias, whereas children aged 5- to 11-years-old categorised more 













5.1 Summary of the Present Findings 
 
This thesis has investigated young children’s ability to learn the names, actions, and 
functions associated with artefacts. Chapter 2 investigated referent selection and fast 
mapping of artefact names and actions. Chapter 3 focused on learning of artefact 
information in a real world context, developing a fast mapping approach to learning artefact 
names, actions and functions. Chapter 4 investigated what children understand about these 
information types with regards to their contribution to artefact categories.  
 
Experiment 1 
 It has been widely documented that children will not attach a novel name to a 
previously named category (e.g., Markman, 1990; Golinkoff, Mervis & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994). 
Experiment 1 used a referent selection to task to investigate this phenomenon, directly 
comparing artefact names with artefact actions. Four and 5-year-old children were 
presented with a novel and a familiar artefact and asked either “Pass me the koba” or to 
“Pass me the one we do this with [pantomiming novel action]”. The majority of participants 
selected the novel artefact in both naming and action conditions. As no significant difference 
was found between the two conditions, these data suggest that children are equally likely to 
use a novel action to select a novel artefact as they are a novel name. 
The principle of not attaching two names to one artefact is often referred to as 
mutual exclusivity (Markman, 1990). Previously, no one had tested whether mutual 
exclusivity is applied to actions in a referent selection task. Results from Experiment 1 
suggest that, in a referent selection task, if one already knows the action associated with the 
familiar artefact then, the novel action must belong to the novel artefact. Unfortunately, 
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from these data alone I could not conclude that mutual exclusivity is applied to actions. I did 
not compare children’s reaction to familiar names and actions, as such I could not exclude 
the possibility that children simply prefer novel artefacts (this possibility was tested in 
Experiment 8). 
 
Experiments 2 and 3 
Following the original methodology of Carey and Bartlett (1978), I defined fast 
mapping as having three essential features: it involves incidental learning through minimal 
exposure, and leads to long-term retention. Using these criteria, I developed a fast mapping 
methodology to directly compare novel artefact name and action learning. In Experiment 2, 
following a brief, incidental exposure, participants were tested after a 5 to 7 day delay on 
name or action comprehension using an extension task.  This task tested whether they would 
select an item that was the same shape, but different size and colour from the target). The 
majority of children did select the shape-matched item. These data demonstrated that not 
only can young children fast map novel actions, but also they can extend this information 
onto new exemplars of the target artefact’s category after a long-term delay. 
Experiment 3 examined the specificity of the action mapping to see whether children 
had correctly retained the exact action demonstrated at exposure. Children were allocated 
to either the novel action or second novel action condition; the exposure session was the 
same as Experiment 2, but at test children in the second action condition were shown a 
different novel action. Children in the novel action condition replicated the results of 
Experiment 2, correctly selecting the target artefact. In the second novel action condition the 
majority rejected the target, selecting an alternative item as the referent for the second 
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novel action. These data suggest that children are retaining an accurate sensorimotor 
representation of the novel action. 
As there has been no stringent examination of artefact action fast mapping, these 
data are novel. I have found that children aged 3-years-old, following brief, incidental 
exposure, can retain novel artefact-action mappings up to seven days later. Moreover, there 
was no significant difference between my novel action and novel name condition suggesting 




Experiment 4 developed a new fast mapping methodology, one in which a novel 
artefact use was demonstrated, in order to test learning of artefact name, action and 
function. Children completed a comprehension test either after a short distracter task in 
(immediate condition), or after 6 to 7 days (delay condition). In the naming condition they 
were asked, “Which one is the koba?”; in the action condition, “Which one do we do this 
with?” (pantomiming the novel action); and in the function condition they were asked, 
“Which one starts the music playing?” Results showed children successfully retained the 
artefact-name, artefact-action and artefact-function mapping after a one-week delay with no 
significant differences between conditions.  
As with Experiments 1 to 3, no one has previously tested children’s artefact learning 
using a stringent fast mapping approach. Results suggest that children are equally able to 
learn an artefact’s function, after a brief incidental exposure, as they are name and action. 
Given that function knowledge must be inferred from the overall demonstration rather than 
directly observed (as with name and action), children’s ability to recall a fast mapped 
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function is impressive. These data suggest that children are excellent learners of all 
knowledge needed for artefact use (name, action and function), and provide the most 
convincing evidence to date that children can fast map this information. 
 
Experiments 5 and 6 
With the results from Experiment 4 ‘at ceiling‘, I needed some poor performance in 
order to dissociate artefact name, action and function learning. Experiment 5 sought such 
poor performance, and focused on children’s learning of function in the long term with two 
manipulations in: the number of demonstrations during the exposure session (one versus 
two); and the verbal labelling of the target artefact (labelling versus not labelling). Despite 
the more challenging exposure conditions, children were still able to retain the artefact-
function mapping at levels significantly above chance. However, analysis demonstrated that 
retention was poorer with a single demonstration (as opposed to two), but was unaffected 
by whether or not the target was labelled. This information was used to design a more 
challenging test of fast mapping for the next experiment. 
The procedure for Experiment 6 replicated Experiment 4, except children only 
observed one demonstration at exposure. To further test the methodology and findings, 
different materials were included to see if the results were generalisable to a different 
substrate, producing a different function (i.e., playing music versus opening a drawer). 
Children performed name, action or function comprehension tests after a 6 to 7 day delay. 
Results showed that only the artefact-action mapping was retained at levels above chance. 
No significant differences were found between the two different substrates: this suggests 
that findings may be generalisable across a range of functions. These data indicate that that 
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Experiment 7 also utilised the methodology from Experiment 4, this time additionally 
comparing name and action production. As with previous experiments, no significant 
differences were found between immediate and delay conditions. Comprehension data 
replicated previous results (Experiments 2 to 4) with children consistently selecting the 
target artefact at ceiling levels, with no significant differences between name and action 
learning. However, a substantial difference was found between naming and action 
production even in the immediate condition. Only three children (19%) managed to 
reproduce the novel artefact’s name in the immediate condition and none after a delay. 
Conversely, 75% produced the action after a one week delay. Following fast mapping 
exposure there was a distinct advantage for action production over name production, 
congruent with, but more striking than, previous production comparisons (e.g. Hahn & 
Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010).  
 
Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 examined two questions, firstly do children have a novelty bias or are 
they using the principle of mutual exclusivity in referent selection tasks with artefacts? 
Secondly, do children treat artefact names, actions and functions as characteristic features of 
artefact kinds? Improving on the procedure in Experiment 1, children were tested on both 
their response to familiar and novel artefact information. Results showed children displayed 
mutually exclusive behaviour with both familiar and unfamiliar information of all three types. 
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I was able to rule out a novelty bias, as children rejected the novel item when faced with 
familiar information. Furthermore, I concluded that 3-years-olds understand artefacts to be 
associated with a specific, name, action and function. The fact that children failed to attach a 
second action or function to a familiar artefact would suggest that, like name, children see 
these features as characteristic of that artefact. 
 
Experiment 9 
Experiment 9 aimed to investigate whether children will treat, shape, action or 
function as the defining feature of an artefact category. Although each may be characteristic 
of a category, which one is necessary to define category? No one had previously investigated 
action in the categorisation literature. Following results from Experiments 6 and 7, I wanted 
to examine whether, as action is best retained when learning about artefacts, would it 
continue to be regarded as the most important feature when young children categorise 
artefacts. Furthermore, I tested five different age groups in order to investigate the 
development of artefact categorisation. 
Children were shown an artefact in use (with a distinctive shape, action and function) 
and told its name, ‘blicket’. Participants, children (aged 3- to 11-years-old) and adults, were 
shown a series of items (varying in shape, action and function) and asked to decide whether 
or not they were also blickets.  Three-year-olds tended to categorise artefacts based on 
shape; children from ages 5 years to adults relied more on function when categorising. 





5.2 Implications And Contributions To The Literature 
 
5.2.1 Fast Mapping of Artefact Information 
I think that the fast mapping data presented in this thesis have contributed to the 
existing literature. Firstly, congruent with findings in Holland, Simpson and Riggs (2015), in 
my thesis I consistently applied three criteria, following the original fast mapping procedure 
of Carey and Bartlett (1978): incidental learning; minimal exposure to the novel information; 
and a demonstration of retention after a long-term delay. Reviewing other ‘fast-mapping’ 
research it is clear how few of them actually follow the procedure of Carey and Bartlett 
(notable examples include: Deák & Toney, 2013; Waxman & Booth, 2000; Jaswal & 
Markman, 2001; Spiegel & Halberda, 2011). Methodologies utilising overt exposure 
(Waxman & Booth, 2000) or explicit teaching (Deák & Toney, 2013) do not demonstrate fast 
mapping, just learning. While studies that do not require long-term retention (Jaswal and 
Markman, 2001: Spiegel & Halberda, 2011), do not demonstrate learning at all. In 
consequence, few studies that have truly investigated fast mapping (e.g., Vlach & Sandhofer, 
2012; Holland, Simpson & Riggs, 2015), and none of these have investigated fast mapping of 
the actions or functions associated with artefacts.  
Although there have been no previous fast mapping studies investigating artefact 
action and function learning, there have been a few articles that indicate rapid learning of 
these artefact features (Childers & Tomasello, 2002, 2003; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; 
Casler & Kelemen, 2005). Data from Experiments 2 – 7 indicated that 3-year-olds were able 
to successfully retain novel artefact-name, artefact-action and artefact-function mapping for 
one week, following a brief, incidental exposure. As such, I believe that this research is an 
important contribution to the literature. It extends the work of Childers and Tomasello 
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(2002, 2003), Hahn and Gershkoff-Stowe (2010) and Casler and Kelemen (2005) to show just 
how able children are, when learning artefact information needed for use. Moreover, it 
demonstrates children are able to fast map more than just novel artefact names. 
There has been some disagreement about whether fast mapping is a learning process 
specific to the acquisition of words (Waxman & Booth, 2000) or a more domain general 
learning process (Bloom & Markson, 2001). Previous research claimed to look at whether 
children can fast map facts about novel artefacts in direct comparison to fast mapping of 
artefact names (Waxman & Booth, 2000; Deák & Toney, 2013) however, neither of these 
studies meet my stringent fast mapping criteria. However, I suggest, in line with Childers and 
Tomasello (2002, 2003) that acquisition of facts is not the best test for whether a fast 
mapping approach is useful for more general learning.  
Childers and Tomasello (2002, 2003) suggest that the most natural non-verbal 
information child learn about an artefact is its action. Therefore they suggest testing fast 
mapping of action (and function) in direct comparison with artefact names offers the best 
test of the language-specificity of fast mapping. Using comprehension tests (Experiments 2 – 
4), I directly compared the fast mapping of a novel artefact’s name, action and function.  
Children did not display any advantage in fast mapping the name over action or function. As 
there were no significant differences between these types of information, I conclude that 
fast mapping is a domain-general learning process (although not everything is fast mapped – 
Holland, Simpson & Riggs, 2015; Riggs et al., 2015).  However, under more challenging 
learning conditions I did observe a dissociation in the fast mapping of name, action and 
function. Experiment 6 reduced the number of demonstrations of artefact information from 
two to one. Under these maximally stringent conditions, children only retained action 
information (name and function retention did not exceed chance). In addition to this, in 
 174 
Experiment 7, when examining the production of name and action, children were only able 
to produce actions but not names. Thus I found that children learnt action best, not names 
(or functions).  
Although Experiment 7 findings are congruent with previous name and action 
production research (Childers & Tomasello, 2002; Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010) none had 
found such a large disparity between action and name production. I suggest that as previous 
research did not employ a stringent fast mapping methodology, their production results for 
words were improved through procedural memory supports such as repeated, ostensive 
naming.  The harder the memory test, the more actions seem to stand out.  This distinct 
advantage for action production is consistent with the proposal that seeing an action is like 
making an action (Simpson et al., 2013; Iacoboni et al., 1999). Thus when children observed 
the experimenter produce an action with the target artefact, this may have led to the 
creation of an output motor representation of that action.  This motor representation can 
them be used by children in the action production task.  If the same process does not occur 
with words (Simpson & Carroll, 2014), then a motor representation will not be available for 
the word production task. 
Experiments 6 and 7 data also support an embodied cognition approach to learning 
about the world. Various researchers believe that children learn about artefacts through 
their physical interaction with them (Hahn & Gershkoff-Stowe, 2010; Perone, Madole, Ross-
Sheehy, Carey & Oakes, 2008; Boncoddo, Dixon & Kelley, 2010). Action information is learnt 
before conceptual information.  Although more research would be needed to investigate 
this, the fact that children were able to retain novel action information with greater accuracy 
than name or function information certainly supports a view of learning via action.  
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Regarding what information children will fast map, Childers and Tomasello (2002) 
suggest that children will rapidly learn information that is socially transmitted rather than 
stored in the world. They also state that “…fast mapping is not a process specific to language 
but is a process reserved for any information that will not be perceptually available at a later 
time” (Childers & Tomasello, 2002; p. 975). Childers and Tomasello (2002) and Riggs, Mather, 
Simpson and Hyde (2015) suggest that children will fast map and extend information that is 
relevant across category members. My data (Experiments 2 - 4) support both of these 
notions.  
Children have consistently fast mapped artefacts’ name, action and function 
demonstrating long-term retention. This information is relayed to children via observational 
learning, once the demonstration of name, action and function are complete there is no way 
of children reviewing this information unless someone repeats the demonstration. Moreover 
an artefact’s name, action and function are consistent across category members. These data 
support these pragmatic explanations for fast mapping – children will fast map information 
that they can only observe infrequently and is relevant to more than one artefact.  
 Overall the fast mapping data in this thesis adds a great deal to the existing literature. 
Firstly, I suggest it is essential to be clear what conditions are necessary for learning to 
constitute fast mapping. Secondly, that fast mapping is not exclusive to word learning. It 
appears children will learn information that is not stored in the world (not visually based) 
and that are relevant across artefact categories. This includes a novel artefact’s name, action 
and function. Finally, when faced with the most challenging learning environments, it 




5.2.2 Mutual Exclusivity and Artefact Categorisation 
The demonstration of mutually exclusive behaviour with artefact names is well 
established in the literature, although researchers offer different explanations for the 
behaviour (Heibeck & Markman, 1987; Markman & Wachtel, 1998; Golinkoff, Mervis & 
Hirsch-Pasek, 1994; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). In contrast, much less research has 
investigated the mutual exclusivity with artefact actions and artefact functions (Birch, 
Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Casler, 2014 – but not using referent selection task). In Experiment 
8 I used a referent selection task to directly compare mutual exclusivity with artefact name, 
action and function and disprove the possibility of a novelty bias. I found that 3-year-old 
children demonstrated mutually exclusive behaviour regarding all information types. This 
suggests that children understand artefacts to be associated with a specific name, a specific 
action and a specific function.  
No one had previously examined whether mutual exclusivity is applied to function 
using a referent selection task. However, my results contradict studies, which suggested that 
children do not apply the mutual exclusivity principle to function (Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 
2008; Casler 2014). However the tasks used in the previous research were much more 
complex. I suggest that the simplicity of the referent selection tasks makes it ideal for 
investigating mutual exclusivity. 
 Experiment 9 extended previous categorisation literature (e.g., Smith, Jones and 
Landau, 1996; Kemler Nelson 1999). This literature suggests that adults categorise novel 
artefacts by their functions (e.g., Diesendruck, Hammer & Catz, 2003). What is still in 
contention is how children categorise novel artefacts, and at what age their categorisation 
and understanding of artefacts becomes adult-like (Cantrell & Smith, 2013; Booth, 2014; 
Kelemen, Seston and Saint Georges, 2012). The literature suggests that young children are 
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susceptible to a shape bias (Gentner, 1978; Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988). As discussed in 
Chapter 1 (sections 1.5.3 – 1.5.5 inclusively) there are two main schools of thought which try 
to explain this bias. The Attentional Learning Account (ALA) suggests that children attend to 
an artefact’s shape as it cues artefact names, and therefore artefact categories (Smith et al., 
2002). The Shape-as-Cue Account (SCA) suggests that children attend to shape, but that they 
do so not because it cues the artefact’s name, but because it cues the artefact’s function 
(Bloom, 2000).  Thus according to SCA even young children categorise artefacts by function. 
 Experiment 9 aimed to investigate artefact categorisation for children aged 3-years-
old to adult. Following the retention advantage for artefact action, I wanted to investigate 
whether it would continue to be regarded as the most important feature when young 
children categorise artefacts. Results suggest that 3-year-olds categorise artefacts by shape, 
while children aged five to 11 years and adults categorise using function. None of the age 
groups tested seemed to define artefact categories using action information. Thus, despite 
evidence that young children learn about an artefact’s action first (Experiments 6 and 7), 
action was not used as a defining feature in artefact categorisation.  After one experiment I 
am reluctant to state whether I support ALA or SCA. However, my youngest children did 
attend to shape over function. One would imagine that ALA researchers would claim that 
this is because they attend to shape as cue for an artefact’s name and category. These 
children seemed not to use function, even though this information was clearly provided, and 
older children did make use of it.  Nevertheless I would wish to replicate these findings with 
different functions, and using different tests of categorisation, before drawing firm 
conclusions. 
Overall, the mutual exclusivity research reported here suggests that children aged 
three years understand an artefact to have a specific name, specific action and specific 
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function. As such they will not attach novel information to familiar referents for which this 
information is already known. The categorisation research suggests that 3-year-olds do not 
yet categorise artefacts in an adult-like fashion. The youngest children in this experiment 
used shape as the defining feature for categorising novel artefacts; older children and adults 
use function, and no age group uses action. 
 
 
5.3 The Future of Research Into the Fast Mapping and Categorisation of Artefact 
Knowledge 
 
 All of the evidence provided in this thesis suggests children are excellent learners of 
artefact knowledge for use. However, as very little research has been done in this area, 
beyond my own, there is still plenty to investigate, and findings always need to be replicated. 
With inconsistent retention results among previous fast mapping literature (Horst & 
Samuelson, 2008; Vlach & Sandhofer 2012), it is vital to replicate results shown here. Such 
follow-up research may also help to clarify inconsistencies in previous research.  Regarding 
future replication, it would also be beneficial to establish whether these findings are 
generalisable to other artefacts, actions, substrates and functions. As was briefly touched 
upon in Experiment 6, it appears that my fast mapping data were the same using two 
different functions and substrates.  
 With ceiling results in Experiment 4 – good comprehension of artefact-name,   -action 
and -function mappings after a week – it would be interesting to investigate the fidelity and 
extent of these artefact mappings further. Firstly, by checking that artefact-information 
mappings are still recalled after a one-month delay (as in Carey & Bartlett, 1978, and Heibeck 
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and Markman, 1987) as this has not been replicated in more recent research (e.g., with 
words in Vlach & Sandhofer, 2012). Moreover, will good comprehension also be observed 
with younger participants? A similar test with 2-year-olds may reveal when these fast 
mapping abilities develop. With the results from Experiments 6 and 7 revealing an advantage 
for learning artefact action, would we find that younger participants fast map novel artefact 
action more easily than its name or function? 
In Experiment 7, the name production results were strikingly poor. Within the 
current methodology children in the immediate condition were tested after a short 
distracter task (approximately two – three minutes after exposure). Even after this very short 
delay only 3 of 16 children reproduced the artefact’s name. It would be worth repeating the 
procedure and testing immediately after exposure to see whether we find children are able 
to produce the name just after hearing it.  If not it would suggest that their problem is with 
encoding rather than memory. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it would be beneficial to clarify whether fast mapping of 
function is also extendable and specific. This may be useful in helping to resolve 
discrepancies between my own mutual exclusivity of function findings with those of Casler 
(2014) and Birch et al. (2008). Both of these articles report complex methods that resulted in 
no mutual exclusivity of function. Potentially, one could run a version of the procedure 
outlined in Experiment 4, but test artefact function extension and specificity (as I did for 
action information in Experiments 2 and 3). Will children reject the target, and instead select 
a different novel artefact for the second novel function as they did with function?  
Experiment 9 results suggested that 3-year-olds defined novel artefact categories by 
their shape. However 19 participants had to be excluded from the analysis for various 
reasons (e.g., they accepted test items that were completely different from the target 
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artefact). I suggested that some of these children may have been unduly attending to the 
substrate in the task.  Even the test items that were completely different from the target still 
acted on the same substrate as the target. As such, it would be interesting to run a similar 
study where the different artefacts acted upon different substrates to remove this possible 
bias. Moreover, in a bid to clarify whether young children will define artefact categories 
according to an ALA or a SCA, it would be interesting to perform a study using carefully 
designed novel artefacts that afford their plausible function – closer to real world artefacts 
and judgements. Hopefully a clear, unbiased study (avoiding pitfalls of previous research) 






The data from this thesis indicate that that by three years of age, children have an 
understanding that each artefact category is associated with a specific name, specific action 
and specific function. Young children will fast map this socially transmitted, category relevant 
information after brief, incidental exposure, and can retain these artefact mappings when 
tested after a one-week delay. Young children appear to be particularly effective learning of 
the actions made with artefacts.  However, despite these impressive (potentially adult-like) 
learning abilities, young children do not appear to take an adult-like approach to categorising 
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